Files
punktfunk/crates/punktfunk-core
enricobuehler 2bfd1cd2d5 chore(safety): three unsafe-hygiene grep gates, blocking in ci.yml (WP2c gates)
scripts/ci/check-unsafe-hygiene.sh — textual gates for three classes no lint
covers:

A. unsafe fn markers carrying no contract. unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn forces real
   ops into blocks, so an unsafe fn with no `unsafe` in its body is a marker
   with no contract (db659809 found two by hand). Contract-deferring fns
   (Vec::set_len shape) waive with `// unsafe-fn-no-op-ok: <reason>`; fenced
   files and `unsafe extern "ABI" fn` (signature-mandated markers) are
   skipped structurally.

B. unwrap/expect/panic! inside extern "C"/"system" bodies — an abort since
   Rust 1.81, not linted, not fuzzable (8b98d0b3). catch_unwind bodies are
   exempt; `// panic-in-extern-ok: <reason>` waives a deliberate abort.

C. Safe-but-process-global APIs (env::set_var/remove_var, sigaction,
   setlocale, set_current_dir) — the 972af299 environ race lived in a file
   with zero occurrences of the word `unsafe`. Per-file count ratchet with
   the baseline in the script; any increase or new file fails.

Making gate B clean on main surfaced 14 real instances of exactly its class —
`.lock().unwrap()` in unguarded extern fns, where a poisoned mutex aborts the
embedding process: six punktfunk-core abi.rs entry points (poll_frame,
next_au, next_audio, next_audio_pcm, next_cursor_shape, next_clipboard),
seven Android JNI entry points, and the Windows client's deeplink wnd_proc.
All fixed with poison-recovering locks (the slots are last-value caches,
valid whatever a poisoned writer left) and Option::insert for the
set-then-unwrap shape; punktfunk-core's 203 lib tests pass. Gate A's
findings were six genuine contract-deferring fns — waived with reasons, not
fixed, because the markers are correct.

Gate-of-the-gate: all three shown to FAIL on deliberately planted instances
(marker fn, panicking extern callback, env::set_var in an unlisted file) and
to run clean on the tree, before the ci.yml step made them blocking.
2026-08-11 23:36:17 +02:00
..

punktfunk-core

The shared protocol core — the one place where punktfunk's transport, forward error correction, and crypto live. It's linked into the host and every native client, so there's exactly one implementation of the wire format everywhere.

Written in Rust with no async on the per-frame path (native threads only). It exposes both a normal Rust API and a stable, versioned C ABI, so the Swift and Kotlin clients — and any C embedder — link the same code as the Rust ones.

What's in here

  • Transport & session (session.rs, transport/, packet.rs) — the punktfunk/1 data plane over raw UDP: packetization, reassembly (with attacker-bounded limits), pacing, and socket tuning.
  • FEC (fec/) — the wall-breaker. Two codes:
    • GF(2⁸) classic ReedSolomon with the Cauchy generator matrix — byte-identical to the nanors library Moonlight uses, so our parity is decodable by a stock Moonlight client.
    • GF(2¹⁶) Leopard-RS (SIMD, O(n log n)) — up to 65535 shards/block, which removes the ~1 Gbps FEC ceiling. punktfunk/1 negotiates this one.
  • Crypto (crypto.rs) — AES-128-GCM session encryption with per-direction nonce salts and sequence-as-AAD; SPAKE2 PIN pairing lives behind the quic feature.
  • QUIC control plane (quic.rs, client.rs, feature quic) — the Hello/Welcome/Start handshake, cert pinning/TOFU, reverse audio, and the embeddable NativeClient connector. This is the only place tokio/quinn are allowed; the feature is off by default so the core stays runtime-free.
  • C ABI (abi.rs) — the versioned surface (punktfunk_abi_version(), PunktfunkConfig carrying its own struct_size) that generates include/punktfunk_core.h via cbindgen at build time.

Build outputs

The crate builds three ways at once (crate-type = ["lib", "cdylib", "staticlib"]):

Output Used by
lib (rlib) the host, probe, and tools link it as a normal Rust crate
cdylib (.so/.dylib) the Swift / Kotlin clients via the C ABI
staticlib (.a) the C test harness and static embedding

Test

cargo test -p punktfunk-core                 # unit + proptest + loopback
cargo run  -p loss-harness                   # FEC loss-resilience sweep (no network needed)
bash crates/punktfunk-core/tests/c/run.sh    # standalone C-ABI link + round-trip proof

Design invariants (do not regress)

  • One core, linked everywhere — protocol/FEC/crypto live only here, behind the stable C ABI.
  • No async on the hot path — the per-frame pipeline is native threads only; quic (tokio/quinn) is control-plane only, feature-gated, off by default.
  • Security hardening stays intact — the reassembler bounds attacker-controlled fields before allocating; AES-GCM keeps per-direction nonce salts + seq-as-AAD; the ABI checks struct_size. Regression tests exist — keep them green.
  • punktfunk-host — the streaming host built on this core
  • Clients — the apps that link this core over the C ABI (or directly, in Rust)
  • punktfunk-planning: implementation-plan.md (internal planning repo) — why GF(2¹⁶) FEC, the latency budget, and the architecture thesis