Files
punktfunk/crates/punktfunk-host/src/inject/windows/gamepad_raii.rs
T
enricobuehler 796d381926 fix(windows): opt-in pad-driver file logs + size-capped service log rotation
Two disk-write fixes:

- pf-xusb/pf-dualsense no longer write C:\Users\Public\pf*-driver.log
  unconditionally — the file log is now opt-in (debug builds, or the
  PFXUSB_DEBUG_LOG / PFDS_DEBUG_LOG system env var), mirroring the audit-§4.4
  fix pf-vdisplay already got: a release driver never writes the world-writable
  Public file (info-leak/DoS surface), and the per-report OUTPUT/SET_STATE hex
  dumps stop being a sustained per-rumble disk-write path during gameplay.
  OutputDebugStringA stays unconditional; the host's driver-silence WARN and
  the gamepad-driver-health failure-mode table now say the log is opt-in.

- service.log/host.log get one-generation rotation: at each (re)open a file
  over 10 MB is renamed to .old, so a crash-restart loop or a RUST_LOG=debug
  left in host.env can't grow the append-forever logs without bound. Rotation
  runs only before an open (never under a live appender — host.log's handle
  lacks FILE_SHARE_DELETE, so a racing rename harmlessly fails).

Windows CI compile/clippy pending (drivers workspace + host are not
Linux-cross-checkable); rides along with the next pad-driver redeploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 14:03:32 +00:00

625 lines
30 KiB
Rust

//! Per-pad Windows resource RAII + the **sealed gamepad channel** broker (DualSense / DualShock 4 /
//! XUSB backends).
//!
//! Each virtual pad owns three OS resources: the **unnamed** DATA section the `pf_dualsense`/`pf_xusb`
//! driver works against (`XusbShm`/`PadShm`), the tiny **named** bootstrap mailbox
//! (`pf_driver_proto::gamepad::PadBootstrap`) that hands the driver a duplicated handle to it, and the
//! `SwDeviceCreate`'d software devnode the driver loads on. [`Shm`] and [`SwDevice`] own the resources
//! with RAII; [`PadChannel`] owns the two sections plus the delivery handshake.
//!
//! **Why the channel is sealed** (`design/gamepad-channel-sealing.md`): the DATA section used to be a
//! `Global\pf…-shm-<index>` named section with an SY+LS DACL, which let any *sibling LocalService*
//! process open it by name to read the live controller input or inject/forge input and rumble — the
//! same name-open vector the frame ring closed (`design/idd-push-security.md`). The DATA section is now
//! UNNAMED with a SYSTEM-only DACL and reaches the driver exclusively as a handle this host duplicated
//! into its WUDFHost (a duplicated handle carries the source's access, so no LS ACE is needed). The pad
//! drivers are UMDF HID minidrivers with **no control device** (hidclass owns the stack), so unlike the
//! frame channel there is no IOCTL to deliver the handle or learn the WUDFHost pid — hence the
//! late-bound [`PadBootstrap`] mailbox handshake, the one *named* object left. It carries only pids and
//! a handle VALUE (meaningless outside the target process), so tampering with it yields at worst a
//! gamepad DoS, never a read or an injection; the empirical floor from the frame work holds here too
//! (a LocalService token is DACL-denied `OpenProcess` on a UMDF WUDFHost for every access right).
use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
use pf_driver_proto::gamepad::{PadBootstrap, BOOT_MAGIC, GAMEPAD_PROTO_VERSION};
use std::os::windows::io::{AsRawHandle, FromRawHandle, OwnedHandle};
use std::sync::atomic::{fence, AtomicU32, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::OnceLock;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use windows::core::{w, HSTRING, PCWSTR};
use windows::Win32::Devices::DeviceAndDriverInstallation::{
CM_Get_DevNode_Status, CM_Locate_DevNodeW, CM_DEVNODE_STATUS_FLAGS, CM_LOCATE_DEVNODE_NORMAL,
CM_PROB, CR_SUCCESS, DN_DRIVER_LOADED, DN_HAS_PROBLEM, DN_STARTED,
};
use windows::Win32::Devices::Enumeration::Pnp::{SwDeviceClose, HSWDEVICE};
use windows::Win32::Foundation::{
DuplicateHandle, GetLastError, SetLastError, DUPLICATE_HANDLE_OPTIONS, ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS,
HANDLE, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, WIN32_ERROR,
};
use windows::Win32::Security::Authorization::{
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW, SDDL_REVISION_1,
};
use windows::Win32::Security::{PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR, SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES};
use windows::Win32::System::Memory::{
CreateFileMappingW, MapViewOfFile, UnmapViewOfFile, FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS,
MEMORY_MAPPED_VIEW_ADDRESS, PAGE_READWRITE,
};
use windows::Win32::System::Threading::{
GetCurrentProcess, OpenProcess, PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION,
};
/// Least access the pad driver needs on the duplicated DATA section: it only MAPS it read/write, so
/// `SECTION_MAP_READ | SECTION_MAP_WRITE` (== the driver's `FILE_MAP_RW`). Granted explicitly in
/// [`PadChannel::deliver_to`] instead of `DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS` (least privilege for the sealed
/// section — the driver's handle then can't take ownership / change security / delete the object).
const SECTION_MAP_RW: u32 = 0x0004 | 0x0002;
/// An anonymous (pagefile-backed) shared section + its mapped read/write view. RAII: drop unmaps the
/// view, then the [`OwnedHandle`] closes the section handle (in that order). Created either
/// [unnamed](Self::create_unnamed) (the sealed DATA section — reachable only by handle duplication) or
/// [named](Self::create_named) (the bootstrap mailbox the driver opens by name).
pub(super) struct Shm {
/// Owns the section handle (closed on drop). Also the duplication source for the sealed channel —
/// see [`Shm::raw_handle`].
handle: OwnedHandle,
view: MEMORY_MAPPED_VIEW_ADDRESS,
}
/// Build a `SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES` from an SDDL literal (`psd` is OS-allocated and leaked — acceptable
/// for the handful of pad channels a host creates; it must outlive the returned `SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES`).
fn sddl_sa(sddl: PCWSTR) -> Result<SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES> {
let mut psd = PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR::default();
// SAFETY: the SDDL literal is valid; `psd` receives an OS-allocated descriptor (leaked — see above).
unsafe {
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(
sddl,
SDDL_REVISION_1,
&mut psd,
None,
)?;
}
Ok(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES {
nLength: core::mem::size_of::<SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES>() as u32,
lpSecurityDescriptor: psd.0,
bInheritHandle: false.into(),
})
}
impl Shm {
/// Create + zero an **unnamed** `size`-byte section, mapped read/write — the sealed DATA section.
/// SDDL `D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)` (SYSTEM-only, protected): with no name there is nothing to enumerate,
/// open, or squat, and the driver reaches it through a duplicated handle, which carries the
/// source's access without re-checking the object DACL (the exact property the frame ring
/// validated on-glass — `design/idd-push-security.md`).
pub(super) fn create_unnamed(size: usize) -> Result<Shm> {
let sa = sddl_sa(w!("D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)"))?;
Self::create_inner(&sa, PCWSTR::null(), size).context("create unnamed gamepad DATA section")
}
/// Create + zero a **named** `size`-byte section, mapped read/write — the bootstrap mailbox. SDDL
/// `D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;LS)`: SYSTEM (this host) + LocalService (the driver's WUDFHost opens it
/// by name). Safe to leave name-openable because it carries nothing exploitable (see the module
/// docs). **Squat-checked**: `Global\` names are creatable by any service holding
/// `SeCreateGlobalPrivilege` (LocalService has it), so if the name already exists —
/// `ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS`, meaning `CreateFileMappingW` silently *opened* a pre-existing object we
/// don't control — we close and retry briefly (our own driver holds the name for microseconds per
/// poll tick), then fail loudly rather than run the handshake through an attacker-owned (or
/// another host instance's) mailbox.
pub(super) fn create_named(name: &HSTRING, size: usize) -> Result<Shm> {
let sa = sddl_sa(w!("D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;LS)"))?;
for attempt in 0..5 {
if attempt > 0 {
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
}
// SAFETY: clearing the thread error slot so ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS below is unambiguous.
unsafe { SetLastError(WIN32_ERROR(0)) };
let shm = Self::create_inner(&sa, PCWSTR(name.as_ptr()), size)
.with_context(|| format!("create gamepad bootstrap mailbox {name}"))?;
// SAFETY: read immediately after the create; windows-rs only touches the error slot on
// failure, so a success here preserves CreateFileMappingW's ALREADY_EXISTS signal.
if unsafe { GetLastError() } != ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS {
return Ok(shm);
}
// `shm` drops here → unmap + close our handle to the foreign object, then retry.
}
bail!(
"bootstrap mailbox {name} already exists and stayed alive across retries — another \
punktfunk-host instance is serving this pad index, or a local service is squatting the \
name (gamepad DoS attempt?)"
);
}
fn create_inner(sa: &SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES, name: PCWSTR, size: usize) -> Result<Shm> {
// SAFETY: an anonymous (pagefile-backed) section of `size` bytes with the caller's SDDL; the
// descriptor behind `sa` outlives this call (leaked by `sddl_sa`).
let map = unsafe {
CreateFileMappingW(
INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE,
Some(sa),
PAGE_READWRITE,
0,
size as u32,
name,
)?
};
// SAFETY: `map` is a fresh section handle we own; take ownership immediately so that the early
// return below (and the eventual drop) closes it. `map` (a `Copy` `HANDLE`) stays usable for the
// `MapViewOfFile` borrow that follows — `from_raw_handle` only copies the inner pointer.
let handle = unsafe { OwnedHandle::from_raw_handle(map.0) };
// SAFETY: `map` is a valid section handle; map the whole thing read/write.
let view = unsafe { MapViewOfFile(map, FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS, 0, 0, size) };
if view.Value.is_null() {
// `handle` drops here → closes the section. No view to unmap.
return Err(anyhow!("MapViewOfFile failed"));
}
// SAFETY: `view` points at `size` writable bytes (just mapped).
unsafe { core::ptr::write_bytes(view.Value as *mut u8, 0, size) };
Ok(Shm { handle, view })
}
/// The mapped section's base pointer. Stable for the `Shm`'s lifetime (moving the `Shm` does not
/// relocate the OS mapping — the view address is fixed by `MapViewOfFile`).
pub(super) fn base(&self) -> *mut u8 {
self.view.Value as *mut u8
}
/// The section handle as a borrowed `HANDLE` (the sealed channel's duplication source).
fn raw_handle(&self) -> HANDLE {
HANDLE(self.handle.as_raw_handle())
}
}
impl Drop for Shm {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// SAFETY: `view` came from `MapViewOfFile`; unmap it BEFORE the `handle` field closes the
// section (struct fields drop only after this `Drop::drop` returns).
unsafe {
let _ = UnmapViewOfFile(self.view);
}
}
}
// ── The sealed-channel bootstrap broker ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Global delivery sequence for [`PadBootstrap::handle_seq`] — host-wide monotonic and never 0, so two
/// consecutive pads on the same index can't hand the (persistent, out-of-band-devnode) driver the same
/// seq twice. Starts at 1.
static BOOT_SEQ: AtomicU32 = AtomicU32::new(1);
/// Hard cap on delivery attempts per pad: each attempt duplicates a handle into a WUDFHost, so a
/// tampered mailbox flapping `driver_pid` must not mint unbounded remote handles (DoS containment).
/// A legitimate pad needs exactly one (a driver restart within one pad lifetime is not a thing —
/// the WUDFHost dies with the devnode).
const MAX_DELIVERY_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 16;
/// One pad's sealed host↔driver channel: the unnamed DATA section (the real `XusbShm`/`PadShm`), the
/// named bootstrap mailbox, and the delivery state machine ([`Self::pump`]) that hands the driver's
/// WUDFHost a duplicated DATA handle once it publishes its pid. Owns both sections (RAII teardown —
/// dropping the channel closes the mailbox, whose *name* then disappears, which is how a persistent
/// (out-of-band-devnode) driver detects the host is gone).
pub(super) struct PadChannel {
data: Shm,
boot: Shm,
boot_name: String,
/// Last `driver_pid` acted on (delivered or rejected) — never retry the same value, so a failed
/// verify can't be spun into a hot loop by a static mailbox.
last_seen_pid: u32,
attempts: u32,
delivered: bool,
warned_proto: bool,
warned_cap: bool,
}
impl PadChannel {
/// Create the unnamed DATA section (`data_size` bytes, zeroed — the caller stamps its layout and
/// magic) plus the named bootstrap mailbox, stamped `host_proto` first and `BOOT_MAGIC` last so a
/// driver only trusts a fully-initialized mailbox.
pub(super) fn create(boot_name: String, data_size: usize) -> Result<PadChannel> {
let data = Shm::create_unnamed(data_size)?;
let boot = Shm::create_named(
&HSTRING::from(boot_name.as_str()),
core::mem::size_of::<PadBootstrap>(),
)?;
let base = boot.base();
// SAFETY: `base` is the live, page-aligned mailbox view (>= size_of::<PadBootstrap>()); the
// field offsets are pinned by the proto's asserts and naturally aligned, so the atomic views
// are valid. `host_proto` is published BEFORE `magic` (Release) — a driver that observes the
// magic (Acquire) sees the version.
unsafe {
(*(base.add(core::mem::offset_of!(PadBootstrap, host_proto)) as *const AtomicU32))
.store(GAMEPAD_PROTO_VERSION, Ordering::Relaxed);
fence(Ordering::Release);
(*(base.add(core::mem::offset_of!(PadBootstrap, magic)) as *const AtomicU32))
.store(BOOT_MAGIC, Ordering::Release);
}
Ok(PadChannel {
data,
boot,
boot_name,
last_seen_pid: 0,
attempts: 0,
delivered: false,
warned_proto: false,
warned_cap: false,
})
}
/// The DATA section's mapped base (the host side of `XusbShm`/`PadShm`).
pub(super) fn data_base(&self) -> *mut u8 {
self.data.base()
}
/// The bootstrap mailbox name (log labelling).
pub(super) fn boot_name(&self) -> &str {
&self.boot_name
}
/// Atomic `u32` load from a mailbox field.
fn boot_load(&self, off: usize) -> u32 {
// SAFETY: the mailbox view is live (owned by `self.boot`), page-aligned, and every
// `PadBootstrap` u32 field offset is 4-aligned (proto asserts), so the atomic view is valid;
// no reference into the shared region outlives the load.
unsafe { (*(self.boot.base().add(off) as *const AtomicU32)).load(Ordering::Acquire) }
}
/// One tick of the delivery state machine — called from the pad's regular service pump (≤4 ms
/// cadence) and from [`Self::deliver_eager`]. Cheap when idle: two atomic loads.
pub(super) fn pump(&mut self) {
// Version diagnostics: the driver writes its own proto version even when it refuses to
// publish a pid (host/driver mismatch), so the operator sees WHY the pad never attaches.
let drv_proto = self.boot_load(core::mem::offset_of!(PadBootstrap, driver_proto));
if drv_proto != 0 && drv_proto != GAMEPAD_PROTO_VERSION && !self.warned_proto {
self.warned_proto = true;
tracing::warn!(
mailbox = %self.boot_name,
driver_proto = drv_proto,
host_proto = GAMEPAD_PROTO_VERSION,
"gamepad driver/host protocol mismatch on the bootstrap mailbox — update the \
drivers: punktfunk-host.exe driver install --gamepad"
);
}
let pid = self.boot_load(core::mem::offset_of!(PadBootstrap, driver_pid));
if pid == 0 || pid == self.last_seen_pid {
return;
}
self.last_seen_pid = pid;
if self.attempts >= MAX_DELIVERY_ATTEMPTS {
if !self.warned_cap {
self.warned_cap = true;
tracing::warn!(
mailbox = %self.boot_name,
attempts = self.attempts,
"gamepad channel delivery cap reached — the bootstrap mailbox keeps changing \
its driver pid (tampering?); no further handles will be duplicated"
);
}
return;
}
self.attempts += 1;
match self.deliver_to(pid) {
Ok(seq) => {
self.delivered = true;
tracing::info!(
mailbox = %self.boot_name,
wudf_pid = pid,
seq,
"sealed gamepad channel delivered (DATA handle duplicated into the driver's \
WUDFHost)"
);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
mailbox = %self.boot_name,
pid,
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
"sealed gamepad channel delivery failed — will retry when the mailbox reports \
a different driver pid"
);
}
}
}
/// Duplicate the DATA section into `pid`'s handle table (after verifying it is a genuine
/// WUDFHost) and publish the handle value + owning pid, bumping `handle_seq` LAST. The driver
/// adopts the handle by consuming the delivery; an unconsumed duplicate dies with the target
/// process (nothing to reap — there is no fallible step after the duplication).
fn deliver_to(&self, pid: u32) -> Result<u32> {
// SAFETY: plain FFI; the handle (checked by `?`) is owned solely here and moved into the
// `OwnedHandle` (single owner, closes on drop); `verify_is_wudfhost` borrows it for the
// synchronous check and forms no lasting alias.
let process = unsafe {
let h = OpenProcess(
PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE | PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION,
false,
pid,
)
.context("OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE) on the mailbox-reported pid")?;
let process = OwnedHandle::from_raw_handle(h.0 as _);
crate::capture::idd_push::verify_is_wudfhost(
HANDLE(process.as_raw_handle()),
pid,
"gamepad-channel",
)?;
process
};
let mut remote = HANDLE::default();
// SAFETY: `self.data.raw_handle()` is the live section handle this channel owns;
// `process` is the live PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE target; `&mut remote` is a valid out-param.
// Least privilege: the pad driver only MAPS the DATA section read/write (its `FILE_MAP_RW` =
// `SECTION_MAP_READ | SECTION_MAP_WRITE`), so grant exactly that instead of copying our
// full-access creator handle via `DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS` (Chen: don't over-grant unnamed
// shared objects — a compromised driver's handle then can't `WRITE_DAC`/`DELETE` the section).
unsafe {
DuplicateHandle(
GetCurrentProcess(),
self.data.raw_handle(),
HANDLE(process.as_raw_handle()),
&mut remote,
SECTION_MAP_RW,
false,
DUPLICATE_HANDLE_OPTIONS(0),
)
.context("DuplicateHandle(gamepad DATA section) into the driver's WUDFHost")?;
}
let value = remote.0 as usize as u64;
let base = self.boot.base();
let seq = BOOT_SEQ.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
// SAFETY: live, page-aligned mailbox view; `data_handle` is 8-aligned and `handle_pid`/
// `handle_seq` 4-aligned (proto asserts). The handle value + owning pid are published BEFORE
// the seq (Release) — a driver that observes the new seq (Acquire) sees a complete delivery.
unsafe {
(*(base.add(core::mem::offset_of!(PadBootstrap, data_handle)) as *const AtomicU64))
.store(value, Ordering::Relaxed);
(*(base.add(core::mem::offset_of!(PadBootstrap, handle_pid)) as *const AtomicU32))
.store(pid, Ordering::Relaxed);
fence(Ordering::Release);
(*(base.add(core::mem::offset_of!(PadBootstrap, handle_seq)) as *const AtomicU32))
.store(seq, Ordering::Release);
}
Ok(seq)
}
/// Bounded wait at pad-open: pump until the mailbox produces a driver pid we act on (delivered or
/// rejected) or `timeout` passes. Closes the identity race for the DualShock 4 (the driver reads
/// `device_type` from the DATA section when hidclass asks for descriptors — the channel should be
/// attached by then); the regular service pump takes over afterwards either way.
pub(super) fn deliver_eager(&mut self, timeout: Duration) {
let deadline = Instant::now() + timeout;
loop {
self.pump();
if self.last_seen_pid != 0 || Instant::now() >= deadline {
if !self.delivered {
tracing::debug!(
mailbox = %self.boot_name,
"eager gamepad-channel delivery window passed without an attach — the \
service pump keeps polling (driver-attach diagnosis follows if it stays \
silent)"
);
}
return;
}
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10));
}
}
}
/// A `SwDeviceCreate`'d software devnode; drop removes it via `SwDeviceClose`. Replaces the manual
/// `SwDeviceClose` each backend used to call in its `Drop`.
pub(super) struct SwDevice(HSWDEVICE);
impl SwDevice {
pub(super) fn new(hsw: HSWDEVICE) -> Self {
SwDevice(hsw)
}
}
impl Drop for SwDevice {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// SAFETY: `self.0` is the handle `SwDeviceCreate` returned; `SwDeviceClose` removes the devnode.
unsafe { SwDeviceClose(self.0) };
}
}
// ── Driver health surfacing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// The gamepad drivers have no IOCTL plane (hidclass gates the stack), so the only cross-process
// signal is the shared section itself. The drivers stamp `driver_proto` into their section once
// attached (pf_driver_proto::gamepad::GAMEPAD_PROTO_VERSION); [`DriverAttach`] watches that field
// from the host's regular pump and turns silence into actionable WARN/ERROR log lines — the piece
// that used to be missing entirely: a pad could be "created" with no driver installed and nothing
// was ever logged until the user gave up ("host doesn't see my controller" bug reports).
/// How long to give PnP to bind the driver + the driver to stamp the section before warning.
const ATTACH_GRACE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
/// Per-pad driver-attach watcher: feed it the section's `driver_proto` on every service tick; it
/// logs the attach (INFO), a version mismatch (WARN), or — after [`ATTACH_GRACE`] of silence — one
/// diagnosis WARN combining the driver-store check and the devnode problem code. States never
/// repeat their log line, so the pump can call this at full rate.
pub(super) struct DriverAttach {
/// Driver label for log lines (`pf_xusb` / `pf_dualsense` / `pf_dualshock4`).
driver: &'static str,
/// The INF the driver store must hold for this driver (`pf_xusb.inf` / `pf_dualsense.inf`).
inf: &'static str,
/// The driver's own debug log, referenced in the diagnosis line.
driver_log: &'static str,
/// Bootstrap-mailbox name, for log lines (the DATA section is unnamed).
shm_name: String,
/// PnP instance id of the SwDeviceCreate'd devnode (`None` on the out-of-band fallback path).
instance_id: Option<String>,
created: Instant,
state: AttachState,
}
enum AttachState {
Waiting,
/// Diagnosis logged; still watching so a late attach gets its INFO line.
Warned,
Attached,
}
impl DriverAttach {
pub(super) fn new(
driver: &'static str,
inf: &'static str,
driver_log: &'static str,
shm_name: String,
instance_id: Option<String>,
) -> DriverAttach {
DriverAttach {
driver,
inf,
driver_log,
shm_name,
instance_id,
created: Instant::now(),
state: AttachState::Waiting,
}
}
/// `driver_proto` is the section field the driver stamps once attached (0 = not attached).
pub(super) fn observe(&mut self, driver_proto: u32) {
match self.state {
AttachState::Attached => {}
AttachState::Waiting | AttachState::Warned if driver_proto != 0 => {
let late = matches!(self.state, AttachState::Warned);
tracing::info!(
driver = self.driver,
shm = %self.shm_name,
proto = driver_proto,
late,
"gamepad driver attached to the shared section"
);
if driver_proto != pf_driver_proto::gamepad::GAMEPAD_PROTO_VERSION {
tracing::warn!(
driver = self.driver,
driver_proto,
host_proto = pf_driver_proto::gamepad::GAMEPAD_PROTO_VERSION,
"gamepad driver/host protocol mismatch — update the drivers: punktfunk-host.exe driver install --gamepad"
);
}
self.state = AttachState::Attached;
}
AttachState::Waiting if self.created.elapsed() >= ATTACH_GRACE => {
self.diagnose();
self.state = AttachState::Warned;
}
_ => {}
}
}
/// One-shot WARN with everything the host can find out about WHY the driver isn't attached:
/// driver-store presence, the devnode's PnP status/problem code, and where to look next.
fn diagnose(&self) {
let store = match driver_store_has(self.inf) {
Some(true) => "driver package present in the driver store",
Some(false) => {
"driver package NOT in the driver store — run: punktfunk-host.exe driver install --gamepad"
}
None => "driver store could not be queried (pnputil failed)",
};
let devnode = match &self.instance_id {
Some(id) => devnode_status_line(id),
None => {
"no per-session devnode (SwDeviceCreate failed earlier — see the warning above)"
.to_string()
}
};
tracing::warn!(
driver = self.driver,
shm = %self.shm_name,
grace_secs = ATTACH_GRACE.as_secs(),
store,
devnode = %devnode,
driver_log = self.driver_log,
"gamepad driver has not attached to the shared section — the virtual pad exists but no \
driver is serving it (games will not see it); an old (pre-sealed-channel) driver also \
reads as not-attached: update with punktfunk-host.exe driver install --gamepad \
(driver_log is only written by debug driver builds, or with the PFXUSB_DEBUG_LOG / \
PFDS_DEBUG_LOG system env var set + the device restarted)"
);
}
}
/// Driver-store inventory (`pnputil /enum-drivers`), lower-cased, fetched once per process — only
/// consulted on the failure path, so the one-off subprocess cost never hits a healthy session.
fn driver_store_inventory() -> &'static str {
static INV: OnceLock<String> = OnceLock::new();
INV.get_or_init(|| {
std::process::Command::new("pnputil")
.arg("/enum-drivers")
.output()
.map(|o| String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).to_ascii_lowercase())
.unwrap_or_default()
})
}
/// Whether the driver store holds `inf` (e.g. `pf_xusb.inf`). `None` = pnputil unavailable/failed.
fn driver_store_has(inf: &str) -> Option<bool> {
let inv = driver_store_inventory();
if inv.is_empty() {
return None;
}
Some(inv.contains(&inf.to_ascii_lowercase()))
}
/// Human-readable PnP status of a devnode: driver bound/started or the CM problem code with a hint.
fn devnode_status_line(instance_id: &str) -> String {
let wide: Vec<u16> = instance_id
.encode_utf16()
.chain(std::iter::once(0))
.collect();
let mut devinst = 0u32;
// SAFETY: `wide` is a valid NUL-terminated UTF-16 instance id; `devinst` receives the handle.
let cr = unsafe {
CM_Locate_DevNodeW(
&mut devinst,
PCWSTR(wide.as_ptr()),
CM_LOCATE_DEVNODE_NORMAL,
)
};
if cr != CR_SUCCESS {
return format!(
"devnode {instance_id} not found (CM_Locate_DevNodeW CR={})",
cr.0
);
}
let mut status = CM_DEVNODE_STATUS_FLAGS(0);
let mut problem = CM_PROB(0);
// SAFETY: devinst is the devnode located above; the two out-params receive status + problem.
let cr = unsafe { CM_Get_DevNode_Status(&mut status, &mut problem, devinst, 0) };
if cr != CR_SUCCESS {
return format!("devnode {instance_id}: status query failed (CR={})", cr.0);
}
if status.0 & DN_HAS_PROBLEM.0 != 0 {
return format!(
"devnode {instance_id} has PnP problem code {} ({}) [status 0x{:08x}]",
problem.0,
cm_problem_hint(problem.0),
status.0
);
}
format!(
"devnode {instance_id} status 0x{:08x} (driver_loaded={} started={})",
status.0,
status.0 & DN_DRIVER_LOADED.0 != 0,
status.0 & DN_STARTED.0 != 0,
)
}
/// The CM_PROB_* codes a virtual-pad devnode realistically hits, with the operator-facing cause.
fn cm_problem_hint(problem: u32) -> &'static str {
match problem {
1 => "not configured — no driver bound; install the drivers",
10 => "device failed to start — driver bound but its start failed; check the driver log",
18 => "reinstall required — re-run driver install",
24 => "device not present/working — PnP could not start the virtual devnode",
28 => "drivers not installed — the pf driver package is missing from the store or its certificate is not trusted",
31 => "driver failed to load — binding found the package but loading it failed",
39 => "driver corrupt or missing — reinstall the drivers",
43 => "reported failure after start — check the driver log",
52 => "driver signature rejected — certificate not in Root/TrustedPublisher, or blocked by Memory Integrity",
_ => "see Device Manager for this code",
}
}