c5402cb1f7
The wire half of sub-frame slice output (latency §7 LN1, planning
design/nvenc-subframe-slice-output.md Phase 2): toward a client that
advertises the new cap bit (0x20), a chunked-poll encoder session ships each
AU's completed FEC blocks while the tail of the frame is still encoding —
the AU's last packet leaves the host as the encode finishes instead of
after it.
Wire semantics (negotiated; zero change for anyone else):
- Non-final blocks ride SENTINEL headers: block_count = 0 (a value no legacy
sender emits) + frame_bytes = 0 + exactly max_data_per_block data shards,
so the receiver's shard-offset formula needs no total.
- The final block's headers carry the real frame_bytes/block_count (+
FLAG_EOF) and RETRO-VALIDATE the whole frame: totals under which a
received sentinel block is out of range or not full-K kill the frame
wholesale (no spliced delivery) and the index can't be resurrected.
- Firewall: sentinels are bounded by the negotiated limits (full-K exactly,
never the last block the limits allow, no total to lie about); the exact
derived-geometry check runs unchanged on every non-sentinel packet and
retroactively at pinning. Sentinel opens commit a max_frame_bytes buffer,
bounded by the existing IN_FLIGHT_BUF_FACTOR budget (amplification test).
- Order-agnostic like legacy: a reversed frame (final block first) opens
legacy-shaped and still accepts its sentinels against the pinned totals.
- Small/empty streamed AUs degenerate to byte-identical legacy headers.
Host: Packetizer::{begin,push,finish}_streamed seal full-K blocks (data +
parity per block) as chunks arrive; Session::seal_streamed_* share the
pooled-wire + two-lane seal machinery via the new seal_run; the send thread
paces each flush under the frame's existing deadline (pace_sealed split out
of paced_submit) and runs the whole-AU accounting at the last chunk; the
encode pump forwards poll_chunk output as ChunkMsg when the client has the
cap AND the encoder chunks (re-queried per AU — an escalation falls back
seamlessly). Probes never run mid-AU. PUNKTFUNK_STREAMED_AU=0 = host escape
hatch. Client core ORs the cap into Hello (the shared reassembler carries
the support). Sampled first_slice_us vs encode_us PERF log measures the
overlap; the 0xCF stage-field extension stays a follow-up.
Core tests: streamed round-trip (clean/loss/reorder/duplicate, both orders),
sentinel firewall bounds, lying-final wholesale kill + no-resurrect,
open-amplification budget, header-shape pins. Gates still owed before
default-on: security review pass, loss-harness curve, GameStream smoke
(plane untouched structurally), bitrate A/B.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
punktfunk-core
The shared protocol core — the one place where punktfunk's transport, forward error correction, and crypto live. It's linked into the host and every native client, so there's exactly one implementation of the wire format everywhere.
Written in Rust with no async on the per-frame path (native threads only). It exposes both a normal Rust API and a stable, versioned C ABI, so the Swift and Kotlin clients — and any C embedder — link the same code as the Rust ones.
What's in here
- Transport & session (
session.rs,transport/,packet.rs) — thepunktfunk/1data plane over raw UDP: packetization, reassembly (with attacker-bounded limits), pacing, and socket tuning. - FEC (
fec/) — the wall-breaker. Two codes:- GF(2⁸) classic Reed–Solomon with the Cauchy generator matrix — byte-identical to the
nanorslibrary Moonlight uses, so our parity is decodable by a stock Moonlight client. - GF(2¹⁶) Leopard-RS (SIMD, O(n log n)) — up to 65535 shards/block, which removes the ~1 Gbps
FEC ceiling.
punktfunk/1negotiates this one.
- GF(2⁸) classic Reed–Solomon with the Cauchy generator matrix — byte-identical to the
- Crypto (
crypto.rs) — AES-128-GCM session encryption with per-direction nonce salts and sequence-as-AAD; SPAKE2 PIN pairing lives behind thequicfeature. - QUIC control plane (
quic.rs,client.rs, featurequic) — the Hello/Welcome/Start handshake, cert pinning/TOFU, reverse audio, and the embeddableNativeClientconnector. This is the only placetokio/quinnare allowed; the feature is off by default so the core stays runtime-free. - C ABI (
abi.rs) — the versioned surface (punktfunk_abi_version(),PunktfunkConfigcarrying its ownstruct_size) that generatesinclude/punktfunk_core.hvia cbindgen at build time.
Build outputs
The crate builds three ways at once (crate-type = ["lib", "cdylib", "staticlib"]):
| Output | Used by |
|---|---|
lib (rlib) |
the host, probe, and tools link it as a normal Rust crate |
cdylib (.so/.dylib) |
the Swift / Kotlin clients via the C ABI |
staticlib (.a) |
the C test harness and static embedding |
Test
cargo test -p punktfunk-core # unit + proptest + loopback
cargo run -p loss-harness # FEC loss-resilience sweep (no network needed)
bash crates/punktfunk-core/tests/c/run.sh # standalone C-ABI link + round-trip proof
Design invariants (do not regress)
- One core, linked everywhere — protocol/FEC/crypto live only here, behind the stable C ABI.
- No async on the hot path — the per-frame pipeline is native threads only;
quic(tokio/quinn) is control-plane only, feature-gated, off by default. - Security hardening stays intact — the reassembler bounds attacker-controlled fields before
allocating; AES-GCM keeps per-direction nonce salts + seq-as-AAD; the ABI checks
struct_size. Regression tests exist — keep them green.
Related
punktfunk-host— the streaming host built on this core- Clients — the apps that link this core over the C ABI (or directly, in Rust)
- punktfunk-planning:
implementation-plan.md(internal planning repo) — why GF(2¹⁶) FEC, the latency budget, and the architecture thesis