enricobuehler
e9b2eacf87
Networking-audit deferred plan §3. One file per concern, zero logic edits:
quic/mod.rs MAGIC/CTL_MAGIC + re-exports (every crate::quic::X path
compiles unchanged across host + all clients)
quic/msgs.rs Hello/Welcome/Start, typed control msgs + type bytes,
resolve_codec, ColorInfo, window_loss_ppm, pairing msgs
quic/pake.rs the SPAKE2 pairing exchange
quic/datagram.rs 0xC9–0xCF plane codecs (audio/rumble/mic/rich-input/
hidout/HdrMeta/HostTiming)
quic/io.rs length-prefixed stream IO
quic/clock.rs clock_offset_ns estimator, clock_sync, ClockResync
quic/endpoint.rs quinn config, ALPN, pinning verifiers, keep-alive
quic/tests.rs the cross-cutting test module, unchanged
Mechanical deltas only: the nested `pub mod` wrappers became files (one
dedent), submodules import what they previously inherited from the parent
scope, and the three RichInput kind tags are pub(super) for the tests
(same-module before). Verified line-multiset-identical after normalizing
indentation. cargo check --workspace, core tests (quic), clippy, and
cargo ndk check all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
3.1 KiB
Rust
65 lines
3.1 KiB
Rust
//! `punktfunk/1` — the native control plane, gated behind the `quic` feature.
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//!
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//! GameStream is punktfunk's compatibility layer; this is the start of its own protocol. A QUIC
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//! connection (quinn, tokio — control plane only, never the per-frame path) carries a
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//! length-prefixed binary handshake on one bidirectional stream:
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//!
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//! ```text
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//! client → host Hello { abi_version }
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//! host → client Welcome { abi_version, session: full data-plane Config + mode + UDP port }
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//! client → host Start { client_udp_port }
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//! ```
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//!
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//! after which both sides bring up a [`crate::session::Session`] over a plain
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//! [`UdpTransport`](crate::transport::udp) (native threads, no async) and the host streams.
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//! The Welcome carries everything the core negotiates — FEC scheme (including GF(2¹⁶)
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//! Leopard, which GameStream can't express), shard sizing, crypto key/salt — so the data
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//! plane is exactly the hardened core `Session`.
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//!
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//! Transport security: the host presents a long-lived self-signed certificate
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//! ([`endpoint::server_with_identity`]) and the client pins its SHA-256 fingerprint
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//! ([`endpoint::client_pinned`]; no pin = trust-on-first-use, with the observed fingerprint
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//! reported back for persisting). The data plane adds AES-GCM on top.
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//! All integers little-endian; every message is `u16 length || payload`.
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//!
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//! Split by concern (networking-audit deferred plan §3 — a pure move): [`msgs`] the
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//! handshake + typed control messages, [`pake`] the pairing SPAKE2, [`datagram`] the
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//! 0xC9–0xCF plane codecs, [`io`] framed stream IO, [`clock`] skew estimation + mid-stream
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//! re-sync, [`endpoint`] the quinn constructors. Every item is re-exported here, so all
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//! existing `crate::quic::X` paths compile unchanged.
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/// Protocol magic + version, first bytes of the positional handshake (Hello/Welcome/Start).
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pub const MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"PKF1";
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/// Magic for typed post-handshake / pairing control messages. A distinct magic keeps the
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/// typed namespace disjoint from the positional handshake: a `Hello` (whose abi_version
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/// byte sits where a type byte would) can never be misparsed as a control message, and
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/// vice-versa, regardless of field values.
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pub const CTL_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"PKFc";
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mod clock;
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mod datagram;
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mod msgs;
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/// quinn endpoint constructors. Host: self-signed identity (fresh, or persisted PEMs via
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/// [`endpoint::server_with_identity`]). Client: fingerprint pinning / TOFU via
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/// [`endpoint::client_pinned`] ([`endpoint::client_insecure`] is the no-pin special case).
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pub mod endpoint;
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/// Async framed-message IO over a quinn stream (`u16 LE length || payload`).
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pub mod io;
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/// SPAKE2 over Ed25519 for the pairing ceremony. The two roles use the asymmetric flow so
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/// the identities are ordered; each side binds **both** certificate fingerprints as the
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/// SPAKE2 identities, so the derived key only matches when client and host agree on the PIN
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/// *and* saw the same two certificates (a MITM, presenting different certs to each leg,
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/// cannot reach a shared key).
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pub mod pake;
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pub use clock::*;
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pub use datagram::*;
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pub use msgs::*;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests;
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