Files
punktfunk/clients/apple/Sources/PunktfunkKit/ClientTLS.swift
T
enricobuehler ecbbff5544
apple / swift (push) Successful in 1m5s
audit / cargo-audit (push) Successful in 1m19s
android / android (push) Successful in 4m21s
ci / web (push) Successful in 58s
ci / docs-site (push) Successful in 58s
ci / rust (push) Successful in 8m40s
release / apple (push) Successful in 9m10s
ci / bench (push) Successful in 4m39s
decky / build-publish (push) Successful in 14s
docker / build-push (--build-arg FEDORA_VERSION=44, ci, ci/fedora-rpm.Dockerfile, punktfunk-fedora44-rpm) (push) Successful in 6s
docker / build-push (., web/Dockerfile, punktfunk-web) (push) Successful in 29s
docker / build-push (ci, ci/fedora-rpm.Dockerfile, punktfunk-fedora-rpm) (push) Successful in 4s
docker / build-push (ci, ci/rust-ci.Dockerfile, punktfunk-rust-ci) (push) Successful in 5s
docker / build-push (docs-site, docs-site/Dockerfile, punktfunk-docs) (push) Successful in 5s
deb / build-publish (push) Successful in 3m50s
apple / screenshots (push) Successful in 5m38s
flatpak / build-publish (push) Successful in 4m12s
windows-host / package (push) Successful in 19m17s
windows-msix / package (arm64, C:\Users\Public\ffmpeg-arm64, aarch64-pc-windows-msvc, C:\t-a64) (push) Successful in 2m15s
rpm / build-publish (bazzite, punktfunk-fedora-rpm) (push) Successful in 9m5s
docker / deploy-docs (push) Successful in 18s
windows-msix / package (x64, C:\Users\Public\ffmpeg, x86_64-pc-windows-msvc, C:\t) (push) Successful in 2m1s
rpm / build-publish (fedora-44, punktfunk-fedora44-rpm) (push) Successful in 8m53s
windows / build (aarch64-pc-windows-msvc) (push) Successful in 3m24s
windows / build (x86_64-pc-windows-msvc) (push) Successful in 3m30s
feat(apple): gamepad ui
2026-07-01 15:14:19 +02:00

196 lines
9.3 KiB
Swift

// mTLS for the management REST API. The host now serves the API over HTTPS and authorizes a
// request whose client certificate is in its paired store (host commit b4a85a8) the SAME
// identity + trust the QUIC data plane uses so a paired client needs no bearer token.
//
// To present that identity, URLSession needs a SecIdentity (cert + private key pair). The client
// stores its identity as PEM (rcgen ECDSA P-256, PKCS#8 key). We rebuild a SecIdentity natively:
// CryptoKit parses the key its X9.63 form a SecKey, the cert PEM a SecCertificate. From
// there the two platform families diverge because `SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate` the
// straight-line "pair these two" API is macOS-only:
// - macOS: SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate does the pairing directly once the key is in the
// Keychain (a plain `SecItemAdd`).
// - iOS/tvOS: that API is unavailable. Instead, add BOTH the key and the certificate to the
// Keychain (under the same application tag) and query `kSecClassIdentity` the system
// correlates a stored cert against a stored key with a matching public key and vends the pair
// as one `SecIdentity`, no PKCS#12 needed. This is the standard non-macOS technique for
// "I already have a raw cert + key, not a .p12".
import CryptoKit
import Foundation
import Security
import os
private let tlsLog = Logger(subsystem: "io.unom.punktfunk", category: "library-tls")
enum ClientTLS {
enum TLSError: LocalizedError {
case badKey(String)
case badCert
case identity(String)
var errorDescription: String? {
switch self {
case .badKey(let why): return "Couldn't load the client key: \(why)"
case .badCert: return "Couldn't load the client certificate."
case .identity(let why): return "Couldn't build the client identity: \(why)"
}
}
}
/// First PEM block of `type` ("CERTIFICATE" / "PRIVATE KEY") its DER bytes.
private static func derFromPEM(_ pem: String, type: String) -> Data? {
guard let start = pem.range(of: "-----BEGIN \(type)-----"),
let end = pem.range(of: "-----END \(type)-----", range: start.upperBound..<pem.endIndex)
else { return nil }
let b64 = pem[start.upperBound..<end.lowerBound]
.components(separatedBy: .whitespacesAndNewlines).joined()
return Data(base64Encoded: b64)
}
/// Build a `SecIdentity` from the client's PEM cert + PKCS#8 P-256 key. Pairs them via the
/// Keychain (stored once under a stable tag, so repeat calls reuse it).
static func makeIdentity(certPEM: String, keyPEM: String) throws -> SecIdentity {
// Key: CryptoKit accepts the SEC1 or PKCS#8 PEM; its x963 form is what SecKey wants.
let priv: P256.Signing.PrivateKey
do {
priv = try P256.Signing.PrivateKey(pemRepresentation: keyPEM)
} catch {
throw TLSError.badKey(error.localizedDescription)
}
var keyError: Unmanaged<CFError>?
let attrs: [CFString: Any] = [
kSecAttrKeyType: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,
kSecAttrKeyClass: kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate,
kSecAttrKeySizeInBits: 256,
]
guard let secKey = SecKeyCreateWithData(
priv.x963Representation as CFData, attrs as CFDictionary, &keyError)
else {
throw TLSError.badKey((keyError?.takeRetainedValue()).map { "\($0)" } ?? "SecKeyCreateWithData")
}
guard let certDER = derFromPEM(certPEM, type: "CERTIFICATE"),
let cert = SecCertificateCreateWithData(nil, certDER as CFData)
else { throw TLSError.badCert }
let tag = Data("io.unom.punktfunk.library-client-key".utf8)
#if os(macOS)
// The key must live in a Keychain for SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate to pair it with the
// cert. Add it under a stable tag; a duplicate just means a previous fetch already did.
let add: [CFString: Any] = [
kSecClass: kSecClassKey,
kSecAttrApplicationTag: tag,
kSecValueRef: secKey,
]
let status = SecItemAdd(add as CFDictionary, nil)
guard status == errSecSuccess || status == errSecDuplicateItem else {
throw TLSError.identity("keychain add key failed (OSStatus \(status))")
}
var identity: SecIdentity?
let idStatus = SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate(nil, cert, &identity)
guard idStatus == errSecSuccess, let identity else {
throw TLSError.identity("SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate (OSStatus \(idStatus))")
}
return identity
#else
// Add the key (tagged) and the certificate (matched to it by public key) separately
// a duplicate of either just means a previous fetch already added it.
let addKey: [CFString: Any] = [
kSecClass: kSecClassKey,
kSecAttrApplicationTag: tag,
kSecValueRef: secKey,
]
let keyStatus = SecItemAdd(addKey as CFDictionary, nil)
guard keyStatus == errSecSuccess || keyStatus == errSecDuplicateItem else {
throw TLSError.identity("keychain add key failed (OSStatus \(keyStatus))")
}
let addCert: [CFString: Any] = [
kSecClass: kSecClassCertificate,
kSecValueRef: cert,
]
let certStatus = SecItemAdd(addCert as CFDictionary, nil)
guard certStatus == errSecSuccess || certStatus == errSecDuplicateItem else {
throw TLSError.identity("keychain add certificate failed (OSStatus \(certStatus))")
}
// The system correlates the just-added cert against the tagged key (matching public key)
// and vends the pair as a kSecClassIdentity the tag filter here matches the KEY half.
var identityRef: CFTypeRef?
let query: [CFString: Any] = [
kSecClass: kSecClassIdentity,
kSecAttrApplicationTag: tag,
kSecReturnRef: true,
]
let idStatus = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &identityRef)
guard idStatus == errSecSuccess, let identityRef else {
throw TLSError.identity("SecItemCopyMatching(kSecClassIdentity) (OSStatus \(idStatus))")
}
// Safe: a kSecClassIdentity query with kSecReturnRef always vends a SecIdentity.
return (identityRef as! SecIdentity) // swiftlint:disable:this force_cast
#endif
}
}
/// URLSession delegate that pins the host's self-signed cert (by the fingerprint the client
/// already trusts) and presents the client identity for the mTLS client-cert challenge but ONLY
/// for challenges from `host`:`port` (the punktfunk host itself). A session built with this
/// delegate is safe to reuse for OTHER origins too (e.g. a GOG/Heroic/Xbox cover-art CDN): a
/// non-matching origin falls through to `.performDefaultHandling`, i.e. normal system trust
/// evaluation and no client cert exactly what `URLSession.shared` would have done. Without the
/// host scoping, pinning would reject every external origin's cert (its fingerprint never matches
/// the host's) and the client identity would leak to servers that didn't ask for it.
final class LibraryTLSDelegate: NSObject, URLSessionDelegate {
private let identity: SecIdentity
private let pinnedHostFingerprint: Data? // SHA-256 of the host cert DER; nil = accept any (TOFU)
private let host: String
private let port: Int
init(identity: SecIdentity, pinnedHostFingerprint: Data?, host: String, port: UInt16) {
self.identity = identity
self.pinnedHostFingerprint = pinnedHostFingerprint
self.host = host
self.port = Int(port)
}
func urlSession(
_ session: URLSession,
didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge,
completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void
) {
let space = challenge.protectionSpace
guard space.host == host, space.port == port else {
completionHandler(.performDefaultHandling, nil)
return
}
switch space.authenticationMethod {
case NSURLAuthenticationMethodServerTrust:
// Pin the host cert by fingerprint the host is self-signed (the client trusts it the
// same way the QUIC session does). No pin yet (TOFU) accept the presented leaf.
guard let trust = space.serverTrust,
let leaf = (SecTrustCopyCertificateChain(trust) as? [SecCertificate])?.first
else {
completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
return
}
let der = SecCertificateCopyData(leaf) as Data
let fp = Data(SHA256.hash(data: der))
if let pinned = pinnedHostFingerprint, pinned != fp {
tlsLog.warning("library: host cert fingerprint mismatch — refusing")
completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
return
}
completionHandler(.useCredential, URLCredential(trust: trust))
case NSURLAuthenticationMethodClientCertificate:
completionHandler(.useCredential,
URLCredential(identity: identity, certificates: nil, persistence: .forSession))
default:
completionHandler(.performDefaultHandling, nil)
}
}
}