Files
punktfunk/crates/punktfunk-host/src/windows/interactive.rs
T
enricobuehler 327a5fa828 docs(host): prove unsafe blocks in the Windows + cross-platform files + gate them (unsafe-proof program 3/N)
Continues the unsafe-proof program across the Windows/cross-platform host files
(~75 blocks, 21 files), each with a SAFETY proof of the real invariant and a
per-file #![deny(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)] gate:

  capture/windows: dxgi.rs, wgc_relay.rs, wgc.rs, desktop_watch.rs, composed_flip.rs
                   (windows-rs COM: interface validity, same-D3D11-device textures,
                    immediate-context single-thread, borrowed args outlive the call)
  windows: service.rs (SCM/token/CreateProcessAsUserW/event handles — OwnedHandle
           liveness, no double-close/signal race), win_display, wgc_helper, interactive
  vdisplay/windows: manager.rs, pf_vdisplay.rs (SwDeviceCreate/IddCx/ioctl handle
                    liveness via the OnceLock VDM singleton + OwnedHandle)
  encode/windows: ffmpeg_win.rs (full AVBufferRef refcount audit — balanced, NO leaks,
                  unlike the vaapi sibling), sw.rs
  cross-platform: gamestream/audio.rs (libopus), gamestream/stream.rs (sendmmsg),
                  inject/windows/sendinput.rs, audio/windows/wasapi_mic.rs,
                  session_tuning.rs, vdisplay.rs

Two findings (handled separately):
- wgc_relay.rs `unsafe impl Sync for HelperRelay` is UNSOUND (its mpsc Receiver is
  !Sync) though not live-exploited — marked SUSPECT inline; fix pending box check
  (it touches the in-flight punktfunk1.rs).
- capture.rs / encode.rs (PARENT modules of the WIP idd_push.rs / nvenc.rs) do NOT
  get the file deny yet — it would propagate the lint into the undocumented WIP
  children. The deny lands there once those are documented (after the WIP commits).

Linux-visible parts verified green (cargo clippy -p punktfunk-host --all-targets
-- -D warnings). The cfg(windows) deny gates are box-verified next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26 09:23:25 +00:00

127 lines
5.8 KiB
Rust

//! Launch a process into the interactive user session from the SYSTEM host.
//!
//! The Windows host runs as a LocalSystem SCM service. To *launch* a game/launcher so it renders onto
//! the captured desktop — and so the user's protocol handlers (`HKCU\Software\Classes`), UWP/appx
//! activation, and each store's auth/entitlement context resolve — the process must run in the
//! interactive session under the **logged-in user's** token, not SYSTEM and not session 0.
//!
//! This is the same `WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId → WTSQueryUserToken → DuplicateTokenEx →
//! CreateProcessAsUserW(winsta0\\default)` primitive the WGC helper relay uses
//! ([`crate::capture::wgc_relay`]), factored out for the library launch path
//! ([`crate::library::launch_title`]).
//!
//! IMPORTANT — use the **user** token (`WTSQueryUserToken`), NOT a session-retargeted SYSTEM token
//! (the host-spawn in [`crate::service`] duplicates the SYSTEM token and only changes its session id;
//! that is correct for launching *our own* streamer, but a store launcher needs the real user's token
//! for activation + auth). The host process itself stays SYSTEM.
// Every `unsafe` block in this file carries a `// SAFETY:` proof; enforce it (unsafe-proof program).
#![deny(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)]
use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
use std::path::Path;
use windows::core::{PCWSTR, PWSTR};
use windows::Win32::Foundation::{CloseHandle, HANDLE};
use windows::Win32::Security::{
DuplicateTokenEx, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS,
};
use windows::Win32::System::Environment::{CreateEnvironmentBlock, DestroyEnvironmentBlock};
use windows::Win32::System::RemoteDesktop::{WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId, WTSQueryUserToken};
use windows::Win32::System::Threading::{
CreateProcessAsUserW, CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT, PROCESS_INFORMATION, STARTUPINFOW,
};
/// Spawn `cmdline` in the active console session, under the logged-in user's token, on the
/// interactive desktop (`winsta0\default`). Returns the new process id.
///
/// Fire-and-forget: the launched game/launcher outlives this call, so the host does not track the
/// child — its handles are closed before returning (the process keeps running). The environment is
/// the user's block merged with the host's `PUNKTFUNK_*`/`RUST_LOG` (same merge the WGC helper uses),
/// so `host.env` settings propagate.
///
/// Requires the host to run as SYSTEM (`WTSQueryUserToken` needs `SE_TCB`). Fails when no interactive
/// user is logged on (a pre-login / freshly-booted box can stream the login desktop but cannot
/// auto-launch a store title until someone signs in).
pub fn spawn_in_active_session(cmdline: &str, workdir: Option<&Path>) -> Result<u32> {
// SAFETY: `spawn_inner` is unsafe only for its Win32 FFI; it has no caller-side preconditions — it
// validates the session/token itself and owns every handle it opens — so calling it is always sound.
unsafe { spawn_inner(cmdline, workdir) }
}
unsafe fn spawn_inner(cmdline: &str, workdir: Option<&Path>) -> Result<u32> {
// The user token of the active console session (requires the host to be SYSTEM).
let session = WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId();
if session == 0xFFFF_FFFF {
bail!("no active console session (no interactive user is logged on)");
}
let mut user_token = HANDLE::default();
WTSQueryUserToken(session, &mut user_token)
.context("WTSQueryUserToken (host must be SYSTEM; needs a logged-on interactive user)")?;
// A primary token for CreateProcessAsUserW.
let mut primary = HANDLE::default();
let dup = DuplicateTokenEx(
user_token,
TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS,
None,
SecurityImpersonation,
TokenPrimary,
&mut primary,
);
let _ = CloseHandle(user_token);
dup.context("DuplicateTokenEx(TokenPrimary)")?;
// The user's environment block (PATH/USERPROFILE/SystemRoot for handler + DLL resolution), MERGED
// with the host's PUNKTFUNK_*/RUST_LOG vars — same shared helper the WGC helper + service spawns use.
let mut env_block: *mut core::ffi::c_void = std::ptr::null_mut();
let _ = CreateEnvironmentBlock(&mut env_block, Some(primary), false);
let merged_env = crate::capture::wgc_relay::merged_env_block(env_block as *const u16);
if !env_block.is_null() {
let _ = DestroyEnvironmentBlock(env_block);
}
// The game/launcher must appear on the interactive desktop the host is capturing.
let mut desktop: Vec<u16> = "winsta0\\default\0".encode_utf16().collect();
let si = STARTUPINFOW {
cb: std::mem::size_of::<STARTUPINFOW>() as u32,
lpDesktop: PWSTR(desktop.as_mut_ptr()),
..Default::default()
};
let mut cmd: Vec<u16> = cmdline.encode_utf16().chain(std::iter::once(0)).collect();
let workdir_w: Option<Vec<u16>> = workdir.map(|d| {
d.as_os_str()
.to_string_lossy()
.encode_utf16()
.chain(std::iter::once(0))
.collect()
});
let cwd = match &workdir_w {
Some(w) => PCWSTR(w.as_ptr()),
None => PCWSTR::null(),
};
let mut pi = PROCESS_INFORMATION::default();
let created = CreateProcessAsUserW(
Some(primary),
None,
Some(PWSTR(cmd.as_mut_ptr())),
None,
None,
false, // no handle inheritance — fire-and-forget GUI launch, no stdio relay
CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT,
Some(merged_env.as_ptr() as *const core::ffi::c_void),
cwd,
&si,
&mut pi,
);
let _ = CloseHandle(primary);
created.context("CreateProcessAsUserW (interactive-session launch)")?;
let pid = pi.dwProcessId;
// We don't supervise the child (it owns its own window/lifetime) — close the handles the API gave us.
let _ = CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
let _ = CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
Ok(pid)
}