Per plan §2.5: the security-critical rustls fingerprint-pinning ServerCertVerifier
was hand-rolled three times — quic/endpoint.rs (PinVerify), pf-client-core
library.rs, punktfunk-tray status.rs — drifting copies on a trust boundary. Add
one canonical punktfunk_core::tls::PinVerify (+ cert_fingerprint) behind a light
`tls` feature (rustls + sha2 only, no QUIC runtime); `quic` now depends on it, and
quic::endpoint re-exports cert_fingerprint so that path stays byte-stable
(gamestream + pf-client-core reach it there).
- core::tls::PinVerify: new(pin) for the HTTP clients, with_observed(pin, slot)
for the QUIC TOFU connect. Behavior-identical to all three originals (pin-check
+ real CertificateVerify signature verification; only hashes the leaf when a pin
or observed slot needs it). Two focused unit tests anchor the boundary.
- quic/endpoint.rs: drop the private PinVerify, wire client_pinned through
tls::PinVerify::with_observed.
- pf-client-core library.rs + tray status.rs: use the shared verifier; tray also
routes load_pin through core cert_fingerprint and drops its direct sha2 dep,
gaining only the light core `tls` feature (still no host dep, no QUIC runtime).
Verified on Linux (home-worker-5): clippy 0/0 for core(quic), core(tls),
pf-client-core, tray, host(nvenc,vulkan-encode,pyrowave); core 153 lib tests +
loopback 7/7 (pinned handshake) + c_abi round-trip green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
enricobuehler
571e22bc0f