# cargo-audit configuration — consumed by `.gitea/workflows/audit.yml` (`cargo audit`).
#
# Silence only advisories that are KNOWN-UNFIXABLE and either not applicable to how we use the crate
# or an accepted, documented risk. Keep this list TIGHT and justify every entry — an ignore here
# means the audit job stops flagging it, so the reasoning must hold up.
#
# NOTE: `cargo audit` (no `--deny warnings`) fails only on *vulnerabilities*, not on the
# `unmaintained` warnings (audiopus_sys via opus, paste via utoipa-axum). Both are transitive, at
# their latest published version with no successor, so there's nothing to bump — left visible on
# purpose so we keep getting the maintenance signal; they do not fail CI. (rustls-pemfile was dropped
# 2026-06-29 by removing axum-server's unused tls-rustls feature + moving our own PEM parsing to
# rustls-pki-types; memmap2's unsoundness was fixed by the 0.9.11 bump.)

[advisories]
ignore = [
    # rsa "Marvin Attack" (RUSTSEC-2023-0071): a timing side-channel in the rsa crate's variable-time
    # modular exponentiation of the SECRET exponent. IMPORTANT — this affects the RSA private-key op in
    # general, INCLUDING signing (m^d mod n), which the host DOES perform (gamestream/pairing.rs
    # `signing_key.sign(&serversecret)`). It is NOT, as an earlier version of this note wrongly claimed,
    # limited to decryption — so "the vulnerable path isn't exercised" is false; signing exercises it.
    # We accept it because the attack is not practically reachable here, NOT because the path is unused:
    #   * No RSA decryption / PKCS#1v1.5 padding oracle exists anywhere (every `decrypt` in the tree is
    #     AES/AES-GCM), so the classic Bleichenbacher/Marvin chosen-ciphertext oracle is absent.
    #   * The only signed message (`serversecret`) is HOST-generated random, never attacker-chosen — so
    #     there's no adaptive chosen-input probing (the lever remote RSA-timing key recovery needs); and
    #     signing is gated behind the operator-entered pairing PIN, ONE signature per ceremony (a
    #     repeated phase-3 is rejected — gamestream/pairing.rs — to deny a passive timing-sample harvester).
    #   * GameStream is OFF by default (bare `serve` is native-only); the secure native QUIC plane uses
    #     rustls' constant-time backend, NOT the rsa crate. RSA is touched only on the opt-in,
    #     trusted-LAN GameStream/Moonlight pairing handshake. Moonlight mandates RSA-2048, so the
    #     GameStream identity cannot move to Ed25519/ECDSA (only the native identity could, and it
    #     already avoids the rsa crate).
    # There is NO fixed rsa release (the constant-time rewrite is still unreleased upstream). Revisit if:
    # a constant-time rsa ships (then drop this), the host ever signs an attacker-chosen message with
    # this key, or any RSA decryption / key-transport using the private key is added.
    "RUSTSEC-2023-0071",

    # quick-xml DoS advisories (RUSTSEC-2026-0194 quadratic-time duplicate-attribute check;
    # RUSTSEC-2026-0195 unbounded namespace-declaration allocation in NsReader). Both are
    # exploited by feeding attacker-controlled XML to a running parser. In this tree quick-xml is
    # a BUILD-TIME-ONLY, transitive dependency of `wayland-scanner` (a proc-macro that parses the
    # TRUSTED wayland protocol XML files shipped with the wayland-rs crates at compile time). It is
    # never linked into any shipped binary and never parses runtime/attacker-controlled input, so
    # neither DoS is reachable. There is no fix to bump to: wayland-scanner 0.31.10 (latest) pins
    # `quick-xml ^0.39`, and the fixes only exist in quick-xml >=0.41. Revisit (drop these) when
    # wayland-scanner releases against quick-xml >=0.41, or if quick-xml is ever pulled onto a
    # runtime path that parses untrusted XML.
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0194",
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0195",
]