//! Shared native (`punktfunk/1`) pairing state — the on-demand arming PIN (with expiry) plus the //! persistent paired-clients store. One [`NativePairing`] handle is shared by the punktfunk/1 QUIC //! accept loop ([`crate::m3`]) and the management API ([`crate::mgmt`]), so an operator can **arm //! pairing and read the PIN from the web console** instead of the service log. //! //! The PIN direction is inherent to the SPAKE2 ceremony: the *host* mints the PIN and the *client* //! enters it (the client needs it to build its first message). So the UI **displays** the PIN — //! armed on demand for a short window — rather than accepting one. use anyhow::Result; use std::path::PathBuf; use std::sync::Mutex; use std::time::{Duration, Instant}; /// The host's paired punktfunk/1 clients: `~/.config/punktfunk/punktfunk1-paired.json`. /// (Separate from GameStream pairing, which has its own store and ceremony.) #[derive(Default, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)] pub struct PairedClients { pub clients: Vec, } #[derive(Clone, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)] pub struct PairedClient { pub name: String, /// Hex SHA-256 of the client's certificate. pub fingerprint: String, } impl PairedClients { fn contains(&self, fp_hex: &str) -> bool { self.clients .iter() .any(|c| c.fingerprint.eq_ignore_ascii_case(fp_hex)) } } struct PairedState { path: PathBuf, clients: PairedClients, } /// The current arming window. `pin == None` ⇒ disarmed. `expires_at == None` ⇒ armed with no /// expiry (the CLI `--allow-pairing` flag); `Some(t)` ⇒ a web-armed window that auto-disarms. #[derive(Default)] struct Armed { pin: Option, expires_at: Option, } /// An unpaired (but identified) device that knocked on a pairing-required host — held for /// **delegated approval** from the management console (roadmap §8b-1) instead of being silently /// forgotten. In-memory only: pending knocks don't survive a restart (the device just knocks /// again), and they expire after [`PENDING_TTL`]. struct Pending { id: u32, name: String, fp_hex: String, requested_at: Instant, } #[derive(Default)] struct PendingState { next_id: u32, items: Vec, } /// A pending-approval snapshot for the management API / web console. pub struct PendingRequest { /// Per-process id used to address approve/deny (stable for the entry's lifetime). pub id: u32, /// Best-effort device label (the client's `Hello` name, else fingerprint-derived). pub name: String, /// Hex SHA-256 of the knocking client's certificate — what approval pins. pub fingerprint: String, /// Seconds since the (most recent) knock. pub age_secs: u64, } /// Pending knocks older than this are dropped (the device retries; a stale entry shouldn't be /// approvable days later when the operator no longer remembers the context). const PENDING_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10 * 60); /// Cap on the pending list — a LAN scanner must not grow it unboundedly. Oldest entries drop. const PENDING_CAP: usize = 32; /// Shared native-pairing state: the arming PIN window + the persistent trust store + the /// pending-approval queue. pub struct NativePairing { arm: Mutex, paired: Mutex, pending: Mutex, } /// A snapshot for the management API / web console. pub struct NativePairingStatus { pub armed: bool, /// The PIN to display while armed (the operator reads it; the user enters it on the client). pub pin: Option, /// Seconds left in a timed window (`None` = armed with no expiry, e.g. the CLI flag). pub expires_in_secs: Option, pub paired_clients: u32, } fn default_path() -> Result { // `config_dir()` resolves XDG/HOME on Linux and falls back to %APPDATA% on Windows — so the // native paired-store works without a HOME env var (which a Windows service/task doesn't set). Ok(crate::gamestream::config_dir().join("punktfunk1-paired.json")) } fn load(path: &std::path::Path) -> PairedClients { std::fs::read(path) .ok() .and_then(|b| serde_json::from_slice(&b).ok()) .unwrap_or_default() } fn save(state: &PairedState) -> Result<()> { if let Some(dir) = state.path.parent() { std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)?; } // Atomic replace: a crash/full-disk mid-write must not truncate the trust store (which would // silently lock out every paired client on a --require-pairing host). Temp + rename. let tmp = state.path.with_extension("json.tmp"); std::fs::write(&tmp, serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&state.clients)?)?; std::fs::rename(&tmp, &state.path)?; Ok(()) } fn random_pin() -> String { use rand::Rng; format!("{:04}", rand::thread_rng().gen_range(0..10_000u32)) } /// Sanitize a client-supplied device name before it's stored, listed, or logged. The name comes /// straight off the wire (the `Hello`/`PairRequest` of an *unpaired* device), so it's untrusted: a /// hostile LAN device could embed terminal escapes / control characters (log + console injection) or /// bidi overrides (`U+202E` etc.) to make a malicious device *look* like a trusted one in the /// approval UI. Strip C0/C1 controls and Unicode bidi/format controls, collapse whitespace, trim, and /// cap the length; an empty/all-control name falls back to a fingerprint-derived label. pub(crate) fn sanitize_device_name(name: &str, fp_hex: &str) -> String { let cleaned: String = name .chars() .map(|c| if c == '\t' || c == '\n' { ' ' } else { c }) .filter(|&c| { !c.is_control() // Bidi/format controls that could spoof or reorder the displayed name. && !('\u{202A}'..='\u{202E}').contains(&c) // LRE..RLO/PDF && !('\u{2066}'..='\u{2069}').contains(&c) // LRI..PDI && c != '\u{200E}' // LRM && c != '\u{200F}' // RLM && c != '\u{061C}' // ALM && c != '\u{FEFF}' // BOM / zero-width no-break space }) .collect(); // Collapse internal whitespace runs, trim, cap at the wire limit. let collapsed = cleaned.split_whitespace().collect::>().join(" "); let mut trimmed = collapsed.as_str(); while trimmed.len() > NAME_MAX { let mut cut = NAME_MAX; while !trimmed.is_char_boundary(cut) { cut -= 1; } trimmed = &trimmed[..cut]; } let trimmed = trimmed.trim(); if trimmed.is_empty() { format!("device {}", &fp_hex[..8.min(fp_hex.len())]) } else { trimmed.to_string() } } /// Max stored device-name length (matches the `Hello` wire cap, `quic::HELLO_NAME_MAX`). const NAME_MAX: usize = 64; impl NativePairing { /// Load the trust store. `store_path = None` uses the default config path. If `arm_at_start` /// (the CLI `--allow-pairing`/`--require-pairing` flags), arm immediately with `fixed_pin` /// (or a fresh random PIN) and **no expiry** — back-compat with the headless CLI flow. pub fn load_with( store_path: Option, fixed_pin: Option, arm_at_start: bool, ) -> Result { let path = match store_path { Some(p) => p, None => default_path()?, }; let clients = load(&path); let arm = if arm_at_start { Armed { pin: Some(fixed_pin.unwrap_or_else(random_pin)), expires_at: None, } } else { Armed::default() }; Ok(NativePairing { arm: Mutex::new(arm), paired: Mutex::new(PairedState { path, clients }), pending: Mutex::new(PendingState::default()), }) } /// Arm pairing with a fresh random PIN, valid for `ttl`. Returns the PIN to display. pub fn arm(&self, ttl: Duration) -> String { let pin = random_pin(); *self.arm.lock().unwrap() = Armed { pin: Some(pin.clone()), expires_at: Some(Instant::now() + ttl), }; pin } /// Disarm pairing (no new ceremonies accepted). pub fn disarm(&self) { *self.arm.lock().unwrap() = Armed::default(); } /// Expire a timed window if its deadline passed (called under the lock before any read). fn expire(arm: &mut Armed) { if let Some(t) = arm.expires_at { if Instant::now() >= t { *arm = Armed::default(); } } } /// The current valid PIN, or `None` if disarmed/expired. The QUIC ceremony reads this /// per-attempt, so a window that lapsed mid-connection no longer pairs. pub fn current_pin(&self) -> Option { let mut arm = self.arm.lock().unwrap(); Self::expire(&mut arm); arm.pin.clone() } /// A snapshot for the management API. pub fn status(&self) -> NativePairingStatus { let mut arm = self.arm.lock().unwrap(); Self::expire(&mut arm); let expires_in_secs = arm .expires_at .map(|t| t.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now()).as_secs()); NativePairingStatus { armed: arm.pin.is_some(), pin: arm.pin.clone(), expires_in_secs, paired_clients: self.paired.lock().unwrap().clients.clients.len() as u32, } } /// Is this client (hex SHA-256 fingerprint) in the paired set? pub fn is_paired(&self, fp_hex: &str) -> bool { self.paired.lock().unwrap().clients.contains(fp_hex) } /// Record a successful pairing (re-pairing the same fingerprint just updates the name — /// matched case-insensitively, like every other fingerprint comparison here). The name is /// sanitized (untrusted). On a persist failure the in-memory store is rolled back so it never /// diverges from disk. Also clears any pending knock for this fingerprint (it's now paired). pub fn add(&self, name: &str, fp_hex: &str) -> Result<()> { let name = sanitize_device_name(name, fp_hex); { let mut p = self.paired.lock().unwrap(); let snapshot = p.clients.clients.clone(); // restore on a failed save p.clients .clients .retain(|c| !c.fingerprint.eq_ignore_ascii_case(fp_hex)); p.clients.clients.push(PairedClient { name, fingerprint: fp_hex.to_string(), }); if let Err(e) = save(&p) { p.clients.clients = snapshot; return Err(e); } } // A device that knocked and is now paired shouldn't linger in the approval list. let mut pending = self.pending.lock().unwrap(); pending .items .retain(|p| !p.fp_hex.eq_ignore_ascii_case(fp_hex)); Ok(()) } /// The paired clients (for the management API's device list). pub fn list(&self) -> Vec { self.paired.lock().unwrap().clients.clients.clone() } /// Remove a paired client by fingerprint. Returns whether one was removed. On a persist /// failure the in-memory store is rolled back (it never diverges from disk). pub fn remove(&self, fp_hex: &str) -> Result { let mut p = self.paired.lock().unwrap(); let before = p.clients.clients.len(); let snapshot = p.clients.clients.clone(); p.clients .clients .retain(|c| !c.fingerprint.eq_ignore_ascii_case(fp_hex)); let removed = p.clients.clients.len() != before; if removed { if let Err(e) = save(&p) { p.clients.clients = snapshot; return Err(e); } } Ok(removed) } // -- Delegated approval (roadmap §8b-1) -------------------------------- /// Drop expired pending knocks (called under the lock, mirroring [`Self::expire`]). fn expire_pending(pending: &mut PendingState) { pending .items .retain(|p| p.requested_at.elapsed() < PENDING_TTL); } /// Record an unpaired device's knock for delegated approval. Re-knocks from the same /// fingerprint refresh the existing entry in place (same id; a connect-retry loop must not spam /// the list); a fresh fingerprint gets a new id, evicting the **least-recently-active** entry /// past [`PENDING_CAP`]. The name is sanitized (untrusted; see [`sanitize_device_name`]). pub fn note_pending(&self, name: &str, fp_hex: &str) { let name = sanitize_device_name(name, fp_hex); let mut pending = self.pending.lock().unwrap(); Self::expire_pending(&mut pending); if let Some(p) = pending .items .iter_mut() .find(|p| p.fp_hex.eq_ignore_ascii_case(fp_hex)) { p.requested_at = Instant::now(); p.name = name; return; } if pending.items.len() >= PENDING_CAP { // Evict the least-recently-active entry. NOT index 0: the in-place refresh above means // Vec order no longer tracks recency, so pick the minimum `requested_at` explicitly. if let Some(at) = pending .items .iter() .enumerate() .min_by_key(|(_, p)| p.requested_at) .map(|(i, _)| i) { pending.items.remove(at); } } let id = pending.next_id; pending.next_id = pending.next_id.wrapping_add(1); pending.items.push(Pending { id, name, fp_hex: fp_hex.to_string(), requested_at: Instant::now(), }); } /// The devices currently awaiting approval (for the management API). pub fn pending(&self) -> Vec { let mut pending = self.pending.lock().unwrap(); Self::expire_pending(&mut pending); pending .items .iter() .map(|p| PendingRequest { id: p.id, name: p.name.clone(), fingerprint: p.fp_hex.clone(), age_secs: p.requested_at.elapsed().as_secs(), }) .collect() } /// Approve a pending knock: pair its fingerprint (under `name_override` if the operator /// labeled it, else the knock's own name) and drop it from the queue. `Ok(None)` = no such /// (or expired) id. pub fn approve_pending( &self, id: u32, name_override: Option<&str>, ) -> Result> { let entry = { let mut pending = self.pending.lock().unwrap(); Self::expire_pending(&mut pending); let Some(at) = pending.items.iter().position(|p| p.id == id) else { return Ok(None); }; pending.items.remove(at) }; // pending lock released — add() takes the paired lock let name = name_override.unwrap_or(&entry.name); self.add(name, &entry.fp_hex)?; Ok(Some(PairedClient { name: name.to_string(), fingerprint: entry.fp_hex, })) } /// Deny (drop) a pending knock. Returns whether one was removed. The device's next knock /// re-creates an entry — deny is "not now", not a blocklist. pub fn deny_pending(&self, id: u32) -> bool { let mut pending = self.pending.lock().unwrap(); let before = pending.items.len(); pending.items.retain(|p| p.id != id); pending.items.len() != before } } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; fn temp() -> PathBuf { // A unique-ish temp path without Date/rand-in-test fuss: pid + addr of a local. let x = 0u8; std::env::temp_dir().join(format!( "pf-native-pair-{}-{}.json", std::process::id(), &x as *const _ as usize )) } #[test] fn arm_expire_and_pair() { let p = temp(); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); let np = NativePairing::load_with(Some(p.clone()), None, false).unwrap(); // Disarmed by default. assert!(np.current_pin().is_none()); assert!(!np.status().armed); // Arm with a tiny TTL → a PIN appears, then expires. let pin = np.arm(Duration::from_millis(40)); assert_eq!(pin.len(), 4); assert_eq!(np.current_pin().as_deref(), Some(pin.as_str())); assert!(np.status().armed); std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(60)); assert!(np.current_pin().is_none(), "window should have expired"); assert!(!np.status().armed); // Pair / list / unpair. assert!(!np.is_paired("ab12")); np.add("Living Room", "AB12").unwrap(); assert!( np.is_paired("ab12"), "fingerprint match is case-insensitive" ); assert_eq!(np.list().len(), 1); assert_eq!(np.status().paired_clients, 1); assert!(np.remove("ab12").unwrap()); assert!(!np.remove("ab12").unwrap()); assert!(np.list().is_empty()); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); } #[test] fn pending_knock_approve_and_deny() { let p = temp(); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); let np = NativePairing::load_with(Some(p.clone()), None, false).unwrap(); assert!(np.pending().is_empty()); // A knock appears; a re-knock from the same fingerprint refreshes (same id, new name) // instead of duplicating. np.note_pending("device aa11", "AA11"); np.note_pending("Bedroom TV", "aa11"); let pend = np.pending(); assert_eq!(pend.len(), 1, "re-knock dedups by fingerprint"); assert_eq!(pend[0].name, "Bedroom TV"); let id = pend[0].id; // Deny drops it without pairing; the next knock gets a fresh id. assert!(np.deny_pending(id)); assert!(!np.deny_pending(id)); assert!(np.pending().is_empty()); assert!(!np.is_paired("aa11")); // Approve pairs the fingerprint (operator label wins) and clears the entry. np.note_pending("device bb22", "BB22"); let id = np.pending()[0].id; assert!( np.approve_pending(9999, None).unwrap().is_none(), "unknown id" ); let client = np .approve_pending(id, Some("Living Room")) .unwrap() .unwrap(); assert_eq!(client.name, "Living Room"); assert!(np.is_paired("bb22"), "approval pins the fingerprint"); assert!(np.pending().is_empty()); assert_eq!(np.list()[0].name, "Living Room"); // The cap evicts the oldest knock. for i in 0..(PENDING_CAP + 3) { np.note_pending("flood", &format!("f{i:03}")); } let pend = np.pending(); assert_eq!(pend.len(), PENDING_CAP); assert_eq!(pend[0].fingerprint, "f003", "oldest entries evicted first"); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); } #[test] fn sanitize_strips_control_and_bidi() { // ANSI escape + newline + a bidi override that could spoof the displayed name. let dirty = "\u{1b}]0;evil\u{07}Good\nDevice\u{202E}xfp"; let clean = sanitize_device_name(dirty, "deadbeef00"); assert!(!clean.contains('\u{1b}') && !clean.contains('\n') && !clean.contains('\u{202E}')); // ESC dropped (']' survives), BEL dropped, '\n'→space (Good Device), RLO dropped (no space). assert_eq!(clean, "]0;evilGood Devicexfp"); // All-control / empty → fingerprint-derived fallback. assert_eq!( sanitize_device_name("\u{1b}\u{07}", "deadbeef00"), "device deadbeef" ); assert_eq!(sanitize_device_name(" ", "abc"), "device abc"); // Over-long names cap at a char boundary. assert!(sanitize_device_name(&"x".repeat(200), "ab").len() <= 64); } #[test] fn pairing_clears_a_pending_knock() { let p = temp(); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); let np = NativePairing::load_with(Some(p.clone()), None, false).unwrap(); np.note_pending("Knocker", "cc44"); assert_eq!(np.pending().len(), 1); // Pairing the same fingerprint (e.g. via the PIN ceremony) drops the stale pending entry. np.add("Knocker", "CC44").unwrap(); assert!( np.pending().is_empty(), "a now-paired device must leave the approval list" ); assert!(np.is_paired("cc44")); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); } #[test] fn add_replaces_case_insensitively() { let p = temp(); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); let np = NativePairing::load_with(Some(p.clone()), None, false).unwrap(); np.add("First", "AB12").unwrap(); np.add("Second", "ab12").unwrap(); // same device, different hex case assert_eq!(np.list().len(), 1, "re-add must replace, not duplicate"); assert_eq!(np.list()[0].name, "Second"); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); } #[test] fn cli_flag_arms_with_no_expiry() { let p = temp(); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); let np = NativePairing::load_with(Some(p.clone()), Some("1234".into()), true).unwrap(); assert_eq!(np.current_pin().as_deref(), Some("1234")); let s = np.status(); assert!(s.armed); assert_eq!(s.expires_in_secs, None, "CLI arming has no expiry"); np.disarm(); assert!(np.current_pin().is_none()); let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p); } }