The catalog the Punktfunk plugin store fetches. Served straight out of this repository over Gitea's anonymous raw endpoint: https://git.unom.io/unom/punktfunk-plugin-index/raw/branch/main/v1/index.json https://git.unom.io/unom/punktfunk-plugin-index/raw/branch/main/v1/index.json.sig Hosts verify the ed25519 signature against a compiled-in public key and only then parse. Verified that the raw endpoint serves blobs byte-for-byte, which the signature depends on; .gitattributes pins LF so a Windows checkout cannot break it from the other direction. Entries pin one exact version plus that version's registry tarball integrity hash -- no ranges, no "latest". A plugin author publishing a new version changes nothing for users; the new version becomes installable only when a reviewer works the checklist and lands a new pinned entry here. That data shape is what makes "verified on every release" enforceable rather than a promise. Seeded with the two first-party plugins, both integrity hashes confirmed against the live registry: - @punktfunk/plugin-rom-manager 0.3.1 (linux, windows) - @punktfunk/plugin-playnite 0.1.1 (windows) Tooling (bun + TypeScript, node builtins only): - validate: every field rule the host enforces, plus a live registry cross-check that the pinned version exists and its dist.integrity matches the pin. Strict on unknown keys, since the host silently drops entries that fail validation -- a `min_host` typo would otherwise ship as a missing version floor with no error anywhere. - sign / verify / keygen: ed25519 over the exact bytes of index.json. keygen never prints the private key; verify defaults to the host-pinned public key so an index can be audited with no arguments. CI splits by trust: pull requests run validate only and hold no secrets, so a fork PR can never reach the signing key or a token that can write to main. Publishing from main validates, signs, self-verifies, then commits the signature back. The loop guard is a paths-ignore filter on v1/index.json.sig, with a [skip ci] marker as a second line of defence; ed25519 determinism means an unchanged index re-signs to identical bytes and commits nothing at all. CI signs after the merge, so there is a brief window where index.json is newer than its signature. It fails closed -- hosts reject the document and keep their last good cached catalog -- and is documented as such in the README. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
106 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
106 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
#!/usr/bin/env bun
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/**
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* Sign v1/index.json with an ed25519 private key.
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*
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* The signature is over the EXACT BYTES of index.json -- no canonicalisation,
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* no re-serialisation. Whatever is committed is what gets signed and what the
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* host hashes, so any whitespace change invalidates the signature (validate.ts
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* enforces canonical formatting to keep that from happening by accident).
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*
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* Output is base64 of the raw 64-byte signature, written to v1/index.json.sig.
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*
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* Key input, in precedence order:
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* --key <path> PKCS#8 PEM file
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* $INDEX_SIGNING_KEY_FILE PKCS#8 PEM file
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* $INDEX_SIGNING_KEY PKCS#8 PEM contents (this is what CI uses)
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*
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* Usage:
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* bun tools/sign.ts [--key path/to/key.pem] [path/to/index.json]
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*/
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import { createPrivateKey, createPublicKey, sign } from "node:crypto";
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import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
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import { resolve } from "node:path";
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import { encodePublicKey } from "./keys.ts";
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function die(message: string): never {
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console.error(`error: ${message}`);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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const args = process.argv.slice(2);
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let keyPath: string | undefined;
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const positional: string[] = [];
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for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
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const arg = args[i]!;
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if (arg === "--key") {
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keyPath = args[++i];
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if (!keyPath) die("--key needs a path");
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} else if (arg.startsWith("--key=")) {
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keyPath = arg.slice("--key=".length);
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} else if (arg.startsWith("--")) {
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die(`unknown flag ${arg}`);
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} else {
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positional.push(arg);
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}
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}
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keyPath ??= process.env.INDEX_SIGNING_KEY_FILE;
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let pem: string;
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let source: string;
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if (keyPath) {
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source = keyPath;
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try {
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pem = readFileSync(keyPath, "utf8");
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} catch (err) {
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die(`cannot read key file ${keyPath}: ${(err as Error).message}`);
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}
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} else if (process.env.INDEX_SIGNING_KEY) {
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source = "$INDEX_SIGNING_KEY";
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pem = process.env.INDEX_SIGNING_KEY;
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} else {
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die(
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"no signing key. Pass --key <pkcs8.pem>, or set INDEX_SIGNING_KEY_FILE (path) " +
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"or INDEX_SIGNING_KEY (PEM contents).",
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);
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}
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// Tolerate secrets stores that mangle newlines into literal \n.
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if (!pem.includes("\n") && pem.includes("\\n")) pem = pem.replace(/\\n/g, "\n");
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let key;
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try {
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key = createPrivateKey({ key: pem, format: "pem" });
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} catch (err) {
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die(`${source} is not a readable PKCS#8 PEM private key: ${(err as Error).message}`);
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}
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if (key.asymmetricKeyType !== "ed25519") {
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die(`${source} is a ${key.asymmetricKeyType ?? "unknown"} key; an ed25519 key is required`);
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}
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const file = resolve(positional[0] ?? "v1/index.json");
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const sigFile = `${file}.sig`;
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let data: Buffer;
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try {
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data = readFileSync(file);
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} catch (err) {
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die(`cannot read ${file}: ${(err as Error).message}`);
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}
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// ed25519 is a pure signature scheme: the digest argument MUST be null.
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const signature = sign(null, data, key);
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if (signature.length !== 64) {
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die(`expected a 64-byte ed25519 signature, got ${signature.length}`);
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}
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writeFileSync(sigFile, `${signature.toString("base64")}\n`);
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// Report the public key so the operator can eyeball WHICH key just signed --
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// the most likely deploy mistake is signing with a key the host does not pin.
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const publicKey = encodePublicKey(createPublicKey(key));
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console.log(`signed ${file} (${data.length} bytes)`);
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console.log(`wrote ${sigFile}`);
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console.log(`key ${publicKey}`);
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console.log("\nThe host must pin that public key in one of its two key slots.");
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