Files
punktfunk/crates/punktfunk-core
enricobuehler 5219107177 chore(unsafe): the workspace adopts the drivers' unsafe discipline
`packaging/windows/drivers/*` has run `deny(unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn)` +
`deny(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)` for a while, with `forbid(unsafe_code)`
on the modules that need no unsafe at all. The main workspace had no lint config
whatsoever, so nothing stopped a clean crate from quietly growing an `unsafe`, and
nothing distinguished the handful of genuinely-unsafe lines inside a 600-line
`unsafe fn` from the safe ones surrounding them.

Three things, all mechanical:

* `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` on the eight crates that already contain zero unsafe
  (`pf-driver-proto`, `pf-host-config`, `pf-paths`, the three clean clients, both
  tools). These were clean by accident, not by contract; now they are clean by
  contract.

* `unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "warn"` workspace-wide. `unsafe fn` states a contract
  the CALLER must uphold — it was never meant to switch off checking for the whole
  body. Measured fallout is 300 sites on Linux, and they are concentrated: six
  files carry all of them, while `punktfunk-core`, `pf-frame`, `pf-clipboard` and
  `pf-vdisplay` are already at zero. `warn` (not `deny`) so the build stays green
  while those six are worked down; it flips to `deny` once they are. This is also
  the Rust 2024 default, so it pays off the edition migration early.

* `proc::current_uid()` replaces eight `unsafe { libc::getuid() }` blocks. Each
  site had copied out the same SAFETY note verbatim, which is the tell: `getuid()`
  is parameterless, always succeeds and touches no memory, so there is no contract
  for a caller to uphold and no reason for the unsafe to be visible eight times.
  One `unsafe` behind a safe wrapper, none at the call sites.

Verified: `pf-vdisplay` builds clean on Linux (Nobara) at zero E0133; the
macOS-buildable crates build clean locally. No behaviour change.
2026-07-28 21:31:41 +02:00
..

punktfunk-core

The shared protocol core — the one place where punktfunk's transport, forward error correction, and crypto live. It's linked into the host and every native client, so there's exactly one implementation of the wire format everywhere.

Written in Rust with no async on the per-frame path (native threads only). It exposes both a normal Rust API and a stable, versioned C ABI, so the Swift and Kotlin clients — and any C embedder — link the same code as the Rust ones.

What's in here

  • Transport & session (session.rs, transport/, packet.rs) — the punktfunk/1 data plane over raw UDP: packetization, reassembly (with attacker-bounded limits), pacing, and socket tuning.
  • FEC (fec/) — the wall-breaker. Two codes:
    • GF(2⁸) classic ReedSolomon with the Cauchy generator matrix — byte-identical to the nanors library Moonlight uses, so our parity is decodable by a stock Moonlight client.
    • GF(2¹⁶) Leopard-RS (SIMD, O(n log n)) — up to 65535 shards/block, which removes the ~1 Gbps FEC ceiling. punktfunk/1 negotiates this one.
  • Crypto (crypto.rs) — AES-128-GCM session encryption with per-direction nonce salts and sequence-as-AAD; SPAKE2 PIN pairing lives behind the quic feature.
  • QUIC control plane (quic.rs, client.rs, feature quic) — the Hello/Welcome/Start handshake, cert pinning/TOFU, reverse audio, and the embeddable NativeClient connector. This is the only place tokio/quinn are allowed; the feature is off by default so the core stays runtime-free.
  • C ABI (abi.rs) — the versioned surface (punktfunk_abi_version(), PunktfunkConfig carrying its own struct_size) that generates include/punktfunk_core.h via cbindgen at build time.

Build outputs

The crate builds three ways at once (crate-type = ["lib", "cdylib", "staticlib"]):

Output Used by
lib (rlib) the host, probe, and tools link it as a normal Rust crate
cdylib (.so/.dylib) the Swift / Kotlin clients via the C ABI
staticlib (.a) the C test harness and static embedding

Test

cargo test -p punktfunk-core                 # unit + proptest + loopback
cargo run  -p loss-harness                   # FEC loss-resilience sweep (no network needed)
bash crates/punktfunk-core/tests/c/run.sh    # standalone C-ABI link + round-trip proof

Design invariants (do not regress)

  • One core, linked everywhere — protocol/FEC/crypto live only here, behind the stable C ABI.
  • No async on the hot path — the per-frame pipeline is native threads only; quic (tokio/quinn) is control-plane only, feature-gated, off by default.
  • Security hardening stays intact — the reassembler bounds attacker-controlled fields before allocating; AES-GCM keeps per-direction nonce salts + seq-as-AAD; the ABI checks struct_size. Regression tests exist — keep them green.
  • punktfunk-host — the streaming host built on this core
  • Clients — the apps that link this core over the C ABI (or directly, in Rust)
  • punktfunk-planning: implementation-plan.md (internal planning repo) — why GF(2¹⁶) FEC, the latency budget, and the architecture thesis