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punktfunk/clients/apple/Sources/PunktfunkClient/HostStore.swift
T
enricobuehler 36107018a8
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feat(apple/library): mTLS — authenticate by the paired identity, drop the token
Phase 3: the Apple library now talks to the host's HTTPS mgmt API (b4a85a8) over mTLS
using this client's persistent identity — the SAME cert the host paired over QUIC — so
there is NO manual token anymore.

- ClientTLS: builds a SecIdentity from the stored PEM (CryptoKit parses the rcgen P-256
  PKCS#8 key → x963 → SecKey; the cert PEM → SecCertificate; SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate
  pairs them via the Keychain). macOS-only for now (that API is unavailable on iOS — a
  PKCS#12 path would be needed there; the client is macOS-first).
- LibraryTLSDelegate: pins the host's self-signed cert by the fingerprint the client
  already trusts, and presents the identity for the client-cert challenge.
- LibraryClient.fetch now does GET https://…/library with the identity + host fingerprint;
  the whole connection form (port + token) and StoredHost.mgmtToken/setMgmt are gone — the
  library "just works" for a paired host. 401 → "pair with the host first".

Can't compile Swift on the Linux box; CI (apple.yml) compiles the macOS path incl. the
Security/CryptoKit code. Runtime (SecIdentity build + the mTLS handshake) needs Mac
validation. Pairs with the host mTLS already landed + live-tested.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 17:47:19 +00:00

103 lines
4.0 KiB
Swift

// Saved hosts + their pinned identities, persisted as JSON in UserDefaults.
//
// Trust model (client side of punktfunk/1): the host serves a persistent certificate and
// logs its SHA-256 fingerprint at startup. The pin lands here one of two ways the
// trust-on-first-use prompt (user compares the observed fingerprint against the host's
// log) or the SPAKE2 PIN pairing ceremony (PairSheet; mutually verified, and the host
// stores our identity from ClientIdentityStore in return). Every later connect passes
// the pin into punktfunk-core, which refuses a host whose identity changed. Hosts running
// --require-pairing only admit paired clients, so for them pairing is the only way in.
import Foundation
import PunktfunkKit
import SwiftUI
struct StoredHost: Identifiable, Codable, Hashable {
var id = UUID()
var name: String
var address: String
var port: UInt16 = 9777
/// SHA-256 of the host's certificate, set after the user explicitly trusted it.
var pinnedSHA256: Data?
/// Last time a streaming session actually started (nil until the first one).
var lastConnected: Date?
/// Management-API port for the library browser (distinct from the data-plane `port`). Optional
/// (NOT a defaulted non-optional) so older saved hosts whose JSON lacks this key still
/// decode: synthesized Decodable ignores property defaults but treats a missing Optional as
/// nil. Resolve via `effectiveMgmtPort`. (Auth is mTLS by the pinned identity no token.)
var mgmtPort: UInt16?
var displayName: String { name.isEmpty ? address : name }
var effectiveMgmtPort: UInt16 { mgmtPort ?? punktfunkDefaultMgmtPort }
}
extension StoredHost {
/// True when a live mDNS advert (`DiscoveredHost`) describes THIS saved host drives the
/// "online" indicator and de-dupes the discovered section. Matched by certificate
/// fingerprint when both sides carry it (so it survives a DHCP address change), otherwise
/// by address:port. Online detection is LAN-scoped: a host not advertising on this network
/// (off, or a remote/cross-subnet address) simply won't match "not seen", not proven off.
func matches(_ discovered: DiscoveredHost) -> Bool {
if let pin = pinnedSHA256, let fp = discovered.fingerprintHex,
pin.hexLower == fp.lowercased() {
return true
}
return address == discovered.host && port == discovered.port
}
}
private extension Data {
/// Lowercase hex, no separators to compare a pinned fingerprint against the mDNS `fp`.
var hexLower: String { map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined() }
}
@MainActor
final class HostStore: ObservableObject {
private static let key = DefaultsKey.hosts
@Published var hosts: [StoredHost] {
didSet { persist() }
}
init() {
if let data = UserDefaults.standard.data(forKey: Self.key),
let decoded = try? JSONDecoder().decode([StoredHost].self, from: data) {
hosts = decoded
} else {
hosts = []
}
}
func add(_ host: StoredHost) {
hosts.append(host)
}
func remove(_ host: StoredHost) {
hosts.removeAll { $0.id == host.id }
}
func markConnected(_ hostID: UUID) {
guard let i = hosts.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == hostID }) else { return }
hosts[i].lastConnected = Date()
}
func pin(_ hostID: UUID, fingerprint: Data) {
guard let i = hosts.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == hostID }) else { return }
hosts[i].pinnedSHA256 = fingerprint
}
/// Drop the pinned identity (e.g. after a legitimate host reinstall) the next
/// connect goes through the trust prompt again.
func forgetIdentity(_ host: StoredHost) {
guard let i = hosts.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == host.id }) else { return }
hosts[i].pinnedSHA256 = nil
}
private func persist() {
if let data = try? JSONEncoder().encode(hosts) {
UserDefaults.standard.set(data, forKey: Self.key)
}
}
}