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fix(pf-vdisplay): a CAPPED compositor refuses /proc/exe — NixOS+KDE still undetectable
v0.27.0 resolved the nixpkgs wrapper decoration (`.kwin_wayland-w`) through `/proc/<pid>/exe`.
On the box that fix was written for, the kernel refuses that link.

Reading `/proc/<pid>/exe` is not gated on owning the process: `cap_ptrace_access_check` requires
the reader's effective set to be a superset of the target's PERMITTED set. NixOS's own Plasma
module ships `security.wrappers.kwin_wayland = { capabilities = "cap_sys_nice+ep"; }`, and our
host must stay uncapped — a capability is precisely what makes it unidentifiable to KWin (#136).
So the two traps compose: the name NEEDS `exe` because nixpkgs wrapped the binary, and `exe` is
DENIED because NixOS capped it. `detect_active_session` went back to `ActiveKind::None`, and every
connect died `no usable compositor` with `wayland="-"` — the identical signature to the bug #158
fixed, which is why a box worked around with a decoy process broke again when the decoy went away.

`match_name` now falls through to `argv[0]` (`/proc/<pid>/cmdline`) when `exe` is unreadable. It
reads correctly for the same reason `ps` does: make-wrapper's wrapper `exec -a "$0"`s the hidden
binary, so `argv[0]` survives the decoration `comm` does not. It is consulted LAST and never
overrides a readable `exe` — it is the process's own claim about itself, and a same-uid process can
set it to anything; the worst a spoof achieves is aiming detection at a backend that then fails its
own availability probe.

MEASURED (Linux 6.x, same-uid reader, target holding cap_sys_nice), for a file capability and for
the ambient form `security.wrappers` actually uses — identically:

  /proc/<pid> owner   real uid   (so the uid filter upstream was never the problem)
  comm                readable   (decorated + truncated, unusable alone)
  exe                 EACCES
  cmdline (argv[0])   readable

End-to-end against a LIVE capped, `.kwin_wayland-wrapped` process, old resolver vs new, both
extracted verbatim from their own sources: v0.27.0 answers `.kwin_wayland-w` (no match) in both
capped scenarios and `kwin_wayland` uncapped; the fixed one answers `kwin_wayland` in all three.

Also reached by the same rung: gamescope carries `cap_sys_nice` on a number of distros, so a
wrapped-and-capped gamescope was equally invisible to the foreign-gamescope probe.

Tests are fixture-driven (a temp dir with `comm`/`exe`/`cmdline`), for the reason #158 documented:
a renamed `/bin/sleep` stand-in dies instantly on multi-call coreutils and reads exactly like the
resolver being broken. 11 tests extracted verbatim and executed on Linux as a non-root user —
0 failures. `cargo fmt --check` and `scripts/xcheck.sh linux clippy` (`--all-targets`) clean.

Refs #158, #136.
2026-08-10 23:23:59 +02:00
..