Files
punktfunk/packaging/arch/punktfunk-host.install
T
enricobuehler 42ee6c5628 fix(packaging): the host's CAP_SYS_NICE made it invisible to KWin, killing every KDE session
0.26.0-1 setcap'd `cap_sys_nice=ep` on /usr/bin/punktfunk-host so the encoder could open an
elevated global-priority Vulkan queue. On every KDE box that ended desktop streaming outright:

    KWin virtual output failed: KWin does not expose zkde_screencast_unstable_v1 to this client

reported from CachyOS on NVIDIA and on AMD, surviving a clean reinstall of host and client, and
worked around only by KWIN_WAYLAND_NO_PERMISSION_CHECKS=1.

The two cannot coexist. KWin hands out its restricted protocols — zkde_screencast_unstable_v1,
which mints our virtual output, and org_kde_kwin_fake_input, which injects input — only to a client
it can IDENTIFY, by resolving that client's /proc/<pid>/exe and matching it against an installed
.desktop's Exec=. The kernel refuses that readlink to any reader whose effective set is not a
superset of the target's PERMITTED set (cap_ptrace_access_check), and KWin holds no capabilities.
So the instant the binary carries one, KWin's executablePath() is empty, nothing matches, and the
global is never advertised — presenting exactly as a missing or mis-installed .desktop file.

Measured on CachyOS (kernel 7.1.6), same-uid reader, cap_sys_nice=ep on the target:

    no capability .............................. readlink /proc/<pid>/exe OK
    capability ................................. EPERM
    capability + prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1) ..... EPERM   <- dumpable is NOT the gate
    capability dropped + PR_SET_DUMPABLE(1) .... OK      <- only an uncapped process works

The third row also rules out the reflex fix of moving the grant to systemd AmbientCapabilities=,
which lands CAP_SYS_NICE in the very same permitted set. Nothing short of not holding the
capability restores identification, so the host does not get one.

The cost is pacing only. pf-zerocopy's device create already walks REALTIME -> HIGH -> default when
a priority class is refused, and pf-frame's thread nice is a documented best-effort no-op without
the capability — so this is 0.25.0's behaviour exactly, which is the behaviour that worked.

  * packaging/arch/punktfunk-host.install: grant -> revoke. post_upgrade strips the capability from
    boxes that already ran 0.26.0-1's scriptlet. A pacman upgrade writes a new inode and file
    capabilities do not survive that, so this is belt-and-braces for reinstall/downgrade paths.
  * pf-vdisplay kwin.rs: all three "KWin does not expose zkde_screencast" errors now read
    /proc/self/status and, if this process holds ANY capability, name it with its CapPrm mask and
    the `setcap -r` that repairs it. The failure stays impossible to diagnose from the Wayland side
    otherwise, and it is not unique to our own packaging — a hand-rolled setcap does it too.

Verified on 192.168.1.21 (CachyOS): the capability/dumpable matrix above; cargo check and
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings clean for pf-vdisplay; both new unit tests pass; and the
hint itself exercised end-to-end, silent uncapped and firing with CapPrm=0x0000000000800000 under
cap_sys_nice=ep. The shipped punktfunk-host-0.26.0-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst was unpacked to confirm its
.INSTALL carries the setcap on both post_install and post_upgrade.

Ships as 0.26.0-2 — packaging plus one crate, no version bump.
2026-08-09 09:37:30 +02:00

164 lines
8.9 KiB
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# pacman install scriptlet — mirrors the RPM %post / deb postinst.
_ensure_update_group() {
# The (empty) opt-in group for web-console-triggered updates — nobody is auto-added.
getent group punktfunk-update >/dev/null 2>&1 || groupadd --system punktfunk-update 2>/dev/null || true
}
_ensure_punktfunk_group() {
# Owns the usbip vhci attach/detach nodes (60-punktfunk.rules). Separate from 'input' on
# purpose: writing 'attach' materialises an arbitrary emulated USB device, which is a root-only
# kernel primitive and must not ride on the group users are told to join for gamepads
# (security-review 2026-08-05 M-4).
getent group punktfunk >/dev/null 2>&1 || groupadd --system punktfunk 2>/dev/null || true
}
# NO capability on the host binary — and an active removal of the one 0.26.0-1 granted.
#
# 0.26.0-1 ran `setcap cap_sys_nice=ep` here, to let the encoder open an elevated global-priority
# Vulkan queue (PyroWave shares the GPU's shader cores with the game; measured 2026-08-08 on an
# RTX 5070 Ti, the encode dispatch goes ~2 ms -> 15-18 ms at 95 % game load without it). That grant
# BROKE DESKTOP STREAMING ON EVERY KDE BOX, and it cannot be made to work — the two are mutually
# exclusive at the kernel level:
#
# KWin hands out its restricted Wayland protocols (zkde_screencast_unstable_v1, which mints our
# virtual output, and org_kde_kwin_fake_input, which injects input) only to a client it can
# IDENTIFY, by resolving that client's /proc/<pid>/exe and matching it against an installed
# .desktop's Exec= (ours is io.unom.Punktfunk.Host.desktop). The kernel refuses that readlink to
# any reader whose effective set is not a superset of the target's PERMITTED set
# (cap_ptrace_access_check), and KWin holds no capabilities. So the moment this binary carries a
# capability it becomes unidentifiable: KWin's executablePath() is empty, nothing matches, the
# globals are never advertised, and every session dies with
# "KWin does not expose zkde_screencast_unstable_v1 to this client" after 8 retries — while
# looking exactly like a missing or wrong .desktop file.
#
# Verified on CachyOS (kernel 7.1.6), same-uid reader, cap_sys_nice=ep on the target:
# no capability .............................. readlink /proc/<pid>/exe OK
# capability ................................. EPERM
# capability + prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1) ..... EPERM <- dumpable is NOT the gate
# capability dropped + PR_SET_DUMPABLE(1) .... OK <- only a capability-free process works
#
# The third row also rules out the obvious "move it to the systemd unit": AmbientCapabilities= puts
# CAP_SYS_NICE in exactly the same permitted set and fails identically. Nothing short of not having
# the capability restores identification, so the host does not get one. The encoder already walks
# REALTIME -> HIGH -> default when the class is refused (pf-zerocopy vulkan.rs), so this costs
# pacing under a GPU-bound game and nothing else — 0.25.0's behaviour exactly.
#
# The removal below heals boxes that ran 0.26.0-1's scriptlet. A pacman upgrade writes a new inode
# and file capabilities do not survive that, so this is belt-and-braces for reinstall/downgrade
# paths — cheap, and the failure it prevents is an 8-retry session death with a misleading message.
_revoke_sched_capability() {
setcap -r usr/bin/punktfunk-host 2>/dev/null || true
}
post_install() {
_ensure_update_group
_ensure_punktfunk_group
_revoke_sched_capability
udevadm control --reload-rules 2>/dev/null || true
udevadm trigger --subsystem-match=misc 2>/dev/null || true
# Apply the UDP socket-buffer tuning now (also auto-applied at boot by systemd-sysctl).
sysctl -p /usr/lib/sysctl.d/99-punktfunk-net.conf >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
cat <<'MSG'
punktfunk-host installed.
1. Add yourself to the 'input' group for virtual gamepads:
sudo usermod -aG input "$USER" # then re-login
Only if you want the virtual Steam Deck pad (usbip), ALSO join 'punktfunk':
sudo usermod -aG punktfunk "$USER"
That group can emulate arbitrary USB devices — join it only on a machine you trust.
2. Pick a backend config (gamescope is the no-desktop default on SteamOS/Deck):
mkdir -p ~/.config/punktfunk
cp /usr/share/punktfunk/host.env.bazzite ~/.config/punktfunk/host.env
3. Enable the host:
systemctl --user enable --now punktfunk-host
NOTE: encode is NVENC-only. Install 'nvidia-utils' on an NVIDIA host. An AMD Steam Deck is NOT
yet supported — it needs a VAAPI (hevc_vaapi) encoder backend (see packaging/arch/README.md).
MSG
# Firewall: stock Arch ships none (ports already open); CachyOS ships ufw; some spins (EndeavourOS)
# enable firewalld. We install a ufw app profile AND firewalld service definitions but never touch
# the running firewall — just point the way for whichever is active.
if command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1; then
cat <<'MSG'
4. ufw is installed — open the streaming ports once (native-only host shown; add
'punktfunk-gamestream' as well for Moonlight compat):
sudo ufw allow punktfunk-native
MSG
fi
if command -v firewall-cmd >/dev/null 2>&1; then
cat <<'MSG'
4. firewalld is active — open the streaming ports once (native-only host shown; add
'punktfunk-gamestream' as well for Moonlight compat):
sudo firewall-cmd --reload # load the new service def
sudo firewall-cmd --permanent --add-service=punktfunk-native
sudo firewall-cmd --reload
MSG
fi
# Conflicting Moonlight-compatible host (Sunshine/Apollo/...): reuse the host's own detector so
# the warning lives in one place. Exit 1 = found; never fail the install on it.
if command -v punktfunk-host >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ! conflict="$(punktfunk-host detect-conflicts 2>/dev/null)"; then
printf '\n%s\n' "$conflict"
fi
fi
}
post_upgrade() {
_ensure_update_group
# Also on UPGRADE, not just post_install: 'punktfunk' was introduced in 0.25.0, so every box that
# reached it by `pacman -Syu` from 0.24.x ran only this function and never got the group at all —
# leaving 60-punktfunk.rules to chgrp to a nonexistent group, the vhci attach/detach nodes
# root-only, and the virtual Steam Deck pad silently unable to attach. groupadd is idempotent, so
# this is a no-op on boxes that installed fresh.
_ensure_punktfunk_group
# Strip the cap_sys_nice 0.26.0-1 granted: it makes the host unidentifiable to KWin (see above).
_revoke_sched_capability
udevadm control --reload-rules 2>/dev/null || true
sysctl -p /usr/lib/sysctl.d/99-punktfunk-net.conf >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
_warn_stale_firewall_ports
}
# An already-open firewall does NOT pick up a port we added to a profile.
#
# ufw expands an app profile into concrete rules when you run `ufw allow`, and stores THOSE. Editing
# /etc/ufw/applications.d later — which is all a package upgrade does — changes nothing about the
# rules already installed. firewalld is friendlier (its permanent config names the service, so a
# reload re-reads the XML) but still needs that reload. Either way the operator has an old rule and
# no reason to suspect it.
#
# That is not hypothetical: 47993 (plugin UIs, a separate origin from the console) arrived exactly
# this way, and on an upgraded ufw box every plugin interface silently became an empty panel in the
# console. So on upgrade, look at what is actually open and say so — still without touching the
# running firewall, which stays the operator's call.
_warn_stale_firewall_ports() {
# `ufw status verbose` prints each rule with its EXPANDED ports — "47992/tcp (punktfunk-web)"
# before the refresh, "47992,47993/tcp (punktfunk-web)" after — so one listing answers both "is
# the profile allowed at all" and "does that rule know the new port". (Plain `ufw status` prints
# the profile NAME instead, which cannot tell the two apart.)
if command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
ufw status verbose 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'punktfunk-web' &&
! ufw status verbose 2>/dev/null | grep -q '47993'; then
cat <<'MSG'
punktfunk: your ufw rule for 'punktfunk-web' predates TCP 47993, the separate origin plugin UIs
are served from. Until it is refreshed, plugin interfaces will not load in the web console:
sudo ufw app update punktfunk-web && sudo ufw reload
MSG
fi
# `--info-service` asks the DAEMON, which answers from the definition it loaded at its last
# (re)start — precisely the stale copy we are warning about. The file on disk already says 47993.
if command -v firewall-cmd >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
firewall-cmd --state >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
firewall-cmd --query-service=punktfunk-web >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
! firewall-cmd --info-service=punktfunk-web 2>/dev/null | grep -q '47993'; then
cat <<'MSG'
punktfunk: the punktfunk-web firewalld service now also covers TCP 47993, the separate origin
plugin UIs are served from. Reload so the running firewall picks it up, or plugin interfaces will
not load in the web console:
sudo firewall-cmd --reload
MSG
fi
}