enricobuehler
bda5556d37
Remediates the two web-console residuals from the 2026-07-05 posture audit: - Brute-force throttle (loginThrottle.ts): per-IP exponential backoff after 5 free attempts, plus a global floor for spread-out floods, keyed on the socket peer IP (not spoofable X-Forwarded-For) with a size-capped map. The constant-time compare already stopped the timing leak; this bounds guess *volume* against a by-design LAN-exposed console. - Session seal key now derives from the high-entropy mgmt token instead of the low-entropy login password, so a captured cookie is no longer an offline password oracle. Falls back to the password only when no token is configured (dev/local). Rotating the token now invalidates sessions. - Replace the process-wide NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 with per-request Bun TLS scoped to the loopback proxy hop; a non-loopback mgmt URL now verifies normally. Dropped the env var from the systemd unit, Steam Deck installer, Windows run scripts, env examples, and web README. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
54 lines
2.5 KiB
Batchfile
54 lines
2.5 KiB
Batchfile
@echo off
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rem punktfunk web console launcher - the action the PunktfunkWeb scheduled task runs at boot.
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rem
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rem Lays out next to the installed payload: {app}\web\web-run.cmd, {app}\web\.output\... and
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rem {app}\bun\bun.exe (so %~dp0 = {app}\web\). Auto-wires the console the same way the Linux
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rem systemd unit does: it sources the host's mgmt bearer token + the console login password from
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rem %ProgramData%\punktfunk\, points the /api proxy at the host's loopback HTTPS mgmt API, and serves
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rem the (self-contained, no-node_modules) Nitro console over HTTPS (HTTP/1.1 over TLS) on :3000 with the
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rem bundled bun, using the host's OWN identity cert. No env editing.
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setlocal EnableExtensions
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set "PFDATA=%ProgramData%\punktfunk"
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set "TOKENFILE=%PFDATA%\mgmt-token"
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set "PWFILE=%PFDATA%\web-password"
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set "CERTFILE=%PFDATA%\cert.pem"
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set "KEYFILE=%PFDATA%\key.pem"
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rem The host's `serve` writes the mgmt token + its identity cert/key on first run. Until they exist
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rem we have no credential and no TLS material, so fail and let the task's restart-on-failure retry
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rem (mirrors the Linux unit's Restart=on-failure waiting for the host to create them) rather than
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rem silently downgrading to plain HTTP.
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if not exist "%TOKENFILE%" (
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echo [punktfunk-web] mgmt token not present yet at "%TOKENFILE%" - waiting for the host service.
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exit /b 1
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)
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if not exist "%CERTFILE%" (
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echo [punktfunk-web] host identity cert not present yet at "%CERTFILE%" - waiting for the host service.
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exit /b 1
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)
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rem Both files are single KEY=VALUE lines (LF), written 0600/ACL'd: PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN=... and
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rem PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD=... . Split on the first '=' and import each into the environment.
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for /f "usebackq tokens=1* delims==" %%A in ("%TOKENFILE%") do set "%%A=%%B"
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if exist "%PWFILE%" for /f "usebackq tokens=1* delims==" %%A in ("%PWFILE%") do set "%%A=%%B"
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rem Fixed deployment wiring (the Windows analogue of scripts/punktfunk-web.service).
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set "PORT=47992"
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set "HOST=0.0.0.0"
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set "PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL=https://127.0.0.1:47990"
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rem No NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: the host's self-signed cert is accepted only for the loopback
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rem proxy hop, scoped inside the proxy code (Bun per-request TLS), not process-wide.
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rem Serve HTTPS (HTTP/1.1 over TLS) with the host's identity cert; mark the session cookie Secure.
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set "PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_CERT=%CERTFILE%"
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set "PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_KEY=%KEYFILE%"
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set "PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE=1"
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set "BUN=%~dp0..\bun\bun.exe"
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set "SERVER=%~dp0.output\server\index.mjs"
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if not exist "%BUN%" (
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echo [punktfunk-web] bundled bun runtime missing at "%BUN%".
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exit /b 1
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)
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"%BUN%" "%SERVER%"
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