7b2cdf5a7a
Four defects from the punktfunk-core quality sweep, all in the data plane. transport/udp: the hole-punch adopted the source address of ANY datagram whose first 8 bytes matched PUNCH_MAGIC — a fixed public constant with no key, nonce or session id — and the authenticated QUIC peer was passed only as the no-punch fallback, so it was never used to validate. Hole-punch is the default bring-up path (it is skipped only for a fixed --data-port), and the data socket is an OS ephemeral, so spraying the ephemeral range during the 2500 ms punch wait let anyone steal the video plane: the legitimate client is then filtered out by the connect() and gets nothing, while QUIC stays healthy so no reconnect fires. With a spoofed source the same 8 bytes aim a full-rate stream at a third party. Take the authenticated peer IP and require the punch to match it — only the PORT is in question (that is what a NAT remaps and what the punch exists to discover); the client dials the same host IP as its QUIC connection, so a NAT presents one source IP for both planes. Also budget each read from the REMAINING window, so off-peer datagrams cannot stretch the wait past punch_timeout. transport/udp: the punch keepalive treated every send error as fatal and broke out of its loop permanently and silently. It holds a clone of the connected, non-blocking data socket — exactly the socket whose transient conditions this module defines and documents in is_transient_io. One ENOBUFS from a full wlan tx queue or an ENETUNREACH during an AP roam killed the only thing holding the NAT mapping open; the path recovers, video keeps flowing, and the stream dies later when the idle timer expires the mapping during a static scene. Route it through is_transient_io like every other send site in the file. packet: adaptive FEC moved fec_percent live (host bands it 1..=50 while Welcome advertises 10) but the receiver's per-block acceptance ceiling was computed once from the negotiated percentage and never re-derived. Once FEC ramped, every packet of a maximal block failed `total > max_total_shards`, the block never accumulated a shard, the frame aged out, and the resulting loss drove FEC higher still — large frames wedged at 100% loss exactly when FEC was meant to rescue the link. Fixed on both sides, because hosts and clients update independently: the sender clamps per-block parity to the ceiling the peer negotiated, and the receiver sizes that ceiling from the whole clamp range rather than a stale snapshot of it. No wire bytes and no C ABI signature change; WIRE_VERSION and ABI_VERSION are unchanged. Regression tests cover all three (the punch tests were confirmed to fail without the fix). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>