enricobuehler
defdfbdb58
Closes H-3 of the 2026-08-05 review, the last of its six highs. A plugin's
interface was reverse-proxied onto the console's own origin and framed with
`allow-same-origin`, so plugin JS ran as first-party code on that origin: one
`fetch('/api/**', {credentials:'same-origin'})` and the BFF attached the
operator's ADMIN bearer. That reached everything `plugin_may_access` withholds
— arm pairing, read the host PIN, approve a device, read `/hooks`. The "open
in new tab" link was the same escalation with no iframe involved at all.
The fix is not a sandbox attribute, and it is worth writing down why, because
the obvious change is the one that does not work. Dropping `allow-same-origin`
gives the frame an OPAQUE origin; its subresource requests are then cross-site;
the `SameSite=Lax` session cookie stops being sent; every plugin asset 302s to
/login and the frame is blank. Nothing about the new-tab link is helped either.
So the origin moves instead. A second listener on its own port (default
PORT + 1) serves plugin UIs and nothing else:
different ORIGIN — scheme+host+PORT — so the same-origin policy separates the
plugin from the console: it cannot read the console's DOM,
its cross-origin fetch of /api/** is unreadable (no CORS)
and cannot mutate (Sec-Fetch-Site sees same-site).
same SITE — cookie scope ignores the port and SameSite is computed on
the site, so the session cookie still reaches the plugin
listener and plugin pages keep working.
Enforcement is two refusals and both are load-bearing: the console origin
refuses /plugin-ui/**, and the plugin origin refuses everything ELSE — above
all /api/**, which would otherwise hand the admin bearer right back to plugin
JS that is now same-origin with that listener. Both are unconditional: if the
plugin port cannot be bound, plugin UIs are DISABLED and the console says so,
rather than falling back to the arrangement this exists to remove.
Two consequences that would otherwise bite in the field:
The port has to be open. Done for the Windows netsh rule, the firewalld
service and the ufw profile.
A browser stores a self-signed-certificate exception per ORIGIN, including
the port — and a certificate interstitial can never be shown inside an
iframe, so the frame would just sit blank with nothing on screen explaining
why. A `no-cors` probe distinguishes it (a TLS failure rejects; any HTTP
answer, even 401, resolves) and the console renders a card linking the
operator to open the port once in a real tab.
Also here: the health probe moved server-side to the console origin (it used
to rely on being same-origin with the plugin), the postMessage listener now
verifies `event.origin` — a real check rather than a tautology — and
plugin-kit's `postMessage(..., "*")` is documented as load-bearing, since
narrowing it to `location.origin` would now target the plugin's own origin and
silently drop every message.
Verified against a running console with a fake mgmt API and a fake plugin:
console /plugin-ui/** → 404; plugin-origin /api/v1/hooks, /, /login,
/_auth/logout → 404; plugin page loads 200 through its own origin;
unauthenticated plugin origin → 401 (not a redirect to a /login it does not
serve); a forged x-pf-listener header changes nothing on either listener; the
plugin's own Clear-Site-Data / Access-Control-Allow-Origin / Set-Cookie are
dropped by the proxy allowlist; the plugin origin's CSP names the console as
its only frame-ancestors source; and with the port squatted, ui-config reports
`unavailable`, the console still refuses /plugin-ui/**, and the console itself
keeps working.
Still wants on-glass confirmation in a real browser — the cookie and framing
behaviour is reasoned from spec, not observed.
cargo fmt --all --check clean; cargo check -p punktfunk-host --all-targets
green on Windows; web console builds and typechecks.
punktfunk web — management console
The browser UI for the punktfunk host's management REST API (crates/punktfunk-host/src/mgmt.rs,
OpenAPI at api/openapi.json). It shows live status, host capabilities, paired
clients, the pairing-PIN flow, and session controls.
Stack: TanStack Start (full SSR) on Bun via Nitro v2 (bun preset) · React
Query through orval codegen from the OpenAPI spec · @unom/ui
— the shared punktfunk/unom design system the marketing site + docs are built on (Tailwind v4,
animated components on the violet brand over dark chrome) ·
Paraglide i18n (en/de). Package manager + runtime: Bun.
The @unom registry mapping lives in .npmrc; the auth token comes from
~/.npmrc (or a CI secret).
Develop
# from web/ — Bun is the toolchain (https://bun.sh)
bun install # runs `prepare` → codegen (orval + paraglide)
bun run dev # http://localhost:47992
# The dev server proxies /api → https://127.0.0.1:47990 (the host's mgmt API; it serves HTTPS
# with the host's self-signed identity cert — the dev proxy uses `secure: false`).
# Point it elsewhere: PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL=https://<host>:47990 bun run dev
Start a host with the management API up:
# from the repo root — `serve` brings up the native punktfunk/1 plane + the mgmt API (the console
# only needs the mgmt API; add --gamestream too if you also want the Moonlight surface):
WAYLAND_DISPLAY=wayland-kde XDG_CURRENT_DESKTOP=KDE \
cargo run -rp punktfunk-host -- serve
# loopback :47990, no token (a token is mandatory for non-loopback binds).
The management token is server-side only — set PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN in the console's
environment and the BFF injects it when proxying (server/routes/api/[...].ts). It never reaches
the browser, so there is no token field in the UI; the browser only ever holds the session cookie.
Build & run (Nitro + Bun)
The console runs on bun (Bun.serve is a Bun API — node can't run it): Nitro's bun preset
plus a custom entry (nitro-entry/bun-https.mjs) that calls Bun.serve({ tls }), so it serves
HTTPS (HTTP/1.1 over TLS) with the host's own identity cert (the cert native clients already
pin). One trust anchor across the data plane, the mgmt API, and this console. (No HTTP/2 — Bun.serve
has no h2 server — and no HTTP/3, which a browser won't speak against this self-signed, no-SAN host
cert; a browser-trusted, SAN-matching cert + a fronting server would be needed, out of scope for a
LAN console.)
bun run build # → .output/ (Nitro `bun` preset + our Bun.serve TLS entry)
PORT=47992 HOST=0.0.0.0 \
PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD=… PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN=… \
PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL=https://127.0.0.1:47990 \
PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_CERT=~/.config/punktfunk/cert.pem \
PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_KEY=~/.config/punktfunk/key.pem PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE=1 \
bun run start # = bun run .output/server/index.mjs
# PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_* unset ⇒ plain HTTP (local dev); both set ⇒ HTTPS (HTTP/1.1 over TLS).
# The host's self-signed mgmt cert is accepted only for the proxy's loopback hop, scoped in code
# (Bun per-request TLS: server/routes/api/[...].ts) — no process-wide NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED.
# See .env.example.
bun run lint # tsc --noEmit
The built Nitro bun server SSR-renders the app and is the only thing exposed on the LAN.
Run it on the same box as the host; it serves the console over HTTPS on :47992 (or $PORT).
Auth (backend-for-frontend)
Single-user, login-gated. Config via env (see .env.example):
- The console requires a login (
PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD). On success the server sets a sealed session cookie (h3useSession, AES-GCM).server/middleware/auth.tsgates every request — pages redirect to/login,/apireturns 401 — and fails closed (503) ifPUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORDis unset, so a misconfigured LAN server admits no one. - The bearer-token admin surface of the management API is loopback-only — the host honors a
bearer token only from a loopback peer, so the admin API is never LAN-exposed. The web server
holds
PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKENserver-side and injects it when proxying/api/**→PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL(loopback;server/routes/api/[...].ts). The token never reaches the browser; the browser only ever holds the session cookie. (The host also binds the read-only surface — host status + the game library — to the LAN so paired native clients can fetch it directly over mTLS; that path uses client certs, not the token, and never touches this console.)
So: browser ──password──▶ web server (session cookie) ──mgmt token, server-side──▶ mgmt API.
Run the host with a matching token: cargo run -rp punktfunk-host -- serve +
PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN=… (or --mgmt-token …). vite dev has no gate (localhost-only) and
proxies straight to the loopback mgmt API.
Toolchain notes (load-bearing): TanStack Start's
start-plugin-corepeer-requires Vite ≥ 7 — on Vite 6 the build's prerender/post-build hook silently doesn't run.@vitejs/plugin-reactmust match Vite (v5 ↔ Vite 7, v6 ↔ Vite 8); it's required even for dev (TanStack Start's dev mode needs the React Refresh runtime, else a blank screen). Nitro is the server target — without itvite buildonly emits client+SSR bundles, no deployable server. The Nitrobunpreset makes.output/server/index.mjsBun-runnable.
Codegen
Generated code is not committed (gitignored) — reproduced from sources:
bun run codegen— regenerate the API client (orval) + i18n runtime (paraglide). Runs onbun install(prepare) and beforedev/build(pre*for orval; the Vite plugin compiles paraglide on dev/build).- After a management-API change, regenerate the spec on the Rust side first:
cargo run -p punktfunk-host -- openapi > api/openapi.json, thenbun run api:gen.
Layout
src/
routes/ file-based routes (index=dashboard, host, clients, pairing, settings)
components/
app-shell.tsx sidebar nav (brand lens + wordmark) + language switcher
brand-mark/wordmark/logo.tsx punktfunk lens mark + wordmark (shared with the site/docs)
ui/ @unom/ui-backed primitives (button, input, label, card; badge/table/skeleton)
query-state.tsx loading/error wrapper (401 → the session is gone, re-login)
api/
fetcher.ts orval mutator: base URL, bearer token, JSON, throwing ApiError
gen/ GENERATED react-query hooks + models (orval)
lib/i18n.ts reactive Paraglide locale hook
paraglide/ GENERATED i18n runtime (paraglide)
messages/{en,de}.json translation sources