Files
punktfunk/web/nitro-entry/bun-https.mjs
T
enricobuehler 8103958169 fix(security): the plugin lane stops being a way in
Acts on the 2026-08-05 host security review. 36 of its 38 findings; the two
exceptions are recorded below and in the review doc.

The review's headline is that `plugin_may_access` was the one authorization
gate in the system that was allow-by-default — a hand-maintained denylist of
route prefixes, where every sibling gate is deny-by-default. Its own doc
comment names the two capabilities it exists to withhold, and both were
reachable one route over, because ~1450 commits of new routes were added and
the list was never one of the things anyone remembered to update.

So the gate is now an allowlist, and a test walks the live route table and
fails the build for any route that has not been deliberately classified for
both non-admin lanes. That test is the actual fix: it is what stops the next
route from arriving pre-authorized.

Route reachability and field authority turned out to be different questions.
A provider plugin has to be able to reconcile its own library entries — that
is what a scanner plugin IS — but `prep` and a `command` launch inside that
payload are handed to `/bin/sh -c` as the host user, and every execution site
documents them as operator-typed. Requests now carry the lane that authorized
them, and those two fields are refused to everyone but the operator's own
token.

The art proxy read any absolute path off disk in the host process, which on
Windows is LocalSystem, from a path the plugin lane could write and then read
back — so it yielded `mgmt-token`, which is full admin. It now serves only
real images (extension AND magic bytes, so a renamed secret fails), only from
inside an allowed root, only after canonicalization, and never over UNC; and
a path it would refuse to serve can no longer be persisted in the first place.

On Windows, the config-dir hardening was skipped exactly when it was needed —
it ran only in the branch that CREATES host.env, so the case it was written
for (a local user pre-created the directory and planted one) was the one case
it never ran in. It is now unconditional and first, an existing host.env is
re-owned, and the inheritable OWNER RIGHTS ACE that kept an attacker's files
theirs after the directory was re-owned is gone. The identity and token
readers were hardening the directory only on the path that GENERATED a new
secret, so a planted cert/key or token was adopted verbatim and permanently;
they harden before the first read now.

`ensure_admin_only_source` is implemented. The 2026-07-05 audit recorded it as
FIXED and it was in no commit in this repository's history — the local EoP it
described was live, and it is the payload half of the config-dir chain above.

Also: the three input planes are bounded and lossy like the mic plane on the
same loop already was; Android's library client no longer accepts any
publicly-trusted certificate for the pinned host; the usbip vhci nodes get
their own group instead of riding on `input`, which every packaging scriptlet
tells users to join; a registry URL can no longer inject a TOML table into
bunfig.toml; the pairing cooldown is charged before the arming state is read,
so armed/disarmed is no longer a free oracle; and the whole Low tier, of which
the two worth naming are a clipboard MIME NUL that panicked the host on one
control message, and an unauthenticated global logout that let any LAN peer
sign the operator out on a loop.

NOT fixed, deliberately:

  H-3 (plugin UIs framed allow-same-origin). Dropping allow-same-origin does
  not work: the document's origin goes opaque, its subresource requests are
  then cross-site, the SameSite=Lax session cookie is not sent, and every
  plugin asset 302s to /login. The "open in new tab" link is the same
  escalation with no iframe at all, so the sandbox attribute is not where this
  gets fixed either. It needs a second listener — a distinct origin that is
  still the same site — which changes the console's deploy model and wants
  on-glass validation. The mechanism and the dead end are written down at the
  iframe.

  H-6 registry authentication, whose other half lives in unom/infra. The
  in-repo halves are done: workflow_dispatch inputs no longer interpolate into
  run: blocks (one of them in the step holding UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY), and the
  syft installer is pinned to its tag instead of main. Digest pinning is left
  until the registry is authenticated, because a tag — content-keyed or not —
  can simply be overwritten while anonymous pushes are accepted.

M-5 is half done: the oracle is closed, but binding the arming window needs
the console to learn the fingerprint first, which is a knock-then-bind flow
rather than an edit.

Verified: cargo fmt --all --check clean; cargo check --all-targets green on
Linux and on Windows (confirmed non-vacuous — a planted type error in
windows/install.rs fails the build); scripts/xcheck.sh windows check green;
cargo test -p punktfunk-host --bins 416 passed, the single failure being
gamestream::stream::tests::sender_delivers_batches, the known qemu-environmental
UDP-loopback flake that fails identically on clean main in the same container;
cargo test -p pf-clipboard 13 passed; web console typechecks.
2026-08-05 17:12:12 +02:00

127 lines
6.5 KiB
JavaScript

// Custom Nitro server entry for the punktfunk web console.
//
// It is the stock Nitro `bun` preset entry
// (node_modules/nitropack/dist/presets/bun/runtime/bun.mjs) plus **TLS**, so the console is served
// over **HTTPS (HTTP/1.1 over TLS)** using the HOST's own identity cert (the cert native clients
// already pin). One trust anchor across the data plane, the management API, and this console. Wired
// in via `entry:` in vite.config.ts on top of Nitro's `bun` preset (which bundles the handler in).
//
// NOTE on HTTP/2 + HTTP/3: NOT offered here, on purpose. `Bun.serve` has no HTTP/2 server, and
// HTTP/3 (which Bun *can* do) is useless to a browser against this cert: QUIC refuses any cert error,
// and the host identity cert is a CN-only, no-SAN, self-signed cert (correct for native fingerprint
// PINNING, rejected by browsers). So browsers stay on HTTP/1.1 regardless — advertising h3 would just
// dangle an `Alt-Svc` no browser can use. Real h2/h3 would need a browser-TRUSTED, SAN-matching cert
// (a local CA installed per device) fronted by a server that speaks them (e.g. Caddy) — deliberately
// out of scope for a LAN console; TLS (no cleartext login/session) is the win.
//
// Env (set by the launchers / the systemd unit — see web.env.example):
// PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_CERT / _KEY PEM file paths (the host's cert.pem / key.pem). BOTH set ⇒ HTTPS.
// Unset ⇒ plain HTTP (local dev only).
// PORT / HOST standard Nitro bind (3000 / 0.0.0.0).
import "#nitro-internal-pollyfills";
import wsAdapter from "crossws/adapters/bun";
import { useNitroApp } from "nitropack/runtime";
import { startScheduleRunner } from "nitropack/runtime/internal";
const nitroApp = useNitroApp();
const ws = import.meta._websocket
? wsAdapter(nitroApp.h3App.websocket)
: undefined;
// The socket peer, handed to the app as a trusted header.
//
// Nitro's `localFetch` (below) hands the app a SYNTHETIC request whose socket has no
// `remoteAddress`, so h3's `getRequestIP()` returns undefined *inside* the app and every
// per-peer decision collapses onto one shared bucket. That silently defeated the login
// throttle: five wrong passwords from anywhere locked out everyone, including the operator
// (and, since the update-apply route shares that budget, locked out host updates too).
// `server.requestIP(req)` is the only place the real peer is knowable, so we stamp it here.
// Any inbound copy is deleted first, so a client cannot forge it.
// Read back by `peerAddress()` in server/util/auth.ts — keep the two names in sync.
const PEER_IP_HEADER = "x-pf-peer-ip";
// TLS from the host's identity cert (file PATHS → Bun.file, not PEM-in-env). Absent ⇒ plain HTTP.
const certPath = process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_CERT;
const keyPath = process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_KEY;
const tls =
certPath && keyPath
? { cert: Bun.file(certPath), key: Bun.file(keyPath) }
: undefined;
// Half-configured TLS is not a warning, it is a refusal.
//
// Two silent failures hide here, and both end with the operator staring at a console that looks
// fine. One path set and the other missing drops to plain HTTP — the login password then crosses
// the LAN in the clear on a server the operator believes is TLS. And PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE without
// TLS marks the session cookie Secure, which a browser refuses to store over http://, so login
// "succeeds" and every request after it is unauthenticated, forever.
//
// Neither state can serve a working console, so exiting is strictly better than serving a broken
// one: a supervisor logs the reason and the operator sees a stopped service instead of a subtly
// wrong one.
const secureFlag = /^(1|true)$/i.test(process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE ?? "");
if (Boolean(certPath) !== Boolean(keyPath)) {
console.error(
`punktfunk web console: only ${certPath ? "PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_CERT" : "PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_KEY"} is set — ` +
"TLS needs BOTH. Refusing to start rather than serve the login password in the clear.",
);
process.exit(1);
}
if (!tls && secureFlag) {
console.error(
"punktfunk web console: PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE is set but TLS is not configured. The session " +
"cookie would be marked Secure and dropped by the browser over http://, so login could " +
"never stick. Refusing to start — set PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_CERT/_KEY, or unset PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE.",
);
process.exit(1);
}
const server = Bun.serve({
port: process.env.NITRO_PORT || process.env.PORT || 3000,
host: process.env.NITRO_HOST || process.env.HOST,
// Bun defaults this to 10 s, which is SHORTER than the host's 15 s SSE keep-alive comment — so a
// proxied `/api/v1/events` stream (or any other quiet long-lived response) gets cut by us and
// reconnects on a loop. 120 s is comfortably above any keep-alive we forward; still overridable.
idleTimeout: Number.parseInt(process.env.NITRO_BUN_IDLE_TIMEOUT, 10) || 120,
// Cap the request body an UNAUTHENTICATED peer can make us hold in memory.
//
// `fetch` below buffers the whole body with `await req.arrayBuffer()` before Nitro — and
// therefore before the auth gate — has seen the request, so Bun's 128 MB default was the only
// bound on what a LAN peer could push into console RSS by POSTing to /login (2026-08-05 review
// L-10). Nothing the console legitimately accepts is remotely this large: the biggest real body
// is a hooks/library JSON edit, kilobytes. 4 MiB leaves several orders of headroom and still
// makes the memory cost of an unauthenticated request negligible.
maxRequestBodySize:
Number.parseInt(process.env.NITRO_BUN_MAX_BODY_BYTES, 10) || 4 * 1024 * 1024,
// `tls: undefined` ⇒ plain HTTP (dev); otherwise HTTPS over HTTP/1.1.
tls,
websocket: import.meta._websocket ? ws.websocket : undefined,
async fetch(req, server) {
if (import.meta._websocket && req.headers.get("upgrade") === "websocket") {
return ws.handleUpgrade(req, server);
}
const url = new URL(req.url);
let body;
if (req.body) {
body = await req.arrayBuffer();
}
// Strip any client-supplied value BEFORE stamping the real one (see PEER_IP_HEADER).
const headers = new Headers(req.headers);
headers.delete(PEER_IP_HEADER);
const peer = server.requestIP(req)?.address;
if (peer) headers.set(PEER_IP_HEADER, peer);
return nitroApp.localFetch(url.pathname + url.search, {
host: url.hostname,
protocol: url.protocol,
headers,
method: req.method,
redirect: req.redirect,
body,
});
},
});
console.log(`punktfunk web console listening on ${server.url} (tls=${!!tls})`);
if (import.meta._tasks) {
startScheduleRunner();
}