enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5
bb1f93d90e
apply.post.ts intercepts the one proxied route that restarts the host: the console password is re-verified per apply (login throttle shared, stripped before forwarding) so a 7-day cookie alone can't do it. New Sec-Fetch-Site same-origin check on every mutating request (login CSRF included). The card's apply flow: confirm dialog → live-session force escalation → download/verify/restart progress rendered from the last snapshot while polls fail (the host and, on Windows, this very server restart mid-flow) → durable success/failure from last_result. Docs: the one-click section + kill switch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
62 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
// The single server-side gate. Runs for EVERY request to the deployed Bun/Nitro server
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// (pages, the /api proxy, everything) before routing. Unauthenticated requests are
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// redirected to /login (page navigations) or rejected 401 (/api). Fails CLOSED if
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// PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD is unset, so a misconfigured LAN-exposed server admits no one.
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import {
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defineEventHandler,
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getRequestHeader,
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getRequestURL,
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sendRedirect,
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setResponseStatus,
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useSession,
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} from "h3";
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import {
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isPublicPath,
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type SessionData,
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sessionConfig,
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uiPassword,
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} from "../util/auth";
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export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
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const { pathname } = getRequestURL(event);
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// Same-origin check for every MUTATING request (defense in depth beyond SameSite=Lax,
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// added with the update-apply route where CSRF ≈ code execution — design
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// host-update-from-web-console.md §4.3). `Sec-Fetch-Site` is browser-set and unforgeable
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// from a page; absent (curl, very old browsers) ⇒ allowed — the console's threat here is
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// a BROWSER being ridden cross-site, and every riding browser sends the header.
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// `same-site` is rejected too: with an IP-address origin, another port on the same box
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// counts as same-site, and nothing on another port has business mutating the console.
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// Applies to public paths as well (login CSRF), before any session logic.
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const method = event.method?.toUpperCase?.() ?? "GET";
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if (method !== "GET" && method !== "HEAD" && method !== "OPTIONS") {
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const site = getRequestHeader(event, "sec-fetch-site")?.toLowerCase();
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if (site && site !== "same-origin" && site !== "none") {
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setResponseStatus(event, 403);
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return { error: "cross-site request refused" };
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}
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}
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if (isPublicPath(pathname)) return;
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// Misconfigured: refuse everything rather than serve open on the LAN.
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if (!uiPassword()) {
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setResponseStatus(event, 503);
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return { error: "auth not configured: set PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD" };
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}
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const session = await useSession<SessionData>(event, sessionConfig());
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if (session.data.authenticated) return; // authenticated — let it through
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if (pathname.startsWith("/api")) {
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setResponseStatus(event, 401);
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return { error: "unauthorized" };
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}
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// Page navigation → bounce to the login screen, remembering where they were headed.
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return sendRedirect(
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event,
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`/login?next=${encodeURIComponent(pathname)}`,
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302,
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);
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});
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