enricobuehler
c56b1b455a
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Fixes the intermittent first-connect freeze. The host streams infinite GOP — one opening IDR, then P-frames only (recovery keyframes just on loss) — so when the client's decoder wedges on the cold first session (a lost/corrupt opening IDR, a bad early P-frame) the picture stays frozen until the far-off next keyframe. The client had no way to ask for one; now it does. Add a RequestKeyframe control message (client -> host, reliable control stream), mirroring Reconfigure: - core: quic.rs RequestKeyframe (type 0x03) + roundtrip test; client.rs CtrlRequest::Keyframe + NativeClient::request_keyframe; abi.rs punktfunk_connection_request_keyframe (header regenerated). - host: m3.rs decodes it in the control loop and signals the encode loop, which coalesces a burst and calls enc.request_keyframe() — wiring the existing NvencEncoder hook (force_kf -> next frame pict_type=I), the same recovery the GameStream path already had via force_idr. - apple: PunktfunkConnection.requestKeyframe(); StreamPump (stage-1) requests on layer.status==.failed; Stage2Pipeline (stage-2) on a sync submit failure and on the async decode-error callback via a thread-safe KeyframeRecovery. All throttled to <=1/250ms (the decode stays wedged for several frames until the IDR lands, so per-frame requests would flood the control stream). Self-healing: a lost recovery IDR is re-requested after the throttle; the host coalesces bursts into a single IDR. Validated: cargo fmt + clippy clean; core + host test suites green (incl. new request_keyframe_roundtrip); swift build + test (39 passed); xcframework rebuilt (all 5 slices), header regenerated with no unrelated drift. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1971 lines
79 KiB
Rust
1971 lines
79 KiB
Rust
//! `punktfunk/1` — the native control plane (M3), gated behind the `quic` feature.
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//!
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//! GameStream is punktfunk's compatibility layer; this is the start of its own protocol. A QUIC
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//! connection (quinn, tokio — control plane only, never the per-frame path) carries a
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//! length-prefixed binary handshake on one bidirectional stream:
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//!
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//! ```text
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//! client → host Hello { abi_version }
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//! host → client Welcome { abi_version, session: full data-plane Config + mode + UDP port }
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//! client → host Start { client_udp_port }
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//! ```
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//!
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//! after which both sides bring up a [`crate::session::Session`] over a plain
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//! [`UdpTransport`](crate::transport::udp) (native threads, no async) and the host streams.
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//! The Welcome carries everything the M1 core negotiates — FEC scheme (including GF(2¹⁶)
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//! Leopard, which GameStream can't express), shard sizing, crypto key/salt — so the data
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//! plane is exactly the hardened M1 `Session`.
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//!
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//! Transport security: the host presents a long-lived self-signed certificate
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//! ([`endpoint::server_with_identity`]) and the client pins its SHA-256 fingerprint
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//! ([`endpoint::client_pinned`]; no pin = trust-on-first-use, with the observed fingerprint
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//! reported back for persisting). The data plane adds AES-GCM on top.
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//! All integers little-endian; every message is `u16 length || payload`.
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use crate::config::{
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CompositorPref, Config, FecConfig, FecScheme, GamepadPref, Mode, ProtocolPhase, Role,
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};
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use crate::error::{PunktfunkError, Result};
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/// Protocol magic + version, first bytes of the positional handshake (Hello/Welcome/Start).
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pub const MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"PKF1";
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/// Magic for typed post-handshake / pairing control messages. A distinct magic keeps the
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/// typed namespace disjoint from the positional handshake: a `Hello` (whose abi_version
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/// byte sits where a type byte would) can never be misparsed as a control message, and
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/// vice-versa, regardless of field values.
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pub const CTL_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"PKFc";
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/// `client → host`: open the session, requesting a display mode (the host creates its
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/// virtual output at exactly this size/refresh — native resolution end to end).
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct Hello {
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pub abi_version: u32,
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pub mode: Mode,
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/// Which compositor the client would like the host to drive (`Auto` = host decides). The
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/// host honors it only if that backend is available, else falls back and reports the real
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/// choice in [`Welcome::compositor`]. Appended to the wire form — omitted by older clients
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/// (decodes to `Auto`).
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pub compositor: CompositorPref,
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/// Which virtual gamepad the host should create for this session's pads (`Auto` = host
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/// decides: its `PUNKTFUNK_GAMEPAD` env var, else X-Box 360). Resolved choice echoed in
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/// [`Welcome::gamepad`]. Appended to the wire form — omitted by older clients (decodes
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/// to `Auto`).
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pub gamepad: GamepadPref,
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/// The client's desired video encoder bitrate, in kilobits per second. `0` = no preference
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/// (the host uses its default). The host clamps the request to a supported range and reports
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/// the value it actually configured in [`Welcome::bitrate_kbps`]. Appended to the wire form —
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/// omitted by older clients (decodes to `0`, i.e. host default).
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pub bitrate_kbps: u32,
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/// Human-readable device name ("Enrico's MacBook"), shown by the host when this device knocks
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/// on a pairing-required host (the delegated-approval pending list) and stored on approval.
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/// Appended to the wire form as `len u8 || UTF-8` (≤ [`HELLO_NAME_MAX`] bytes) — omitted by
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/// older clients (decodes to `None`; the host falls back to a fingerprint-derived label).
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pub name: Option<String>,
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}
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/// Longest device name carried in a [`Hello`] (bytes of UTF-8; longer names are truncated on
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/// encode, rejected on decode — a one-byte length prefix caps it at 255 anyway).
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pub const HELLO_NAME_MAX: usize = 64;
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/// `host → client`: the complete session offer.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct Welcome {
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pub abi_version: u32,
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/// Host UDP port for the data plane.
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pub udp_port: u16,
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pub mode: Mode,
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pub fec: FecConfig,
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pub shard_payload: u16,
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pub encrypt: bool,
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pub key: [u8; 16],
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pub salt: [u8; 4],
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/// Seed/testing: how many frames the host will send (0 = unbounded).
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pub frames: u32,
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/// The compositor the host actually resolved for this session (the client's
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/// [`Hello::compositor`] preference if available, else the host's auto-detected choice).
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/// Appended to the wire form — `Auto` when an older host omitted it (i.e. "unknown").
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pub compositor: CompositorPref,
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/// The virtual gamepad backend the host actually resolved (the client's [`Hello::gamepad`]
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/// preference if available, else env var / X-Box 360). A client uses this to know whether
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/// DualSense feedback (0xCD) can arrive at all. Appended to the wire form — `Auto` when an
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/// older host omitted it (i.e. "unknown, assume X-Box 360").
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pub gamepad: GamepadPref,
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/// The encoder bitrate the host actually configured for this session, in kilobits per second
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/// (the client's [`Hello::bitrate_kbps`] clamped to the host's supported range, or the host
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/// default when the client requested `0`). Appended to the wire form — `0` when an older host
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/// omitted it (i.e. "unknown").
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pub bitrate_kbps: u32,
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}
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/// `client → host`: data plane is bound, begin streaming.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct Start {
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pub client_udp_port: u16,
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}
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/// `client → host`, any time after [`Start`]: switch the session to a new display mode
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/// (window resized, refresh changed) without reconnecting. The host answers with
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/// [`Reconfigured`]; on acceptance it rebuilds its virtual output + encoder at the new
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/// mode and the stream continues over the unchanged data plane — the first new-mode frame
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/// is an IDR with in-band parameter sets, which is all a decoder needs to follow.
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///
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/// Post-handshake messages carry a type byte after the magic (the handshake itself is
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/// positional and stays untyped for wire compatibility).
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct Reconfigure {
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pub mode: Mode,
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}
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/// `host → client`: answer to [`Reconfigure`]. `accepted = false` means the requested
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/// mode was rejected (e.g. exceeds encoder limits) and the session continues at `mode`
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/// (the still-active one); `true` means `mode` is now being switched to live.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct Reconfigured {
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pub accepted: bool,
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pub mode: Mode,
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}
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/// `client → host`, any time after [`Start`]: ask the host's encoder to emit a fresh IDR
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/// keyframe NOW. The infinite-GOP stream opens with one IDR then sends P-frames only, so a
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/// decoder that wedges (a lost/corrupt opening IDR, a bad early P-frame — most likely on the
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/// cold first session) would otherwise stay frozen until the next loss-triggered recovery
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/// keyframe, which may be far off. The client sends this when it detects a stalled decode;
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/// the host forces the next frame to be an IDR with in-band parameter sets, recovering the
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/// picture in ~one frame. Fire-and-forget — no reply (the recovered IDR is the ack).
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct RequestKeyframe;
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/// `client → host`, any time after [`Start`]: run a bandwidth speed test. The host bursts
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/// filler access units (flagged [`crate::packet::FLAG_PROBE`]) over the data plane at
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/// `target_kbps` of application goodput for `duration_ms`, *pausing video for the duration*, then
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/// replies with [`ProbeResult`]. The client measures the received probe bytes + time to estimate
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/// the link's sustainable rate (and the loss vs. the host's reported send count) so it can pick a
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/// [`Hello::bitrate_kbps`]. The host clamps both fields to sane bounds.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct ProbeRequest {
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/// Goodput rate the host should send the probe at, in kilobits per second.
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pub target_kbps: u32,
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/// How long to burst, in milliseconds.
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pub duration_ms: u32,
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}
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/// `host → client`: the probe burst is finished. Reports what the host actually sent so the
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/// client can compute delivery ratio (loss) = `received / bytes_sent` and throughput =
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/// `received_bytes * 8 / elapsed`.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct ProbeResult {
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/// Total access-unit payload bytes the host emitted for the probe.
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pub bytes_sent: u64,
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/// Number of probe access units the host emitted.
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pub packets_sent: u32,
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/// The burst's actual duration in milliseconds (the host clamps/measures the request).
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pub duration_ms: u32,
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}
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/// `client → host`, right after [`Start`]: one round of the wall-clock skew handshake. The client
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/// stamps `t1_ns` (its monotonic-since-epoch clock) and sends; the host echoes it in [`ClockEcho`]
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/// with its own receive/send stamps. A few rounds let the client estimate the host↔client clock
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/// offset, so the per-frame `capture→reassembled` latency (the AU `pts_ns` is the host's capture
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/// clock) is meaningful across machines, not just same-host. An old host ignores it (the client
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/// times out and assumes a shared clock).
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct ClockProbe {
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pub t1_ns: u64,
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}
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/// `host → client`: answer to [`ClockProbe`]. `t2_ns` is when the host received the probe and
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/// `t3_ns` when it sent this echo (both the host clock); `t1_ns` is the client's send stamp echoed
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/// back. With the client's receive time `t4`, offset = ((t2−t1)+(t3−t4))/2 (host minus client) and
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/// RTT = (t4−t1)−(t3−t2). See [`clock_offset_ns`].
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct ClockEcho {
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pub t1_ns: u64,
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pub t2_ns: u64,
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pub t3_ns: u64,
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}
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/// Estimate the host↔client clock offset (**host minus client**, ns) and RTT (ns) from skew-handshake
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/// samples `(t1, t2, t3, t4)` — NTP's formula, taking the **minimum-RTT** sample (least queuing
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/// noise; also discards the first round's host-setup latency). Offset is positive when the host
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/// clock is ahead of the client's; add it to a client timestamp to express it in the host clock.
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/// Returns `None` for an empty sample set.
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pub fn clock_offset_ns(samples: &[(u64, u64, u64, u64)]) -> Option<(i64, u64)> {
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samples
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.iter()
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.map(|&(t1, t2, t3, t4)| {
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let rtt = ((t4 as i128 - t1 as i128) - (t3 as i128 - t2 as i128)).max(0) as u64;
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let offset = (((t2 as i128 - t1 as i128) + (t3 as i128 - t4 as i128)) / 2) as i64;
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(offset, rtt)
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})
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.min_by_key(|&(_, rtt)| rtt)
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}
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/// Type byte of [`Reconfigure`] (first byte after the magic).
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pub const MSG_RECONFIGURE: u8 = 0x01;
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/// Type byte of [`Reconfigured`].
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pub const MSG_RECONFIGURED: u8 = 0x02;
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/// Type byte of [`RequestKeyframe`].
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pub const MSG_REQUEST_KEYFRAME: u8 = 0x03;
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/// Type byte of [`ProbeRequest`].
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pub const MSG_PROBE_REQUEST: u8 = 0x20;
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/// Type byte of [`ProbeResult`].
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pub const MSG_PROBE_RESULT: u8 = 0x21;
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/// Type byte of [`ClockProbe`].
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pub const MSG_CLOCK_PROBE: u8 = 0x30;
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/// Type byte of [`ClockEcho`].
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pub const MSG_CLOCK_ECHO: u8 = 0x31;
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Pairing ceremony (typed control messages): instead of a session Hello, a client may open
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// the control stream with PairRequest. The host shows a short PIN out-of-band (log/UI); the
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// user types it into the client.
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//
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// Trust is established by **SPAKE2** (a balanced PAKE), NOT a hash of the PIN. SPAKE2 turns
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// the low-entropy PIN into a high-entropy shared key via a Diffie-Hellman exchange; the only
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// thing an active man-in-the-middle who terminates the (TOFU) ceremony learns is whether a
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// single PIN guess was right — there is no transcript value that reveals the PIN to an
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// *offline* dictionary search (the fatal flaw of an HMAC-of-PIN proof over a 4-digit space).
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// Both peers' certificate fingerprints are bound in as the SPAKE2 identities, so the
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// established key — and the key-confirmation MACs derived from it — only agree when both
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// sides saw the same two certificates. After mutual key confirmation the host persists the
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// client's fingerprint and the client pins the host's.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/// Type byte of [`PairRequest`].
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pub const MSG_PAIR_REQUEST: u8 = 0x10;
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/// Type byte of [`PairChallenge`].
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pub const MSG_PAIR_CHALLENGE: u8 = 0x11;
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/// Type byte of [`PairProof`].
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pub const MSG_PAIR_PROOF: u8 = 0x12;
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/// Type byte of [`PairResult`].
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pub const MSG_PAIR_RESULT: u8 = 0x13;
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/// `client → host`: begin pairing. `name` is the human label the host stores (≤64 bytes
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/// UTF-8); `spake_a` is the client's SPAKE2 message (see [`SpakeRole::start`]).
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct PairRequest {
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pub name: String,
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pub spake_a: Vec<u8>,
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}
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/// `host → client`: the host's SPAKE2 message + its key-confirmation MAC. The client
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/// finishes SPAKE2, verifies `confirm` (proving the host derived the same key, i.e. knows
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/// the PIN and saw the same certs), then sends its own confirmation.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct PairChallenge {
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pub spake_b: Vec<u8>,
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pub confirm: [u8; 32],
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}
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/// `client → host`: the client's key-confirmation MAC (its single proof attempt).
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct PairProof {
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pub confirm: [u8; 32],
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}
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/// `host → client`: ceremony outcome.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct PairResult {
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pub ok: bool,
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}
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/// A length-prefixed (u16 LE) byte field within a control message.
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fn put_bytes(b: &mut Vec<u8>, x: &[u8]) {
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b.extend_from_slice(&(x.len() as u16).to_le_bytes());
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b.extend_from_slice(x);
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}
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/// Read a length-prefixed field at `off`, returning the bytes and the next offset.
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fn get_bytes(b: &[u8], off: usize) -> Result<(&[u8], usize)> {
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if off + 2 > b.len() {
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return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("truncated field"));
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}
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let n = u16::from_le_bytes([b[off], b[off + 1]]) as usize;
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let start = off + 2;
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if start + n > b.len() {
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return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("field overruns message"));
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}
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Ok((&b[start..start + n], start + n))
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}
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impl PairRequest {
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pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let name = self.name.as_bytes();
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let n = name.len().min(64);
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let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(8 + n + self.spake_a.len());
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b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
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b.push(MSG_PAIR_REQUEST);
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b.push(n as u8);
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b.extend_from_slice(&name[..n]);
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put_bytes(&mut b, &self.spake_a);
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b
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}
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pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<PairRequest> {
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if b.len() < 6 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_PAIR_REQUEST {
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return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad PairRequest"));
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}
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let n = b[5] as usize;
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if n > 64 || b.len() < 6 + n {
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return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad PairRequest name"));
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}
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let name = String::from_utf8_lossy(&b[6..6 + n]).into_owned();
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let (spake_a, end) = get_bytes(b, 6 + n)?;
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if end != b.len() {
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return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("trailing bytes"));
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}
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Ok(PairRequest {
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name,
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spake_a: spake_a.to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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impl PairChallenge {
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pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(7 + self.spake_b.len() + 32);
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b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
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b.push(MSG_PAIR_CHALLENGE);
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put_bytes(&mut b, &self.spake_b);
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b.extend_from_slice(&self.confirm);
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b
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}
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pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<PairChallenge> {
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if b.len() < 5 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_PAIR_CHALLENGE {
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return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad PairChallenge"));
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}
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let (spake_b, end) = get_bytes(b, 5)?;
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if end + 32 != b.len() {
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return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad PairChallenge confirm"));
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}
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let mut confirm = [0u8; 32];
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confirm.copy_from_slice(&b[end..end + 32]);
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Ok(PairChallenge {
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spake_b: spake_b.to_vec(),
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confirm,
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})
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}
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}
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impl PairProof {
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pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(37);
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b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
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b.push(MSG_PAIR_PROOF);
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b.extend_from_slice(&self.confirm);
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b
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}
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pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<PairProof> {
|
||
if b.len() != 37 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_PAIR_PROOF {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad PairProof"));
|
||
}
|
||
let mut confirm = [0u8; 32];
|
||
confirm.copy_from_slice(&b[5..37]);
|
||
Ok(PairProof { confirm })
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl PairResult {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(6);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
|
||
b.push(MSG_PAIR_RESULT);
|
||
b.push(self.ok as u8);
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<PairResult> {
|
||
if b.len() != 6 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_PAIR_RESULT {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad PairResult"));
|
||
}
|
||
Ok(PairResult { ok: b[5] != 0 })
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// SPAKE2 over Ed25519 for the pairing ceremony. The two roles use the asymmetric flow so
|
||
/// the identities are ordered; each side binds **both** certificate fingerprints as the
|
||
/// SPAKE2 identities, so the derived key only matches when client and host agree on the PIN
|
||
/// *and* saw the same two certificates (a MITM, presenting different certs to each leg,
|
||
/// cannot reach a shared key).
|
||
pub mod pake {
|
||
use super::*;
|
||
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
|
||
use spake2::{Ed25519Group, Identity, Password, Spake2};
|
||
|
||
/// In-progress SPAKE2 state plus the identity transcript for key confirmation.
|
||
pub struct PairingPake {
|
||
state: Spake2<Ed25519Group>,
|
||
transcript: Vec<u8>,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Start the exchange. `client_fp`/`host_fp` are the two certificate fingerprints (the
|
||
/// client passes what it observed via TOFU; the host passes its own + the client's
|
||
/// presented cert). Returns the state and this side's outbound SPAKE2 message.
|
||
pub fn start(
|
||
is_client: bool,
|
||
pin: &str,
|
||
client_fp: &[u8; 32],
|
||
host_fp: &[u8; 32],
|
||
) -> (PairingPake, Vec<u8>) {
|
||
let pw = Password::new(pin.as_bytes());
|
||
let id_client = Identity::new(client_fp);
|
||
let id_host = Identity::new(host_fp);
|
||
let (state, msg) = if is_client {
|
||
Spake2::<Ed25519Group>::start_a(&pw, &id_client, &id_host)
|
||
} else {
|
||
Spake2::<Ed25519Group>::start_b(&pw, &id_client, &id_host)
|
||
};
|
||
let mut transcript = Vec::with_capacity(64);
|
||
transcript.extend_from_slice(client_fp);
|
||
transcript.extend_from_slice(host_fp);
|
||
(PairingPake { state, transcript }, msg)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Key confirmation MAC for one direction (`label` distinguishes host vs client), keyed
|
||
/// by the SPAKE2 shared key and bound to the fingerprint transcript.
|
||
fn confirm(key: &[u8], label: &[u8], transcript: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||
let mut mac =
|
||
<Hmac<sha2::Sha256> as Mac>::new_from_slice(key).expect("hmac takes any key length");
|
||
mac.update(label);
|
||
mac.update(transcript);
|
||
mac.finalize().into_bytes().into()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// `Hmac` verification is constant-time via `ct_eq` in the underlying crate; we compare
|
||
/// our recomputed tag the same way.
|
||
fn ct_eq(a: &[u8; 32], b: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
|
||
a.iter()
|
||
.zip(b.iter())
|
||
.fold(0u8, |acc, (x, y)| acc | (x ^ y))
|
||
== 0
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Confirmation tags both sides expect, given the agreed SPAKE2 key.
|
||
pub struct Confirmations {
|
||
/// MAC the host sends (client verifies).
|
||
pub host: [u8; 32],
|
||
/// MAC the client sends (host verifies).
|
||
pub client: [u8; 32],
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl PairingPake {
|
||
/// Finish SPAKE2 with the peer's message → the pair of confirmation tags. `Err` if
|
||
/// the peer's message is malformed (a wrong PIN does NOT error here — it yields a
|
||
/// *different* key, so the confirmation MACs simply won't match).
|
||
pub fn finish(self, peer_msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Confirmations> {
|
||
let key = self
|
||
.state
|
||
.finish(peer_msg)
|
||
.map_err(|_| PunktfunkError::Crypto)?;
|
||
Ok(Confirmations {
|
||
host: confirm(&key, b"punktfunk-pair-host", &self.transcript),
|
||
client: confirm(&key, b"punktfunk-pair-client", &self.transcript),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Constant-time tag comparison for the confirmation step.
|
||
pub fn verify(expected: &[u8; 32], got: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
|
||
ct_eq(expected, got)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl Hello {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(22);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.abi_version.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.width.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.height.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.refresh_hz.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.push(self.compositor.to_u8()); // appended at offset 20 — older hosts read [0..20] and skip it
|
||
b.push(self.gamepad.to_u8()); // appended at offset 21 — same back-compat discipline
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.bitrate_kbps.to_le_bytes()); // appended at offset 22..26
|
||
if let Some(name) = &self.name {
|
||
// Appended at offset 26: len u8 || UTF-8. This is the LAST trailing field — `None`
|
||
// emits nothing (so a no-name Hello is byte-identical to the bitrate-era form), which
|
||
// means a *future* field can't simply follow `name` at a fixed offset; it would need
|
||
// its own presence flag. Truncate to a char boundary within HELLO_NAME_MAX.
|
||
let mut n = name.as_str();
|
||
while n.len() > HELLO_NAME_MAX {
|
||
let mut cut = HELLO_NAME_MAX;
|
||
while !n.is_char_boundary(cut) {
|
||
cut -= 1;
|
||
}
|
||
n = &n[..cut];
|
||
}
|
||
b.push(n.len() as u8);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(n.as_bytes());
|
||
}
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<Hello> {
|
||
if b.len() < 20 || &b[0..4] != MAGIC {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad Hello"));
|
||
}
|
||
let u32at = |o: usize| u32::from_le_bytes([b[o], b[o + 1], b[o + 2], b[o + 3]]);
|
||
Ok(Hello {
|
||
abi_version: u32at(4),
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: u32at(8),
|
||
height: u32at(12),
|
||
refresh_hz: u32at(16),
|
||
},
|
||
// Optional trailing bytes — an older client that omits them requests `Auto`.
|
||
compositor: b
|
||
.get(20)
|
||
.map(|&v| CompositorPref::from_u8(v))
|
||
.unwrap_or_default(),
|
||
gamepad: b
|
||
.get(21)
|
||
.map(|&v| GamepadPref::from_u8(v))
|
||
.unwrap_or_default(),
|
||
// Optional trailing 4 bytes (LE) — absent on an older client → `0` (host default).
|
||
bitrate_kbps: b
|
||
.get(22..26)
|
||
.map(|s| u32::from_le_bytes(s.try_into().unwrap()))
|
||
.unwrap_or(0),
|
||
// Optional trailing device name: len u8 || UTF-8. Absent / oversized / non-UTF-8 →
|
||
// `None` (never fail the handshake over a label).
|
||
name: b.get(26).and_then(|&len| {
|
||
let len = len as usize;
|
||
if len == 0 || len > HELLO_NAME_MAX {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
b.get(27..27 + len)
|
||
.and_then(|s| std::str::from_utf8(s).ok())
|
||
.map(String::from)
|
||
}),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl Welcome {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(64);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.abi_version.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.udp_port.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.width.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.height.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.refresh_hz.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.push(match self.fec.scheme {
|
||
FecScheme::Gf8 => 0,
|
||
FecScheme::Gf16 => 1,
|
||
});
|
||
b.push(self.fec.fec_percent);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.fec.max_data_per_block.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.shard_payload.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.push(self.encrypt as u8);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.key);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.salt);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.frames.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.push(self.compositor.to_u8()); // appended at offset 53 — older clients read [0..53] and skip it
|
||
b.push(self.gamepad.to_u8()); // appended at offset 54 — same back-compat discipline
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.bitrate_kbps.to_le_bytes()); // appended at offset 55..59
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<Welcome> {
|
||
// Layout (LE): magic[0..4] abi[4..8] port[8..10] w[10..14] h[14..18] hz[18..22]
|
||
// scheme[22] pct[23] max_data[24..26] shard[26..28] encrypt[28] key[29..45]
|
||
// salt[45..49] frames[49..53] compositor[53] gamepad[54] bitrate_kbps[55..59]
|
||
// (compositor/gamepad/bitrate are optional trailing bytes).
|
||
if b.len() < 53 || &b[0..4] != MAGIC {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad Welcome"));
|
||
}
|
||
let u32at = |o: usize| u32::from_le_bytes([b[o], b[o + 1], b[o + 2], b[o + 3]]);
|
||
let u16at = |o: usize| u16::from_le_bytes([b[o], b[o + 1]]);
|
||
let mut key = [0u8; 16];
|
||
key.copy_from_slice(&b[29..45]);
|
||
let mut salt = [0u8; 4];
|
||
salt.copy_from_slice(&b[45..49]);
|
||
Ok(Welcome {
|
||
abi_version: u32at(4),
|
||
udp_port: u16at(8),
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: u32at(10),
|
||
height: u32at(14),
|
||
refresh_hz: u32at(18),
|
||
},
|
||
fec: FecConfig {
|
||
scheme: if b[22] == 1 {
|
||
FecScheme::Gf16
|
||
} else {
|
||
FecScheme::Gf8
|
||
},
|
||
fec_percent: b[23],
|
||
max_data_per_block: u16at(24),
|
||
},
|
||
shard_payload: u16at(26),
|
||
encrypt: b[28] != 0,
|
||
key,
|
||
salt,
|
||
frames: u32at(49),
|
||
// Optional trailing bytes — an older host that omits them leaves the resolved
|
||
// compositor / gamepad backend unknown (`Auto`).
|
||
compositor: b
|
||
.get(53)
|
||
.map(|&v| CompositorPref::from_u8(v))
|
||
.unwrap_or_default(),
|
||
gamepad: b
|
||
.get(54)
|
||
.map(|&v| GamepadPref::from_u8(v))
|
||
.unwrap_or_default(),
|
||
// Optional trailing 4 bytes (LE) — absent on an older host → `0` (unknown).
|
||
bitrate_kbps: b
|
||
.get(55..59)
|
||
.map(|s| u32::from_le_bytes(s.try_into().unwrap()))
|
||
.unwrap_or(0),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Build the data-plane [`Config`] this offer describes (for `role`).
|
||
pub fn session_config(&self, role: Role) -> Config {
|
||
let mut c = Config::p1_defaults(role);
|
||
c.phase = ProtocolPhase::P1GameStream; // wire phase id pending the P2 packet rev
|
||
c.fec = self.fec;
|
||
c.shard_payload = self.shard_payload as usize;
|
||
c.encrypt = self.encrypt;
|
||
c.key = self.key;
|
||
c.salt = self.salt;
|
||
c
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl Start {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(6);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.client_udp_port.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<Start> {
|
||
if b.len() < 6 || &b[0..4] != MAGIC {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad Start"));
|
||
}
|
||
Ok(Start {
|
||
client_udp_port: u16::from_le_bytes([b[4], b[5]]),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl Reconfigure {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
// magic[0..4] type[4] w[5..9] h[9..13] hz[13..17]
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(17);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
|
||
b.push(MSG_RECONFIGURE);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.width.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.height.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.refresh_hz.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<Reconfigure> {
|
||
if b.len() != 17 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_RECONFIGURE {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad Reconfigure"));
|
||
}
|
||
let u32at = |o: usize| u32::from_le_bytes([b[o], b[o + 1], b[o + 2], b[o + 3]]);
|
||
Ok(Reconfigure {
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: u32at(5),
|
||
height: u32at(9),
|
||
refresh_hz: u32at(13),
|
||
},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl Reconfigured {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
// magic[0..4] type[4] accepted[5] w[6..10] h[10..14] hz[14..18]
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(18);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
|
||
b.push(MSG_RECONFIGURED);
|
||
b.push(self.accepted as u8);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.width.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.height.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.mode.refresh_hz.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<Reconfigured> {
|
||
if b.len() != 18 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_RECONFIGURED {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad Reconfigured"));
|
||
}
|
||
let u32at = |o: usize| u32::from_le_bytes([b[o], b[o + 1], b[o + 2], b[o + 3]]);
|
||
Ok(Reconfigured {
|
||
accepted: b[5] != 0,
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: u32at(6),
|
||
height: u32at(10),
|
||
refresh_hz: u32at(14),
|
||
},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl RequestKeyframe {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
// magic[0..4] type[4] — no payload
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(5);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
|
||
b.push(MSG_REQUEST_KEYFRAME);
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<RequestKeyframe> {
|
||
if b.len() != 5 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_REQUEST_KEYFRAME {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad RequestKeyframe"));
|
||
}
|
||
Ok(RequestKeyframe)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl ProbeRequest {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
// magic[0..4] type[4] target_kbps[5..9] duration_ms[9..13]
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(13);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
|
||
b.push(MSG_PROBE_REQUEST);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.target_kbps.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.duration_ms.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<ProbeRequest> {
|
||
if b.len() != 13 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_PROBE_REQUEST {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad ProbeRequest"));
|
||
}
|
||
let u32at = |o: usize| u32::from_le_bytes([b[o], b[o + 1], b[o + 2], b[o + 3]]);
|
||
Ok(ProbeRequest {
|
||
target_kbps: u32at(5),
|
||
duration_ms: u32at(9),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl ProbeResult {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
// magic[0..4] type[4] bytes_sent[5..13] packets_sent[13..17] duration_ms[17..21]
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(21);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
|
||
b.push(MSG_PROBE_RESULT);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.bytes_sent.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.packets_sent.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.duration_ms.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<ProbeResult> {
|
||
if b.len() != 21 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_PROBE_RESULT {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad ProbeResult"));
|
||
}
|
||
Ok(ProbeResult {
|
||
bytes_sent: u64::from_le_bytes(b[5..13].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||
packets_sent: u32::from_le_bytes(b[13..17].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||
duration_ms: u32::from_le_bytes(b[17..21].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl ClockProbe {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
// magic[0..4] type[4] t1[5..13]
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(13);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
|
||
b.push(MSG_CLOCK_PROBE);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.t1_ns.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<ClockProbe> {
|
||
if b.len() != 13 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_CLOCK_PROBE {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad ClockProbe"));
|
||
}
|
||
Ok(ClockProbe {
|
||
t1_ns: u64::from_le_bytes(b[5..13].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl ClockEcho {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
// magic[0..4] type[4] t1[5..13] t2[13..21] t3[21..29]
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(29);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(CTL_MAGIC);
|
||
b.push(MSG_CLOCK_ECHO);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.t1_ns.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.t2_ns.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&self.t3_ns.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Result<ClockEcho> {
|
||
if b.len() != 29 || &b[0..4] != CTL_MAGIC || b[4] != MSG_CLOCK_ECHO {
|
||
return Err(PunktfunkError::InvalidArg("bad ClockEcho"));
|
||
}
|
||
Ok(ClockEcho {
|
||
t1_ns: u64::from_le_bytes(b[5..13].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||
t2_ns: u64::from_le_bytes(b[13..21].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||
t3_ns: u64::from_le_bytes(b[21..29].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Frame a message for the control stream: `u16 LE length || payload`.
|
||
pub fn frame(payload: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(2 + payload.len());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u16).to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(payload);
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Datagram wire tags. Video rides UDP; everything low-rate rides QUIC datagrams,
|
||
/// demultiplexed by the first byte: input = [`crate::input::INPUT_MAGIC`] (0xC8, client→host),
|
||
/// audio = [`AUDIO_MAGIC`] (0xC9, host→client), rumble = [`RUMBLE_MAGIC`] (0xCA, host→client),
|
||
/// mic = [`MIC_MAGIC`] (0xCB, client→host), rich-input = [`RICH_INPUT_MAGIC`] (0xCC, client→host),
|
||
/// HID-output = [`HIDOUT_MAGIC`] (0xCD, host→client).
|
||
pub const AUDIO_MAGIC: u8 = 0xC9;
|
||
pub const RUMBLE_MAGIC: u8 = 0xCA;
|
||
/// Microphone uplink: the client's mic, Opus-encoded, client → host (the inverse of
|
||
/// [`AUDIO_MAGIC`]). The host feeds it into a virtual PipeWire source so its apps can record it.
|
||
pub const MIC_MAGIC: u8 = 0xCB;
|
||
/// Rich client→host input: events too big for the fixed 18-byte [`InputEvent`]
|
||
/// (crate::input::InputEvent) — the DualSense touchpad and motion sensors. Variable-length,
|
||
/// kind-tagged (see [`RichInput`]).
|
||
pub const RICH_INPUT_MAGIC: u8 = 0xCC;
|
||
/// HID output, host → client: DualSense feedback a game wrote to the host's virtual controller
|
||
/// (lightbar, player LEDs, adaptive triggers) — the rich analog of [`RUMBLE_MAGIC`]. See
|
||
/// [`HidOutput`].
|
||
pub const HIDOUT_MAGIC: u8 = 0xCD;
|
||
|
||
/// Audio datagram, host → client: `[0xC9][u32 seq LE][u64 pts_ns LE][opus payload]`.
|
||
/// One Opus frame per datagram (5 ms — well under any MTU); QUIC already encrypts.
|
||
pub fn encode_audio_datagram(seq: u32, pts_ns: u64, opus: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(13 + opus.len());
|
||
b.push(AUDIO_MAGIC);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&seq.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&pts_ns.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(opus);
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Parse an audio datagram → `(seq, pts_ns, opus payload)`. `None` on bad tag/length.
|
||
pub fn decode_audio_datagram(b: &[u8]) -> Option<(u32, u64, &[u8])> {
|
||
if b.len() < 13 || b[0] != AUDIO_MAGIC {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
let seq = u32::from_le_bytes(b[1..5].try_into().unwrap());
|
||
let pts_ns = u64::from_le_bytes(b[5..13].try_into().unwrap());
|
||
Some((seq, pts_ns, &b[13..]))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Rumble datagram, host → client: `[0xCA][u16 pad LE][u16 low LE][u16 high LE]`.
|
||
/// Force-feedback state for pad `pad` (0xFFFF amplitudes, 0/0 = stop).
|
||
pub fn encode_rumble_datagram(pad: u16, low: u16, high: u16) -> [u8; 7] {
|
||
let mut b = [0u8; 7];
|
||
b[0] = RUMBLE_MAGIC;
|
||
b[1..3].copy_from_slice(&pad.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b[3..5].copy_from_slice(&low.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b[5..7].copy_from_slice(&high.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Parse a rumble datagram → `(pad, low, high)`. `None` on bad tag/length.
|
||
pub fn decode_rumble_datagram(b: &[u8]) -> Option<(u16, u16, u16)> {
|
||
if b.len() < 7 || b[0] != RUMBLE_MAGIC {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
let u16at = |o: usize| u16::from_le_bytes([b[o], b[o + 1]]);
|
||
Some((u16at(1), u16at(3), u16at(5)))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Mic datagram, client → host: `[0xCB][u32 seq LE][u64 pts_ns LE][opus payload]` — the same
|
||
/// layout as [`encode_audio_datagram`] with [`MIC_MAGIC`], one Opus frame per datagram.
|
||
pub fn encode_mic_datagram(seq: u32, pts_ns: u64, opus: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(13 + opus.len());
|
||
b.push(MIC_MAGIC);
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&seq.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(&pts_ns.to_le_bytes());
|
||
b.extend_from_slice(opus);
|
||
b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Parse a mic datagram → `(seq, pts_ns, opus payload)`. `None` on bad tag/length.
|
||
pub fn decode_mic_datagram(b: &[u8]) -> Option<(u32, u64, &[u8])> {
|
||
if b.len() < 13 || b[0] != MIC_MAGIC {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
let seq = u32::from_le_bytes(b[1..5].try_into().unwrap());
|
||
let pts_ns = u64::from_le_bytes(b[5..13].try_into().unwrap());
|
||
Some((seq, pts_ns, &b[13..]))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const RICH_TOUCHPAD: u8 = 0x01;
|
||
const RICH_MOTION: u8 = 0x02;
|
||
|
||
/// A rich client→host controller input beyond the fixed [`InputEvent`](crate::input::InputEvent):
|
||
/// the DualSense touchpad and motion sensors. `pad` is the gamepad index. Wire form is
|
||
/// `[0xCC][kind][fields…]` — variable-length and kind-tagged (forward-compatible: an unknown
|
||
/// kind decodes to `None` and is dropped).
|
||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||
pub enum RichInput {
|
||
/// One touchpad contact. `x`/`y` are normalized `0..=65535` (the host scales to the
|
||
/// DualSense touchpad resolution); `active = false` lifts the finger.
|
||
Touchpad {
|
||
pad: u8,
|
||
finger: u8,
|
||
active: bool,
|
||
x: u16,
|
||
y: u16,
|
||
},
|
||
/// Motion sensors: `gyro` (pitch/yaw/roll) + `accel`, raw signed-16 in the sensor's own
|
||
/// units — passed straight into the DualSense report.
|
||
Motion {
|
||
pad: u8,
|
||
gyro: [i16; 3],
|
||
accel: [i16; 3],
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl RichInput {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut out = vec![RICH_INPUT_MAGIC];
|
||
match *self {
|
||
RichInput::Touchpad {
|
||
pad,
|
||
finger,
|
||
active,
|
||
x,
|
||
y,
|
||
} => {
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(&[RICH_TOUCHPAD, pad, finger, active as u8]);
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(&x.to_le_bytes());
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(&y.to_le_bytes());
|
||
}
|
||
RichInput::Motion { pad, gyro, accel } => {
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(&[RICH_MOTION, pad]);
|
||
for v in gyro.iter().chain(accel.iter()) {
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes());
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
out
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Option<RichInput> {
|
||
if b.first() != Some(&RICH_INPUT_MAGIC) {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
match *b.get(1)? {
|
||
RICH_TOUCHPAD if b.len() >= 9 => Some(RichInput::Touchpad {
|
||
pad: b[2],
|
||
finger: b[3],
|
||
active: b[4] != 0,
|
||
x: u16::from_le_bytes([b[5], b[6]]),
|
||
y: u16::from_le_bytes([b[7], b[8]]),
|
||
}),
|
||
RICH_MOTION if b.len() >= 15 => {
|
||
let i16at = |o: usize| i16::from_le_bytes([b[o], b[o + 1]]);
|
||
Some(RichInput::Motion {
|
||
pad: b[2],
|
||
gyro: [i16at(3), i16at(5), i16at(7)],
|
||
accel: [i16at(9), i16at(11), i16at(13)],
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
_ => None,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const HIDOUT_LED: u8 = 0x01;
|
||
const HIDOUT_PLAYER_LEDS: u8 = 0x02;
|
||
const HIDOUT_TRIGGER: u8 = 0x03;
|
||
|
||
/// DualSense feedback flowing host → client (what a game wrote to the host's virtual pad).
|
||
/// Wire form `[0xCD][kind][pad][fields…]`. The rich analog of the fixed rumble datagram;
|
||
/// rumble itself stays on [`RUMBLE_MAGIC`].
|
||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||
pub enum HidOutput {
|
||
/// Lightbar RGB.
|
||
Led { pad: u8, r: u8, g: u8, b: u8 },
|
||
/// Player-indicator LEDs (low 5 bits).
|
||
PlayerLeds { pad: u8, bits: u8 },
|
||
/// One adaptive-trigger effect: `which` 0 = L2, 1 = R2; `effect` is the raw DualSense
|
||
/// trigger parameter block (mode + params) for the client to replay on a real controller.
|
||
Trigger { pad: u8, which: u8, effect: Vec<u8> },
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl HidOutput {
|
||
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut out = vec![HIDOUT_MAGIC];
|
||
match self {
|
||
HidOutput::Led { pad, r, g, b } => {
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(&[HIDOUT_LED, *pad, *r, *g, *b])
|
||
}
|
||
HidOutput::PlayerLeds { pad, bits } => {
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(&[HIDOUT_PLAYER_LEDS, *pad, *bits])
|
||
}
|
||
HidOutput::Trigger { pad, which, effect } => {
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(&[HIDOUT_TRIGGER, *pad, *which]);
|
||
out.extend_from_slice(effect);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
out
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn decode(b: &[u8]) -> Option<HidOutput> {
|
||
if b.first() != Some(&HIDOUT_MAGIC) {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
match *b.get(1)? {
|
||
HIDOUT_LED if b.len() >= 6 => Some(HidOutput::Led {
|
||
pad: b[2],
|
||
r: b[3],
|
||
g: b[4],
|
||
b: b[5],
|
||
}),
|
||
HIDOUT_PLAYER_LEDS if b.len() >= 4 => Some(HidOutput::PlayerLeds {
|
||
pad: b[2],
|
||
bits: b[3],
|
||
}),
|
||
HIDOUT_TRIGGER if b.len() >= 4 => Some(HidOutput::Trigger {
|
||
pad: b[2],
|
||
which: b[3],
|
||
effect: b[4..].to_vec(),
|
||
}),
|
||
_ => None,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Async framed-message IO over a quinn stream (`u16 LE length || payload`).
|
||
pub mod io {
|
||
/// Read one framed message (bounded at 64 KiB — control messages are tiny).
|
||
pub async fn read_msg(recv: &mut quinn::RecvStream) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||
let mut len = [0u8; 2];
|
||
recv.read_exact(&mut len)
|
||
.await
|
||
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
|
||
let n = u16::from_le_bytes(len) as usize;
|
||
let mut buf = vec![0u8; n];
|
||
recv.read_exact(&mut buf)
|
||
.await
|
||
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
|
||
Ok(buf)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Write one framed message.
|
||
pub async fn write_msg(send: &mut quinn::SendStream, payload: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
|
||
send.write_all(&super::frame(payload))
|
||
.await
|
||
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// One wall-clock skew-handshake outcome (see [`clock_sync`]).
|
||
pub struct ClockSkew {
|
||
/// Host clock minus client clock, ns: add it to a client timestamp to express it in host time.
|
||
pub offset_ns: i64,
|
||
/// Round-trip time of the minimum-RTT sample, ns.
|
||
pub rtt_ns: u64,
|
||
/// How many probe rounds the host answered.
|
||
pub rounds: usize,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Run the wall-clock skew handshake from the client side over the (already-open) control stream:
|
||
/// `ROUNDS` [`ClockProbe`]/[`ClockEcho`] round-trips, returning the host↔client offset from the
|
||
/// minimum-RTT sample. `None` if the host never answers (an old host) — the caller then assumes a
|
||
/// shared clock. Each read is bounded so a silent host can't wedge session start. Shared by the
|
||
/// reference client and the embeddable connector; uses the realtime clock the host stamps `pts_ns`
|
||
/// with, so the offset aligns a client receive instant to the host's capture clock.
|
||
pub async fn clock_sync(
|
||
send: &mut quinn::SendStream,
|
||
recv: &mut quinn::RecvStream,
|
||
) -> Option<ClockSkew> {
|
||
use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||
fn now_ns() -> u64 {
|
||
SystemTime::now()
|
||
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||
.map(|d| d.as_nanos() as u64)
|
||
.unwrap_or(0)
|
||
}
|
||
const ROUNDS: usize = 8;
|
||
let read_timeout = Duration::from_secs(2);
|
||
let mut samples: Vec<(u64, u64, u64, u64)> = Vec::with_capacity(ROUNDS);
|
||
for _ in 0..ROUNDS {
|
||
let t1 = now_ns();
|
||
let probe = ClockProbe { t1_ns: t1 }.encode();
|
||
if io::write_msg(send, &probe).await.is_err() {
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
let read = tokio::time::timeout(read_timeout, io::read_msg(recv)).await;
|
||
let echo = match read {
|
||
Ok(Ok(b)) => match ClockEcho::decode(&b) {
|
||
Ok(e) => e,
|
||
Err(_) => break,
|
||
},
|
||
_ => break, // timeout or stream error -> old host / no skew support
|
||
};
|
||
samples.push((echo.t1_ns, echo.t2_ns, echo.t3_ns, now_ns()));
|
||
}
|
||
clock_offset_ns(&samples).map(|(offset_ns, rtt_ns)| ClockSkew {
|
||
offset_ns,
|
||
rtt_ns,
|
||
rounds: samples.len(),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// quinn endpoint constructors. Host: self-signed identity (fresh, or persisted PEMs via
|
||
/// [`endpoint::server_with_identity`]). Client: fingerprint pinning / TOFU via
|
||
/// [`endpoint::client_pinned`] ([`endpoint::client_insecure`] is the no-pin special case).
|
||
pub mod endpoint {
|
||
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
|
||
|
||
/// Shared QUIC transport tuning for BOTH the host and client endpoints. Keep-alive is the
|
||
/// load-bearing setting: with quinn's defaults it is OFF, so any quiet stretch on the
|
||
/// connection (no input, audio muted or stalled, a capture hiccup, a mode change) lets the
|
||
/// idle timer run out and quinn closes the session — surfacing to the embedder as
|
||
/// `next_au` → Closed. The native equivalent of Moonlight's ENet keepalive: a small PING
|
||
/// every `KEEP_ALIVE` keeps the path warm. The interval sits well under `MAX_IDLE` so
|
||
/// several keepalives can be lost back-to-back (a wifi roam, a brief blip) without a false
|
||
/// close, while a genuinely dead peer is still detected within `MAX_IDLE`.
|
||
fn stream_transport() -> Arc<quinn::TransportConfig> {
|
||
use std::time::Duration;
|
||
const MAX_IDLE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
|
||
const KEEP_ALIVE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(4);
|
||
let mut t = quinn::TransportConfig::default();
|
||
t.max_idle_timeout(Some(
|
||
quinn::IdleTimeout::try_from(MAX_IDLE).expect("20s is a valid QUIC idle timeout"),
|
||
));
|
||
t.keep_alive_interval(Some(KEEP_ALIVE));
|
||
Arc::new(t)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Server endpoint with a fresh self-signed certificate (tests/dev — production hosts
|
||
/// persist an identity and use [`server_with_identity`] so clients can pin it).
|
||
pub fn server(addr: std::net::SocketAddr) -> anyhow_result::Result<quinn::Endpoint> {
|
||
let cert = rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed(vec!["punktfunk".into()])
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("self-signed cert: {e}")))?;
|
||
let cert_der = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(cert.cert);
|
||
let key_der = rustls::pki_types::PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(cert.key_pair.serialize_der());
|
||
server_from_der(cert_der, key_der.into(), addr)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Server endpoint from a persisted PEM identity (certificate + PKCS#8 private key) —
|
||
/// the host's long-lived self-signed cert, so the fingerprint clients pin is stable
|
||
/// across restarts.
|
||
pub fn server_with_identity(
|
||
addr: std::net::SocketAddr,
|
||
cert_pem: &str,
|
||
key_pem: &str,
|
||
) -> anyhow_result::Result<quinn::Endpoint> {
|
||
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
|
||
let cert_der = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("cert pem: {e}")))?;
|
||
let key_der = rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer::from_pem_slice(key_pem.as_bytes())
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("key pem: {e}")))?;
|
||
server_from_der(cert_der, key_der, addr)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn server_from_der(
|
||
cert_der: rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'static>,
|
||
key_der: rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer<'static>,
|
||
addr: std::net::SocketAddr,
|
||
) -> anyhow_result::Result<quinn::Endpoint> {
|
||
let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
|
||
// Client auth is OFFERED but optional: a client that presents its self-signed
|
||
// identity is fingerprinted post-handshake (pairing / --require-pairing checks);
|
||
// one that presents none still connects (and is rejected at the app layer when
|
||
// pairing is required).
|
||
let rustls_cfg = rustls::ServerConfig::builder()
|
||
.with_client_cert_verifier(Arc::new(AcceptAnyClientCert))
|
||
.with_single_cert(vec![cert_der], key_der)
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("server config: {e}")))?;
|
||
let quic_cfg = quinn::crypto::rustls::QuicServerConfig::try_from(rustls_cfg)
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("quic server config: {e}")))?;
|
||
let mut server_config = quinn::ServerConfig::with_crypto(Arc::new(quic_cfg));
|
||
server_config.transport_config(stream_transport()); // keep-alive — see stream_transport
|
||
Ok(quinn::Endpoint::server(server_config, addr)?)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Generate a fresh self-signed identity (certificate + PKCS#8 key, both PEM) — what a
|
||
/// client persists once and presents on every connect so hosts can recognize it.
|
||
pub fn generate_identity() -> anyhow_result::Result<(String, String)> {
|
||
let cert = rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed(vec!["punktfunk-client".into()])
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("self-signed cert: {e}")))?;
|
||
Ok((cert.cert.pem(), cert.key_pair.serialize_pem()))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Fingerprint of the client certificate a connection presented (host side), if any.
|
||
pub fn peer_fingerprint(conn: &quinn::Connection) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
|
||
let identity = conn.peer_identity()?;
|
||
let certs = identity
|
||
.downcast::<Vec<rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'static>>>()
|
||
.ok()?;
|
||
certs.first().map(|c| cert_fingerprint(c.as_ref()))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// SHA-256 of a certificate's DER encoding — the fingerprint clients pin.
|
||
pub fn cert_fingerprint(cert_der: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||
use sha2::Digest;
|
||
sha2::Sha256::digest(cert_der).into()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Fingerprint of a PEM-encoded certificate (what a host logs/shows for pairing UX —
|
||
/// must match what the client's verifier computes from the DER on the wire).
|
||
pub fn fingerprint_of_pem(cert_pem: &str) -> anyhow_result::Result<[u8; 32]> {
|
||
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
|
||
let der = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("cert pem: {e}")))?;
|
||
Ok(cert_fingerprint(der.as_ref()))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Client endpoint that skips certificate verification (TOFU bootstrap — read the
|
||
/// observed fingerprint off the slot and pin it on the next connect).
|
||
pub fn client_insecure() -> anyhow_result::Result<quinn::Endpoint> {
|
||
client_pinned(None).0
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// What [`client_pinned`] returns: the endpoint plus the slot the verifier writes the
|
||
/// observed host fingerprint into during the handshake.
|
||
pub type PinnedClient = (
|
||
anyhow_result::Result<quinn::Endpoint>,
|
||
Arc<Mutex<Option<[u8; 32]>>>,
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
/// Client endpoint that verifies the host by certificate fingerprint.
|
||
///
|
||
/// `pin = Some(sha256)` rejects any host whose leaf cert doesn't hash to `sha256`;
|
||
/// `None` accepts any (trust-on-first-use). Either way the observed fingerprint is
|
||
/// written to the returned slot during the handshake, so a TOFU caller can persist it.
|
||
pub fn client_pinned(pin: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> PinnedClient {
|
||
client_pinned_with_identity(pin, None)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// [`client_pinned`], additionally presenting a client identity (PEM cert + PKCS#8
|
||
/// key) via TLS client auth — how a paired client identifies itself to the host.
|
||
pub fn client_pinned_with_identity(
|
||
pin: Option<[u8; 32]>,
|
||
identity: Option<(&str, &str)>,
|
||
) -> PinnedClient {
|
||
let observed = Arc::new(Mutex::new(None));
|
||
let ep = (|| {
|
||
let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
|
||
let builder = rustls::ClientConfig::builder()
|
||
.dangerous()
|
||
.with_custom_certificate_verifier(Arc::new(PinVerify {
|
||
pin,
|
||
observed: observed.clone(),
|
||
}));
|
||
let rustls_cfg = match identity {
|
||
None => builder.with_no_client_auth(),
|
||
Some((cert_pem, key_pem)) => {
|
||
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
|
||
let cert =
|
||
rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())
|
||
.map_err(|e| {
|
||
anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("client cert pem: {e}"))
|
||
})?;
|
||
let key = rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer::from_pem_slice(key_pem.as_bytes())
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("client key pem: {e}")))?;
|
||
builder
|
||
.with_client_auth_cert(vec![cert], key)
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("client auth: {e}")))?
|
||
}
|
||
};
|
||
let quic_cfg = quinn::crypto::rustls::QuicClientConfig::try_from(rustls_cfg)
|
||
.map_err(|e| anyhow_result::Error::msg(format!("quic client config: {e}")))?;
|
||
let mut client_cfg = quinn::ClientConfig::new(Arc::new(quic_cfg));
|
||
client_cfg.transport_config(stream_transport()); // keep-alive — see stream_transport
|
||
let mut ep = quinn::Endpoint::client("0.0.0.0:0".parse().unwrap())?;
|
||
ep.set_default_client_config(client_cfg);
|
||
Ok(ep)
|
||
})();
|
||
(ep, observed)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Minimal error plumbing without pulling anyhow into punktfunk-core's public API.
|
||
pub mod anyhow_result {
|
||
pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
|
||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||
pub struct Error(String);
|
||
impl Error {
|
||
pub fn msg(s: String) -> Self {
|
||
Error(s)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
impl std::fmt::Display for Error {
|
||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
|
||
f.write_str(&self.0)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
impl std::error::Error for Error {}
|
||
impl From<std::io::Error> for Error {
|
||
fn from(e: std::io::Error) -> Self {
|
||
Error(e.to_string())
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Fingerprint-pinning verifier: trust is the SHA-256 of the host's (self-signed) leaf
|
||
/// cert, not a CA chain. With no pin it accepts any cert (TOFU) but still records what
|
||
/// it saw, so the embedder can persist the fingerprint and pin it from then on.
|
||
/// Server-side client-cert verifier: accept any (self-signed) client certificate but
|
||
/// verify the handshake signature for real — possession of the presented cert's key is
|
||
/// what makes the post-handshake fingerprint ([`peer_fingerprint`]) meaningful.
|
||
/// Authorization (is this fingerprint paired?) happens at the application layer.
|
||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||
struct AcceptAnyClientCert;
|
||
|
||
impl rustls::server::danger::ClientCertVerifier for AcceptAnyClientCert {
|
||
fn root_hint_subjects(&self) -> &[rustls::DistinguishedName] {
|
||
&[]
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn client_auth_mandatory(&self) -> bool {
|
||
false // unpaired/legacy clients still connect; gating is per-feature
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn verify_client_cert(
|
||
&self,
|
||
_end_entity: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
|
||
_intermediates: &[rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>],
|
||
_now: rustls::pki_types::UnixTime,
|
||
) -> std::result::Result<rustls::server::danger::ClientCertVerified, rustls::Error>
|
||
{
|
||
Ok(rustls::server::danger::ClientCertVerified::assertion())
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn verify_tls12_signature(
|
||
&self,
|
||
message: &[u8],
|
||
cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
|
||
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
|
||
) -> std::result::Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error>
|
||
{
|
||
rustls::crypto::verify_tls12_signature(
|
||
message,
|
||
cert,
|
||
dss,
|
||
&rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn verify_tls13_signature(
|
||
&self,
|
||
message: &[u8],
|
||
cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
|
||
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
|
||
) -> std::result::Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error>
|
||
{
|
||
rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature(
|
||
message,
|
||
cert,
|
||
dss,
|
||
&rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<rustls::SignatureScheme> {
|
||
rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider()
|
||
.signature_verification_algorithms
|
||
.supported_schemes()
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||
struct PinVerify {
|
||
pin: Option<[u8; 32]>,
|
||
observed: Arc<Mutex<Option<[u8; 32]>>>,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier for PinVerify {
|
||
fn verify_server_cert(
|
||
&self,
|
||
end_entity: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
|
||
_intermediates: &[rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>],
|
||
_server_name: &rustls::pki_types::ServerName<'_>,
|
||
_ocsp: &[u8],
|
||
_now: rustls::pki_types::UnixTime,
|
||
) -> std::result::Result<rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified, rustls::Error>
|
||
{
|
||
let fp = cert_fingerprint(end_entity.as_ref());
|
||
*self.observed.lock().unwrap() = Some(fp);
|
||
if let Some(expected) = self.pin {
|
||
if fp != expected {
|
||
return Err(rustls::Error::InvalidCertificate(
|
||
rustls::CertificateError::ApplicationVerificationFailure,
|
||
));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
Ok(rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified::assertion())
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// The handshake signatures MUST be verified for real even though we pin the cert:
|
||
// CertificateVerify is what proves the peer *holds the pinned cert's private key* —
|
||
// skip it and an active MITM can replay the host's (public) certificate, match the
|
||
// pin, and complete the handshake with its own key.
|
||
fn verify_tls12_signature(
|
||
&self,
|
||
message: &[u8],
|
||
cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
|
||
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
|
||
) -> std::result::Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error>
|
||
{
|
||
rustls::crypto::verify_tls12_signature(
|
||
message,
|
||
cert,
|
||
dss,
|
||
&rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn verify_tls13_signature(
|
||
&self,
|
||
message: &[u8],
|
||
cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
|
||
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
|
||
) -> std::result::Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error>
|
||
{
|
||
rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature(
|
||
message,
|
||
cert,
|
||
dss,
|
||
&rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<rustls::SignatureScheme> {
|
||
rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider()
|
||
.signature_verification_algorithms
|
||
.supported_schemes()
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||
mod tests {
|
||
use super::*;
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn welcome_roundtrip() {
|
||
let w = Welcome {
|
||
abi_version: 1,
|
||
udp_port: 9999,
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: 2560,
|
||
height: 1440,
|
||
refresh_hz: 240,
|
||
},
|
||
fec: FecConfig {
|
||
scheme: FecScheme::Gf16,
|
||
fec_percent: 20,
|
||
max_data_per_block: 4096,
|
||
},
|
||
shard_payload: 1200,
|
||
encrypt: true,
|
||
key: [7u8; 16],
|
||
salt: [1, 2, 3, 4],
|
||
frames: 600,
|
||
compositor: CompositorPref::Gamescope,
|
||
gamepad: GamepadPref::DualSense,
|
||
bitrate_kbps: 50_000,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(Welcome::decode(&w.encode()).unwrap(), w);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn hello_start_roundtrip() {
|
||
let h = Hello {
|
||
abi_version: 1,
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: 1280,
|
||
height: 720,
|
||
refresh_hz: 120,
|
||
},
|
||
compositor: CompositorPref::Kwin,
|
||
gamepad: GamepadPref::DualSense,
|
||
bitrate_kbps: 25_000,
|
||
name: Some("Test Device".into()),
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(Hello::decode(&h.encode()).unwrap(), h);
|
||
let s = Start {
|
||
client_udp_port: 1234,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(Start::decode(&s.encode()).unwrap(), s);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn compositor_pref_wire_and_names() {
|
||
for p in [
|
||
CompositorPref::Auto,
|
||
CompositorPref::Kwin,
|
||
CompositorPref::Wlroots,
|
||
CompositorPref::Mutter,
|
||
CompositorPref::Gamescope,
|
||
] {
|
||
assert_eq!(CompositorPref::from_u8(p.to_u8()), p);
|
||
assert_eq!(CompositorPref::from_name(p.as_str()), Some(p));
|
||
}
|
||
// Aliases + unknowns.
|
||
assert_eq!(CompositorPref::from_name("KDE"), Some(CompositorPref::Kwin));
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
CompositorPref::from_name("sway"),
|
||
Some(CompositorPref::Wlroots)
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(CompositorPref::from_name("nope"), None);
|
||
// Unknown wire byte degrades to Auto (forward-compatible).
|
||
assert_eq!(CompositorPref::from_u8(200), CompositorPref::Auto);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn gamepad_pref_wire_and_names() {
|
||
for p in [
|
||
GamepadPref::Auto,
|
||
GamepadPref::Xbox360,
|
||
GamepadPref::DualSense,
|
||
] {
|
||
assert_eq!(GamepadPref::from_u8(p.to_u8()), p);
|
||
assert_eq!(GamepadPref::from_name(p.as_str()), Some(p));
|
||
}
|
||
// Aliases + unknowns.
|
||
assert_eq!(GamepadPref::from_name("PS5"), Some(GamepadPref::DualSense));
|
||
assert_eq!(GamepadPref::from_name("x360"), Some(GamepadPref::Xbox360));
|
||
assert_eq!(GamepadPref::from_name("nope"), None);
|
||
// Unknown wire byte degrades to Auto (forward-compatible).
|
||
assert_eq!(GamepadPref::from_u8(200), GamepadPref::Auto);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn hello_welcome_compositor_back_compat() {
|
||
// Trailing optional bytes (compositor at 20/53, gamepad at 21/54): a legacy peer's
|
||
// shorter message still decodes (missing fields = Auto), and a legacy peer reading a
|
||
// new message ignores the trailing bytes. Simulate both directions by truncation.
|
||
let h = Hello {
|
||
abi_version: 2,
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: 1920,
|
||
height: 1080,
|
||
refresh_hz: 60,
|
||
},
|
||
compositor: CompositorPref::Mutter,
|
||
gamepad: GamepadPref::DualSense,
|
||
bitrate_kbps: 80_000,
|
||
name: None,
|
||
};
|
||
let enc = h.encode();
|
||
assert_eq!(enc.len(), 26);
|
||
// Legacy (20-byte) Hello → both Auto, no bitrate, mode intact.
|
||
let legacy = Hello::decode(&enc[..20]).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy.compositor, CompositorPref::Auto);
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy.gamepad, GamepadPref::Auto);
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy.bitrate_kbps, 0);
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy.mode, h.mode);
|
||
// Compositor-era (21-byte) Hello → compositor intact, gamepad Auto.
|
||
let mid = Hello::decode(&enc[..21]).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(mid.compositor, CompositorPref::Mutter);
|
||
assert_eq!(mid.gamepad, GamepadPref::Auto);
|
||
// Gamepad-era (22-byte) Hello → compositor + gamepad intact, bitrate 0 (host default).
|
||
let pre_bitrate = Hello::decode(&enc[..22]).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(pre_bitrate.gamepad, GamepadPref::DualSense);
|
||
assert_eq!(pre_bitrate.bitrate_kbps, 0);
|
||
// Full message → bitrate intact.
|
||
assert_eq!(Hello::decode(&enc).unwrap().bitrate_kbps, 80_000);
|
||
|
||
let w = Welcome {
|
||
abi_version: 2,
|
||
udp_port: 7000,
|
||
mode: h.mode,
|
||
fec: FecConfig {
|
||
scheme: FecScheme::Gf16,
|
||
fec_percent: 20,
|
||
max_data_per_block: 4096,
|
||
},
|
||
shard_payload: 1200,
|
||
encrypt: true,
|
||
key: [3u8; 16],
|
||
salt: [9, 8, 7, 6],
|
||
frames: 0,
|
||
compositor: CompositorPref::Kwin,
|
||
gamepad: GamepadPref::Xbox360,
|
||
bitrate_kbps: 120_000,
|
||
};
|
||
let wenc = w.encode();
|
||
assert_eq!(wenc.len(), 59);
|
||
let legacy_w = Welcome::decode(&wenc[..53]).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy_w.compositor, CompositorPref::Auto);
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy_w.gamepad, GamepadPref::Auto);
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy_w.bitrate_kbps, 0);
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy_w.frames, 0);
|
||
assert_eq!(legacy_w.key, w.key);
|
||
let mid_w = Welcome::decode(&wenc[..54]).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(mid_w.compositor, CompositorPref::Kwin);
|
||
assert_eq!(mid_w.gamepad, GamepadPref::Auto);
|
||
// Gamepad-era (55-byte) Welcome → gamepad intact, bitrate 0 (unknown).
|
||
let pre_bitrate_w = Welcome::decode(&wenc[..55]).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(pre_bitrate_w.gamepad, GamepadPref::Xbox360);
|
||
assert_eq!(pre_bitrate_w.bitrate_kbps, 0);
|
||
assert_eq!(Welcome::decode(&wenc).unwrap().bitrate_kbps, 120_000);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn hello_name_roundtrip_and_back_compat() {
|
||
let base = Hello {
|
||
abi_version: 2,
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: 1280,
|
||
height: 720,
|
||
refresh_hz: 60,
|
||
},
|
||
compositor: CompositorPref::Auto,
|
||
gamepad: GamepadPref::Auto,
|
||
bitrate_kbps: 0,
|
||
name: Some("Enrico's MacBook".into()),
|
||
};
|
||
let enc = base.encode();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
Hello::decode(&enc).unwrap().name.as_deref(),
|
||
Some("Enrico's MacBook")
|
||
);
|
||
// A bitrate-era (26-byte) peer reading a named Hello ignores the trailing name; a named
|
||
// host reading a bitrate-era Hello decodes name = None.
|
||
assert_eq!(Hello::decode(&enc[..26]).unwrap().name, None);
|
||
// No name → wire form is byte-identical to the bitrate-era message (26 bytes).
|
||
let unnamed = Hello {
|
||
name: None,
|
||
..base.clone()
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(unnamed.encode().len(), 26);
|
||
// Over-long names truncate to a char boundary within HELLO_NAME_MAX on encode.
|
||
let long = Hello {
|
||
name: Some(format!("{}ü", "x".repeat(HELLO_NAME_MAX - 1))), // ü straddles the cap
|
||
..base.clone()
|
||
};
|
||
let dec = Hello::decode(&long.encode()).unwrap();
|
||
let n = dec.name.expect("truncated name still present");
|
||
assert!(n.len() <= HELLO_NAME_MAX && n.starts_with('x'));
|
||
// A corrupt length byte (longer than the buffer) or bad UTF-8 degrades to None, never Err.
|
||
let mut bad_len = unnamed.encode();
|
||
bad_len.push(40); // claims 40 name bytes, none follow
|
||
assert_eq!(Hello::decode(&bad_len).unwrap().name, None);
|
||
let mut bad_utf8 = unnamed.encode();
|
||
bad_utf8.extend_from_slice(&[2, 0xFF, 0xFE]);
|
||
assert_eq!(Hello::decode(&bad_utf8).unwrap().name, None);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn reconfigure_roundtrip() {
|
||
let rq = Reconfigure {
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: 1920,
|
||
height: 1080,
|
||
refresh_hz: 144,
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(Reconfigure::decode(&rq.encode()).unwrap(), rq);
|
||
for accepted in [true, false] {
|
||
let rs = Reconfigured {
|
||
accepted,
|
||
mode: rq.mode,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(Reconfigured::decode(&rs.encode()).unwrap(), rs);
|
||
}
|
||
// The type byte separates the post-handshake messages from each other.
|
||
assert!(Reconfigure::decode(
|
||
&Reconfigured {
|
||
accepted: true,
|
||
mode: rq.mode
|
||
}
|
||
.encode()
|
||
)
|
||
.is_err());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn request_keyframe_roundtrip() {
|
||
let bytes = RequestKeyframe.encode();
|
||
assert!(RequestKeyframe::decode(&bytes).is_ok());
|
||
// Distinct from the other control messages — its type byte must not collide.
|
||
let mode = Mode {
|
||
width: 1280,
|
||
height: 720,
|
||
refresh_hz: 60,
|
||
};
|
||
assert!(RequestKeyframe::decode(&Reconfigure { mode }.encode()).is_err());
|
||
assert!(Reconfigure::decode(&bytes).is_err());
|
||
// Length is exact (no trailing bytes accepted).
|
||
assert!(RequestKeyframe::decode(&[bytes.as_slice(), &[0]].concat()).is_err());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn probe_messages_roundtrip() {
|
||
let req = ProbeRequest {
|
||
target_kbps: 250_000,
|
||
duration_ms: 2000,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(ProbeRequest::decode(&req.encode()).unwrap(), req);
|
||
let res = ProbeResult {
|
||
bytes_sent: 62_500_000,
|
||
packets_sent: 480,
|
||
duration_ms: 2003,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(ProbeResult::decode(&res.encode()).unwrap(), res);
|
||
// Type bytes keep the control messages disjoint from each other.
|
||
assert!(ProbeRequest::decode(&res.encode()).is_err());
|
||
assert!(Reconfigure::decode(&req.encode()).is_err());
|
||
assert!(ProbeResult::decode(&req.encode()).is_err());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn clock_messages_roundtrip() {
|
||
let probe = ClockProbe {
|
||
t1_ns: 1_700_000_000_123,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(ClockProbe::decode(&probe.encode()).unwrap(), probe);
|
||
let echo = ClockEcho {
|
||
t1_ns: 1_700_000_000_123,
|
||
t2_ns: 1_700_000_050_456,
|
||
t3_ns: 1_700_000_050_789,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(ClockEcho::decode(&echo.encode()).unwrap(), echo);
|
||
// Disjoint from the other control messages (distinct type bytes).
|
||
assert!(ClockProbe::decode(&echo.encode()).is_err());
|
||
assert!(ProbeRequest::decode(&probe.encode()).is_err());
|
||
assert!(ClockEcho::decode(&probe.encode()).is_err());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn clock_offset_picks_min_rtt_and_recovers_offset() {
|
||
// Host clock is +1_000_000 ns ahead of the client. Construct samples where a symmetric
|
||
// round-trip recovers exactly that offset, and a noisy (asymmetric, high-RTT) sample is
|
||
// present but must be ignored by the min-RTT selection.
|
||
const OFF: i64 = 1_000_000;
|
||
// Clean sample: client t1=0, one-way=200µs each way → t2 = t1 + 200_000 + OFF (host clock),
|
||
// t3 = t2 + 50_000 (host processing), t4 = t3 - OFF + 200_000 (back in client clock).
|
||
let t1 = 0u64;
|
||
let t2 = (t1 as i64 + 200_000 + OFF) as u64;
|
||
let t3 = t2 + 50_000;
|
||
let t4 = (t3 as i64 - OFF + 200_000) as u64;
|
||
// Noisy sample: same offset but a fat, asymmetric RTT (slow return path) — higher RTT.
|
||
let n1 = 1_000_000u64;
|
||
let n2 = (n1 as i64 + 200_000 + OFF) as u64;
|
||
let n3 = n2 + 50_000;
|
||
let n4 = (n3 as i64 - OFF + 5_000_000) as u64; // 5 ms return → big RTT
|
||
let (offset, rtt) =
|
||
clock_offset_ns(&[(n1, n2, n3, n4), (t1, t2, t3, t4)]).expect("non-empty");
|
||
// The min-RTT sample recovers the offset exactly; its RTT is 2x200us, and the noisy
|
||
// (asymmetric, 5 ms return) sample is ignored by the min-RTT selection.
|
||
assert_eq!(offset, OFF);
|
||
assert_eq!(rtt, 400_000);
|
||
assert!(clock_offset_ns(&[]).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn control_messages_disjoint_from_hello() {
|
||
// A Hello uses MAGIC (PKF1); control messages use CTL_MAGIC (PKFc). No Hello — at
|
||
// any abi_version — can be misparsed as a control message, and vice-versa.
|
||
for abi in [1u32, 2, 16, 0x10, 0x0113, 0x1410] {
|
||
let h = Hello {
|
||
abi_version: abi,
|
||
mode: Mode {
|
||
width: 1280,
|
||
height: 720,
|
||
refresh_hz: 60,
|
||
},
|
||
compositor: CompositorPref::Auto,
|
||
gamepad: GamepadPref::Auto,
|
||
bitrate_kbps: 0,
|
||
name: None,
|
||
}
|
||
.encode();
|
||
assert!(PairRequest::decode(&h).is_err(), "abi {abi} parsed as pair");
|
||
assert!(Reconfigure::decode(&h).is_err());
|
||
}
|
||
// And a PairRequest never parses as a Hello.
|
||
let pr = PairRequest {
|
||
name: "x".into(),
|
||
spake_a: vec![0u8; 33],
|
||
}
|
||
.encode();
|
||
assert!(Hello::decode(&pr).is_err());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn pair_messages_roundtrip() {
|
||
let pr = PairRequest {
|
||
name: "Enrico's Mac".into(),
|
||
spake_a: vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5],
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(PairRequest::decode(&pr.encode()).unwrap(), pr);
|
||
let pc = PairChallenge {
|
||
spake_b: vec![9; 33],
|
||
confirm: [7u8; 32],
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(PairChallenge::decode(&pc.encode()).unwrap(), pc);
|
||
let pp = PairProof { confirm: [3u8; 32] };
|
||
assert_eq!(PairProof::decode(&pp.encode()).unwrap(), pp);
|
||
for ok in [true, false] {
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
PairResult::decode(&PairResult { ok }.encode()).unwrap().ok,
|
||
ok
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
// Length-exact: a truncated/padded PairProof is rejected.
|
||
let mut bad = pp.encode();
|
||
bad.push(0);
|
||
assert!(PairProof::decode(&bad).is_err());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn spake2_pairing_agrees_only_on_matching_pin_and_certs() {
|
||
let cfp = [0x11u8; 32];
|
||
let hfp = [0x22u8; 32];
|
||
|
||
// Right PIN, same fingerprint views on both sides → both confirmations agree.
|
||
let (ca, ma) = pake::start(true, "4321", &cfp, &hfp);
|
||
let (cb, mb) = pake::start(false, "4321", &cfp, &hfp);
|
||
let a = ca.finish(&mb).unwrap();
|
||
let b = cb.finish(&ma).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(pake::verify(&a.host, &b.host) && pake::verify(&a.client, &b.client));
|
||
|
||
// Wrong PIN → different keys → confirmations DON'T match (one online guess wasted).
|
||
let (ca, ma) = pake::start(true, "0000", &cfp, &hfp);
|
||
let (cb, mb) = pake::start(false, "4321", &cfp, &hfp);
|
||
let a = ca.finish(&mb).unwrap();
|
||
let b = cb.finish(&ma).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(!pake::verify(&a.client, &b.client));
|
||
|
||
// MITM: the two legs saw different host certs → no agreement even with the right PIN.
|
||
let attacker_hfp = [0x33u8; 32];
|
||
let (ca, ma) = pake::start(true, "4321", &cfp, &attacker_hfp);
|
||
let (cb, mb) = pake::start(false, "4321", &cfp, &hfp);
|
||
let a = ca.finish(&mb).unwrap();
|
||
let b = cb.finish(&ma).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(!pake::verify(&a.client, &b.client));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn audio_datagram_roundtrip() {
|
||
let opus = [0x42u8; 97];
|
||
let d = encode_audio_datagram(7, 1_000_000_123, &opus);
|
||
assert_eq!(d[0], AUDIO_MAGIC);
|
||
let (seq, pts, payload) = decode_audio_datagram(&d).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!((seq, pts), (7, 1_000_000_123));
|
||
assert_eq!(payload, opus);
|
||
assert!(decode_audio_datagram(&d[..12]).is_none()); // truncated header
|
||
assert!(decode_audio_datagram(&[0u8; 13]).is_none()); // bad magic
|
||
|
||
// Empty payload is legal (DTX) — header-only datagram.
|
||
let header_only = encode_audio_datagram(0, 0, &[]);
|
||
let (_, _, empty) = decode_audio_datagram(&header_only).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(empty.is_empty());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn rumble_datagram_roundtrip() {
|
||
let d = encode_rumble_datagram(1, 0x1234, 0xFFFF);
|
||
assert_eq!(d[0], RUMBLE_MAGIC);
|
||
assert_eq!(decode_rumble_datagram(&d), Some((1, 0x1234, 0xFFFF)));
|
||
assert!(decode_rumble_datagram(&d[..6]).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mic_datagram_roundtrip_and_disjoint_from_audio() {
|
||
let opus = [0x5Au8; 80];
|
||
let d = encode_mic_datagram(42, 9_999, &opus);
|
||
assert_eq!(d[0], MIC_MAGIC);
|
||
let (seq, pts, payload) = decode_mic_datagram(&d).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!((seq, pts), (42, 9_999));
|
||
assert_eq!(payload, opus);
|
||
assert!(decode_mic_datagram(&d[..12]).is_none()); // truncated
|
||
// Tag separation: a mic datagram is not an audio datagram and vice-versa.
|
||
assert!(decode_audio_datagram(&d).is_none());
|
||
assert!(decode_mic_datagram(&encode_audio_datagram(1, 2, &opus)).is_none());
|
||
// Empty payload (DTX) is legal.
|
||
assert!(decode_mic_datagram(&encode_mic_datagram(0, 0, &[]))
|
||
.unwrap()
|
||
.2
|
||
.is_empty());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn rich_input_roundtrip() {
|
||
for ev in [
|
||
RichInput::Touchpad {
|
||
pad: 1,
|
||
finger: 0,
|
||
active: true,
|
||
x: 40000,
|
||
y: 12345,
|
||
},
|
||
RichInput::Motion {
|
||
pad: 0,
|
||
gyro: [-100, 200, -300],
|
||
accel: [16384, -8192, 1],
|
||
},
|
||
] {
|
||
let d = ev.encode();
|
||
assert_eq!(d[0], RICH_INPUT_MAGIC);
|
||
assert_eq!(RichInput::decode(&d), Some(ev));
|
||
}
|
||
// Disjoint from the fixed input datagram (0xC8); unknown kind + truncation → None.
|
||
assert!(RichInput::decode(&[crate::input::INPUT_MAGIC; 18]).is_none());
|
||
assert!(RichInput::decode(&[RICH_INPUT_MAGIC, 0x7F]).is_none()); // unknown kind
|
||
assert!(RichInput::decode(&[RICH_INPUT_MAGIC, RICH_TOUCHPAD, 0]).is_none());
|
||
// short
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn hid_output_roundtrip() {
|
||
let cases = [
|
||
HidOutput::Led {
|
||
pad: 2,
|
||
r: 0xAA,
|
||
g: 0xBB,
|
||
b: 0xCC,
|
||
},
|
||
HidOutput::PlayerLeds {
|
||
pad: 0,
|
||
bits: 0b10101,
|
||
},
|
||
HidOutput::Trigger {
|
||
pad: 1,
|
||
which: 1,
|
||
effect: vec![0x26, 0x90, 0xA0, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00],
|
||
},
|
||
];
|
||
for ev in &cases {
|
||
let d = ev.encode();
|
||
assert_eq!(d[0], HIDOUT_MAGIC);
|
||
assert_eq!(HidOutput::decode(&d).as_ref(), Some(ev));
|
||
}
|
||
assert!(HidOutput::decode(&[HIDOUT_MAGIC, 0x7F]).is_none()); // unknown kind
|
||
// A rich-input datagram is not a HID-output datagram.
|
||
assert!(HidOutput::decode(
|
||
&RichInput::Motion {
|
||
pad: 0,
|
||
gyro: [0; 3],
|
||
accel: [0; 3]
|
||
}
|
||
.encode()
|
||
)
|
||
.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn fingerprint_is_sha256_of_der() {
|
||
// Stable across calls, distinct for distinct certs.
|
||
let a = endpoint::cert_fingerprint(b"cert-a");
|
||
assert_eq!(a, endpoint::cert_fingerprint(b"cert-a"));
|
||
assert_ne!(a, endpoint::cert_fingerprint(b"cert-b"));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|