enricobuehler
8103958169
Acts on the 2026-08-05 host security review. 36 of its 38 findings; the two exceptions are recorded below and in the review doc. The review's headline is that `plugin_may_access` was the one authorization gate in the system that was allow-by-default — a hand-maintained denylist of route prefixes, where every sibling gate is deny-by-default. Its own doc comment names the two capabilities it exists to withhold, and both were reachable one route over, because ~1450 commits of new routes were added and the list was never one of the things anyone remembered to update. So the gate is now an allowlist, and a test walks the live route table and fails the build for any route that has not been deliberately classified for both non-admin lanes. That test is the actual fix: it is what stops the next route from arriving pre-authorized. Route reachability and field authority turned out to be different questions. A provider plugin has to be able to reconcile its own library entries — that is what a scanner plugin IS — but `prep` and a `command` launch inside that payload are handed to `/bin/sh -c` as the host user, and every execution site documents them as operator-typed. Requests now carry the lane that authorized them, and those two fields are refused to everyone but the operator's own token. The art proxy read any absolute path off disk in the host process, which on Windows is LocalSystem, from a path the plugin lane could write and then read back — so it yielded `mgmt-token`, which is full admin. It now serves only real images (extension AND magic bytes, so a renamed secret fails), only from inside an allowed root, only after canonicalization, and never over UNC; and a path it would refuse to serve can no longer be persisted in the first place. On Windows, the config-dir hardening was skipped exactly when it was needed — it ran only in the branch that CREATES host.env, so the case it was written for (a local user pre-created the directory and planted one) was the one case it never ran in. It is now unconditional and first, an existing host.env is re-owned, and the inheritable OWNER RIGHTS ACE that kept an attacker's files theirs after the directory was re-owned is gone. The identity and token readers were hardening the directory only on the path that GENERATED a new secret, so a planted cert/key or token was adopted verbatim and permanently; they harden before the first read now. `ensure_admin_only_source` is implemented. The 2026-07-05 audit recorded it as FIXED and it was in no commit in this repository's history — the local EoP it described was live, and it is the payload half of the config-dir chain above. Also: the three input planes are bounded and lossy like the mic plane on the same loop already was; Android's library client no longer accepts any publicly-trusted certificate for the pinned host; the usbip vhci nodes get their own group instead of riding on `input`, which every packaging scriptlet tells users to join; a registry URL can no longer inject a TOML table into bunfig.toml; the pairing cooldown is charged before the arming state is read, so armed/disarmed is no longer a free oracle; and the whole Low tier, of which the two worth naming are a clipboard MIME NUL that panicked the host on one control message, and an unauthenticated global logout that let any LAN peer sign the operator out on a loop. NOT fixed, deliberately: H-3 (plugin UIs framed allow-same-origin). Dropping allow-same-origin does not work: the document's origin goes opaque, its subresource requests are then cross-site, the SameSite=Lax session cookie is not sent, and every plugin asset 302s to /login. The "open in new tab" link is the same escalation with no iframe at all, so the sandbox attribute is not where this gets fixed either. It needs a second listener — a distinct origin that is still the same site — which changes the console's deploy model and wants on-glass validation. The mechanism and the dead end are written down at the iframe. H-6 registry authentication, whose other half lives in unom/infra. The in-repo halves are done: workflow_dispatch inputs no longer interpolate into run: blocks (one of them in the step holding UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY), and the syft installer is pinned to its tag instead of main. Digest pinning is left until the registry is authenticated, because a tag — content-keyed or not — can simply be overwritten while anonymous pushes are accepted. M-5 is half done: the oracle is closed, but binding the arming window needs the console to learn the fingerprint first, which is a knock-then-bind flow rather than an edit. Verified: cargo fmt --all --check clean; cargo check --all-targets green on Linux and on Windows (confirmed non-vacuous — a planted type error in windows/install.rs fails the build); scripts/xcheck.sh windows check green; cargo test -p punktfunk-host --bins 416 passed, the single failure being gamestream::stream::tests::sender_delivers_batches, the known qemu-environmental UDP-loopback flake that fails identically on clean main in the same container; cargo test -p pf-clipboard 13 passed; web console typechecks.
88 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
88 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
# Announce a stable release to the Discord #releases channel.
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#
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# This is the deliberate "go" step for a release. Release notes live in the repo at
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# docs/releases/<tag>.md and are seeded into the Gitea release body at creation by the build
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# workflows (scripts/ci/gitea-release.sh), so the release is never noteless. Once every
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# platform's CI is green for a tag, dispatch this workflow with that tag: it re-asserts the notes
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# file over the live release and posts a formatted embed to #releases.
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#
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# Manual on purpose — pressing "go" is the quality gate that says "all platforms built, notes are
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# final, tell the community." It is NOT wired to the tag push, so a half-built or failed release
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# is never announced. Stable-only: a -rc/pre-release tag is refused unless allow_prerelease=true.
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#
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# Requires the repo secret DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK (the #releases channel webhook URL); GITEA auth
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# reuses REGISTRY_TOKEN like the other release workflows.
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name: announce
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on:
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workflow_dispatch:
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inputs:
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tag:
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description: "Release tag to announce (e.g. v0.18.0)"
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required: true
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allow_prerelease:
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description: "Announce even if the tag is a pre-release (-rc)"
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required: false
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default: "false"
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jobs:
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announce:
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runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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# Publish the SIGNED stable update manifest — the moment every host's update check learns
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# about this release (planning: host-update-from-web-console.md §3.3). Deliberately here in
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# announce, not on the tag: the manual "fleet is green, go" gate doubles as the gate for the
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# fleet-wide "update available". Fails the announce loudly if the key is missing (fail-closed)
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# or the installer's live bytes don't match their .sha256 sidecar. Pre-release tags are
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# ALWAYS skipped — an -rc must never enter the stable feed, even with allow_prerelease.
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- name: Publish the stable update manifest
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env:
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REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
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UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY: ${{ secrets.UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY }}
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# Through the ENVIRONMENT, never interpolated into the script body. A `${{ }}` expansion
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# is a raw textual substitution performed BEFORE the shell sees the line, so a
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# workflow_dispatch input containing shell syntax executes as this step — and this is the
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# step holding UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY, the Ed25519 key every host pins to decide whether an
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# update is real (2026-08-05 review H-6). As `$INPUT_TAG` it is only ever data.
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INPUT_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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TAG="$INPUT_TAG"
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# Shape-check before the value reaches a URL or a filename: tags are `vX.Y.Z[-suffix]`.
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case "$TAG" in
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v[0-9]*) ;;
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*) echo "refusing to publish for a tag that is not vX.Y.Z: $TAG" >&2; exit 1 ;;
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esac
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case "$TAG" in
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*[!A-Za-z0-9.+_-]*) echo "tag has characters no release tag has: $TAG" >&2; exit 1 ;;
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esac
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case "$TAG" in
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*-*) echo "pre-release tag $TAG — not publishing to the stable update feed"; exit 0 ;;
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esac
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VER="${TAG#v}"
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URL="https://git.unom.io/unom/punktfunk/releases/download/${TAG}/punktfunk-host-setup-${VER}.exe"
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# Re-download and re-hash the real bytes; the sidecar is a cross-check, never the truth.
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curl -fsSL "$URL" -o /tmp/installer.exe
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curl -fsSL "$URL.sha256" -o /tmp/installer.sha256
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SHA="$(sha256sum /tmp/installer.exe | awk '{print $1}')"
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grep -qi "$SHA" /tmp/installer.sha256 || {
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echo "ERROR: installer sha256 $SHA does not match the release's .sha256 sidecar" >&2
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exit 1
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}
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CHANNEL=stable VERSION="$VER" REQUIRE_KEY=1 \
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WINDOWS_URL="$URL" WINDOWS_SHA256="$SHA" \
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NOTES_URL="https://git.unom.io/unom/punktfunk/releases/tag/${TAG}" \
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bash scripts/ci/publish-update-manifest.sh
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- name: Post release announcement to Discord
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env:
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GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
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DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK: ${{ secrets.DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK }}
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ALLOW_PRERELEASE: ${{ inputs.allow_prerelease }}
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# Same reasoning as the publish step above: the input is data in the environment, never
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# text spliced into the command line.
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INPUT_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
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run: bash scripts/ci/discord-announce.sh "$INPUT_TAG"
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