Files
punktfunk/web/server/routes/plugin-ui/[...].ts
T
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 5 4575134c21 fix(web): one bad password from anywhere stops locking out the whole console
The console's login throttle was documented as per-IP and was not. Nitro's
`localFetch` hands the app a synthetic request whose socket has no
`remoteAddress`, so `getRequestIP()` returned undefined for every request and
every attempt was charged to one shared "unknown" bucket. Five wrong guesses
from any LAN peer locked out everyone — including the operator, and including
the update-apply route, which shares that budget. The Bun entry is the only
place the real peer is knowable, so it now stamps it into a header (deleting
any client-supplied copy first) and `peerAddress()` reads it back.

Verified on a real build bound to 0.0.0.0: seven wrong logins from 127.0.0.1
lock 127.0.0.1 out, a different peer still logs in on the first try, and a
request forging the header is charged to its real address.

Also on the way through:

- Installing an unreviewed package and adding a catalog source now re-ask for
  the console password, like applying an update already did. A 7-day session
  cookie should not be able to run new code on the host, and `store/install`
  with `accept_unverified` did exactly that through the generic passthrough.
  The gate sits at the trust boundary — adding a source, or a raw spec — not
  on every install from a source the operator already chose to trust.
- The ui-credential denylist is matched against the normalised path too, so
  `/api//v1/...` and friends can no longer walk around it.
- The console serves nosniff, a no-referrer policy, and a CSP that pins
  frame-ancestors, object-src and base-uri.
- A plugin UI's response no longer re-emits the content-encoding that `fetch`
  already decoded (which made compressed plugin pages fail to load), no longer
  sets cookies on the console's origin, and OPTIONS reaches the plugin instead
  of being refused 405 by us.
- An unreachable host reads as 502 on these routes, matching the passthrough,
  instead of a bare 500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 00:20:10 +02:00

111 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript

// /plugin-ui/<id>/** → a plugin's loopback UI server (plugin-ui-surface §5). By the time we get
// here the gate (middleware/auth.ts) has confirmed a session — a plugin UI is reachable only by the
// logged-in operator, on the console's own origin, with no separate password. We look up the
// plugin's `{port, secret}` server-side, inject the secret as a bearer, strip the browser's cookie,
// and stream the response through (SSE included). The plugin only ever gets dialed on 127.0.0.1.
//
// This route runs in the built Bun/Nitro server. In `vite dev` a small middleware in vite.config.ts
// handles `/plugin-ui` instead (it intercepts before this route, like the /api dev proxy).
import {
defineEventHandler,
getProxyRequestHeaders,
getRequestURL,
readRawBody,
sendWebResponse,
setResponseStatus,
} from "h3";
import {
bustCredential,
fetchUiCredential,
PLUGIN_ID_RE,
} from "../../util/pluginProxy";
export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
const { pathname, search } = getRequestURL(event);
// /plugin-ui/<id>/<rest…>
const m = pathname.match(/^\/plugin-ui\/([^/]+)(\/.*)?$/);
const id = m?.[1];
if (!id || !PLUGIN_ID_RE.test(id)) {
setResponseStatus(event, 404);
return { error: "not a valid plugin-ui path" };
}
const rest = m?.[2] ?? "/";
const prefix = `/plugin-ui/${id}`;
// Forwardable request headers (h3 strips hop-by-hop + host); we set our own auth and drop the
// session cookie so plugin code never sees it.
const headers = getProxyRequestHeaders(event) as Record<string, string>;
delete headers.cookie;
delete headers.authorization;
headers["x-forwarded-prefix"] = prefix;
const method = event.method;
// Only read a body for the methods that can carry one. `readRawBody` asserts a payload method,
// so calling it for OPTIONS (a plugin UI's CORS preflight, or any client probing Allow) threw
// 405 out of the CONSOLE before the plugin was ever dialed.
const body = BODY_METHODS.has(method)
? ((await readRawBody(event, false)) as Uint8Array | undefined)
: undefined;
// One proxied attempt; `null` means the plugin is unreachable (unregistered, or its port died).
const attempt = async (bustCache: boolean): Promise<Response | null> => {
const cred = await fetchUiCredential(id, { bustCache });
if (!cred) return null;
const target = `http://127.0.0.1:${cred.port}${rest}${search}`;
try {
return await fetch(target, {
method,
headers: { ...headers, authorization: `Bearer ${cred.secret}` },
body: body as BodyInit | undefined,
redirect: "manual",
});
} catch {
// The port is dead (plugin crashed/restarted on a new port): drop the stale credential so
// the next request re-resolves it.
bustCredential(id);
return null;
}
};
let resp = await attempt(false);
// Stale secret after a plugin restart (S7): the plugin rejects our cached secret — re-fetch once.
if (resp?.status === 401) {
const retry = await attempt(true);
if (retry) resp = retry;
}
if (!resp) {
setResponseStatus(event, 502);
return { error: `plugin "${id}" is not running` };
}
return sendWebResponse(event, sanitize(resp));
});
/** Methods that may carry a request body. Anything else (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE) must not be
* handed to `readRawBody`. */
const BODY_METHODS = new Set(["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]);
/**
* Fix up a plugin's response before it goes out on the console's origin.
*
* - `content-encoding` / `content-length` / `transfer-encoding`: `fetch` already decoded the body,
* but the plugin's original headers survive on the Response. Re-emitting `content-encoding: gzip`
* over plaintext makes the browser fail to decode the page, and a stale `content-length` truncates
* it. The framing belongs to OUR response, so drop the plugin's and let it be recomputed.
* - `set-cookie`: a plugin runs on the console's own origin, so any cookie it sets is scoped to the
* console — it could collide with (or shadow) `pf_session`. A plugin UI has no business setting
* cookies on this origin; it authenticates with the injected per-boot bearer.
*/
function sanitize(resp: Response): Response {
const headers = new Headers(resp.headers);
headers.delete("content-encoding");
headers.delete("content-length");
headers.delete("transfer-encoding");
headers.delete("set-cookie");
// 204/304 must not carry a body — passing one through throws in the Response constructor.
const bodyless = resp.status === 204 || resp.status === 304;
return new Response(bodyless ? null : resp.body, {
status: resp.status,
statusText: resp.statusText,
headers,
});
}