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Follows the security audit (#5/#9): the GameStream-compat plane carries inherent on-path weaknesses that can't be fixed on the wire without breaking stock Moonlight — its pairing runs over plain HTTP (#9, MITM-able during the pairing window) and its legacy control encryption can reuse GCM nonces (#5, a passive eavesdropper can recover/forge input). The native punktfunk/1 plane (SPAKE2 PIN pairing + per-direction AEAD nonces) has neither. So flip the default to secure-by-default: - `serve` → native punktfunk/1 plane + management API ONLY (no GameStream surface). - `serve --gamestream` → ALSO the GameStream/Moonlight-compat planes (nvhttp pairing, RTSP, ENet control, _nvstream mDNS). Opt-in, logged with a trusted-LAN caveat. `--moonlight` is an alias. - The native plane is now ALWAYS on in `serve` (`--native` is a kept-for-compat no-op); the unified GameStream+native host is `serve --gamestream`. `gamestream::serve` gates the GameStream spawns (nvhttp/rtsp/control/mdns) on the flag; the native plane + mgmt + native-pairing handle always run. To avoid silently regressing validated Moonlight deployments, the explicit deployment configs PRESERVE Moonlight via `--gamestream` (each documents dropping it for a secure native-only host): the Linux systemd unit, the Steam Deck installer, and the Windows service default (DEFAULT_HOST_CMD). The bare `serve` default (new/manual use) is secure. Docs swept to match (host-cli, moonlight, quickstart, install, packaging READMEs, CLAUDE.md, README, …): Moonlight setup now instructs `--gamestream`; native/console refs use bare `serve`. OpenAPI regenerated (a stale "run `serve --native`" string). fmt + clippy clean; 94 host tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
92 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
92 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Pairing & Trust
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description: How a client and host establish trust — PIN pairing once, pinned reconnects after.
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---
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punktfunk has no accounts and no cloud. Trust is established directly between a client and a host,
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on your network, with a one-time pairing — either an **approval click in the host's console** or a
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**PIN ceremony**. After that, the device reconnects automatically on a pinned cryptographic
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identity.
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## How it works
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- Each host has a stable **identity** (a certificate). Clients remember its fingerprint, so they know
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they're talking to the same host next time.
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- The first time a client connects, you **pair** it: the host shows a short **4-digit PIN**, you type
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it into the client, and a secure exchange (SPAKE2) binds the two identities. An attacker who doesn't
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know the PIN gets a single online guess — no offline cracking.
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- After pairing, the host stores the client's identity in its allow-list, and the client stores the
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host's fingerprint. Reconnects are automatic — no PIN.
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## Approving a device from the console (no PIN)
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The fastest way to admit a new device: just **try to connect** from it. On a pairing-required host,
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the attempt shows up in the web console's Pairing page under **Waiting for approval** — with the
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device's name and identity fingerprint. Click **Approve** (and optionally give it a label like
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"Living Room TV"), and the device is paired on the spot: its next connect goes straight through. No
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PIN to read or type.
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**Deny** just dismisses the request (the device can knock again later — it's "not now", not a
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blocklist). Requests expire on their own after a few minutes.
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This works because approval happens on the host's authenticated management surface — only someone
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with console access can admit a device.
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## Pairing with a PIN
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PIN pairing is the **default and required** path for any new host: unless the host has explicitly
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opted into trust-on-first-use (see below), a client connecting to an unknown host must complete the
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PIN ceremony before it can stream. It's the right path for the *first* device (before the console has
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admitted anything) or when you're at the client and the console isn't handy.
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Pairing has to be **armed** on the host before a client can pair (so a random device can't pair
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itself). On the production host (`serve`), this is done from the **web console**: open the
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host's management console, click to arm pairing, and the host displays a 4-digit PIN along with the
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list of paired devices. This works on a headless host over the network — there is no command-line flag
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to arm pairing on `serve`.
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(The standalone headless test host, `punktfunk1-host`, takes `--allow-pairing`/`--require-pairing` on its
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command line instead; the production `serve` host arms pairing from the console.)
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Then, on the client:
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- **Native clients (Apple, Linux, Windows, Android):** select the host (or use *Pair with PIN…* from
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its menu) and enter the PIN the host displays.
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- **Moonlight:** choose **Pair**; Moonlight shows the PIN to confirm on the host side.
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## Requiring pairing (the default)
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By default, the native host **requires** pairing — only devices that have paired can stream. This is
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the right setting on a shared network: a device has to complete the PIN ceremony once before it can
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connect.
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If you're on a fully trusted single-user network and want to skip pairing, run the host open with
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`serve --open` (or `punktfunk1-host --allow-tofu` for the standalone host) — it then advertises
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`pair=optional` and accepts unpaired clients. Requiring pairing is strongly recommended.
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## Trust-on-first-use (host opt-in)
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Trust-on-first-use (TOFU) is **off by default** and is an explicit *host* opt-in for fully trusted
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networks. A host enables it by running open — `punktfunk1-host --allow-tofu` or `serve --open` — which makes
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it advertise `pair=optional` over mDNS and accept unpaired clients. Only then does a client offer the
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TOFU path: connecting to such a host for the first time shows the host's fingerprint and asks you to
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confirm it (compare it with the one the host logged at startup), then pins it. The client presents
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this clearly as the reduced-security option, alongside **Pair with PIN**.
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> **Warning:** TOFU cannot detect an impostor on the first connection — if someone is impersonating
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> the host the very first time you connect, you'll pin the attacker's fingerprint. PIN pairing closes
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> that gap (the SPAKE2 ceremony binds both identities), which is why it's the default. Use TOFU only
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> on a network you fully trust.
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For every other case — a host advertising `pair=required` (the default), a host you typed in by hand,
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or a discovered host whose pair policy is unknown — TOFU is not offered and the client routes straight
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to the PIN ceremony.
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Once a host is pinned, a fingerprint change is treated as the impostor signal: the client forces
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re-pairing through the PIN ceremony rather than offering to re-trust the new identity.
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## Managing paired devices
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The web console lists every paired device and lets you remove one (revoking its access). Re-pairing is
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just the PIN ceremony again.
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