ecbbff55447f020905e75140ceed67afef18027d
5 Commits
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705a8fa94e |
chore(deps): drop unmaintained rustls-pemfile; axum-server 0.7 -> 0.8
axum-server was used only for the plain-HTTP nvhttp listener, but we enabled its tls-rustls feature (HTTPS is hand-rolled over tokio-rustls) — and that feature was what pulled the unmaintained rustls-pemfile (RUSTSEC-2025-0134). Drop the feature, bump axum-server to 0.8 (0.8 also no longer pulls it), and move our own PEM parsing in gamestream/tls.rs to rustls-pki-types' PemObject (the same path punktfunk-core/quic.rs already uses), removing our direct rustls-pemfile dep too. Net: rustls-pemfile fully gone; dependency graph trimmed 547 -> 529 crates (the tls-rustls feature also dragged in prettyplease + a wasm-tooling chain). cargo audit now reports only audiopus_sys + paste (transitive, latest, no successor). 108 host tests + clippy + fmt green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3532e35b75 |
fix(host/security): close audit findings S1,#1,#4,#10,#12,#7,#6,S2-S6 (Linux/cross-platform)
Remediations from design/security-review-2026-06-28.md verified on Linux (cargo check/clippy/test green; Windows-gated paths verify in CI): - S1 [HIGH]: bump quinn-proto 0.11.14 -> 0.11.15 (RUSTSEC-2026-0185, pre-auth out-of-order STREAM reassembly memory exhaustion on the always-on default QUIC listener). - #1 [HIGH]: remove the unauthenticated nvhttp `GET /pin` endpoint; the GameStream PIN is delivered ONLY via the bearer-gated mgmt API, so a network client can no longer submit its own displayed PIN and self-pair. - #4 [HIGH->MED]: gate the unauthenticated RTSP/UDP media plane on a paired `/launch` and bind it to the launching client's source IP (threaded through the HTTPS handler), so an unpaired peer can neither start capture on an idle host nor ride a paired client's active launch. - #12: bound concurrent parked pairing waiters (MAX_PARKED_WAITERS) so a pre-auth peer can't pin unbounded 300s handshakes. +regression test. - #10: throttle the per-packet ENet control GCM-decrypt-failed warn (exponential backoff) so a junk flood can't spam the log. - #7 [MED->LOW]: serialize all process-global env mutation on the session-setup path under a new vdisplay::ENV_LOCK (apply_session_env / apply_input_env / the launch-cmd set_var / the gamescope env read), so concurrent native sessions can't race set_var/getenv (data-race UB -> host-wide DoS). Full per-session SessionContext threading remains a follow-up for cross-session value confusion. - #6 [MED]: move the gamescope EIS socket relay from world-writable /tmp to $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR (per-user 0700) and reject a symlinked relay file, so a local user can't intercept (keylog) or deny the remote session's input. - S2: a malformed client Opus mic frame now drops that frame instead of tearing down the shared host-lifetime virtual mic (cross-session DoS). - S3: track held buttons/keys in capped HashSets (was unbounded Vec with O(n) scans) so a paired client can't grow per-session input state. - S5: reject fps==0/absurd at the open_video chokepoint (covers Hello, ANNOUNCE, Reconfigure) so the encoder time_base/pts math can't div-by-0. - S6: bound the shared mic mpsc (drop-newest when full). - S4: cap Epic launcher-cache reads (catcache.bin/.item) so a planted giant can't OOM the host during library enumeration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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450bcf1e7b |
feat(host): Apollo-backlog hardening — cert gate, NVENC RFI, media QoS, async injector
A pass over the apollo-comparison backlog (re-verified against current code). Lands four items end-to-end plus a Windows-DualSense scoping doc. - #5/#92/#26 — GameStream paired-cert allow-list. tls.rs surfaces the verified peer cert to handlers (serve_https + PeerCertFingerprint, now shared with the mgmt API instead of duplicated); nvhttp gates /launch /resume /applist /cancel on AppState.paired and reports a real PairStatus; save_paired writes atomically (temp+rename). Closes the "mTLS accepts any client cert" hole. + regression test. - #6/#51/#19/#22 — NVENC caps query -> reference-frame invalidation. nvenc.rs query_caps probes nvEncGetEncodeCaps (max dims / 10-bit / custom-VBV / RFI), rejecting over-range modes and degrading 10-bit->8-bit instead of an opaque InvalidParam. New Encoder::invalidate_ref_frames (default false -> caller keyframes); the Windows NVENC path implements real RFI (multi-ref DPB + nvEncInvalidateRefFrames, dedup + IDR-on-overflow). control.rs decodes the 0x0301 lost-frame range (Apollo's IDX_INVALIDATE_REF_FRAMES) -> AppState.rfi_range -> encode loop, falling back to a keyframe. NOTE: the Windows NVENC impl is RTX-box/CI-pending (can't compile on Linux); adversarially reviewed vs the SDK. - #43/#72 — media socket QoS + buffer growth. New punktfunk_core::transport::qos: grow_socket_buffers (factored out the native plane's 32MB SO_SNDBUF growth so the GameStream sockets reuse it) + set_media_qos (opt-in PUNKTFUNK_DSCP=1: DSCP CS5 video / CS6 audio + Linux SO_PRIORITY, Apollo's scheme). Wired into UdpTransport and the GameStream video/audio sockets. Windows IP_TOS needs qWAVE (follow-up). - #8/#45 — GameStream input injection off the ENet service thread. on_receive no longer injects inline (a slow inject head-blocked ENet keepalive/retransmit); it forwards to a dedicated injector thread. The hardened InjectorService moved from punktfunk1 into crate::inject (shared by both planes) + a coalesce step that sums adjacent relative-mouse/scroll deltas while preserving button/key/abs ordering. Docs: re-verified apollo-comparison.md status (22 items already done/obsolete since the snapshot) + windows-dualsense-scoping.md (ViGEm can't emulate a DualSense; real DS5 on Windows needs a VHF virtual-HID driver — web-research pass pending). fmt + clippy -D warnings clean; full workspace test suite green; no C-ABI/OpenAPI drift. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b4a85a8610 |
feat(host/mgmt): mTLS auth — a paired client's cert authorizes the REST API
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Phase 1 of moving the library off a manual mgmt token: the management API now serves over HTTPS with the host's persistent identity (the cert clients already pin) and OPTIONAL client-cert auth. A request is authorized if EITHER the peer presented a client certificate whose SHA-256 is in the punktfunk/1 paired store (the same trust the QUIC data plane uses — so a paired native client needs no token), OR it carries the bearer token (the web console / admin). `/health` stays open. axum-server can't surface the peer cert to a handler, so `serve_https` runs the rustls handshake itself (tokio-rustls), reads the verified peer certificate, and serves the axum Router over hyper with the fingerprint attached to each request; `require_auth` checks it against `NativePairing::is_paired`. The verifier reuses the GameStream AcceptAnyClientCert, parameterized to make client auth optional (a browser with no cert still completes the handshake and falls back to the token). Validated live: paired cert → 200, unpaired cert / no creds / bad token → 401, bearer → 200, /health open. (Note: the API is now HTTPS with a self-signed cert — a browser shows a one-time trust prompt; native clients pin by fingerprint.) Next: Apple client presents its identity over mTLS (drops the token field); embed the web console; enable HTTPS mgmt by default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bfd64ce871 |
rename: lumen → punktfunk, everywhere
ci / rust (push) Has been cancelled
Full project rename, decided 2026-06-10: - Crates/binaries: punktfunk-core / punktfunk-host / punktfunk-client-rs. - C ABI: punktfunk_* symbols, Punktfunk* types, include/punktfunk_core.h, PUNKTFUNK_FEATURE_QUIC guard (header regenerated; cbindgen renames updated, incl. PUNKTFUNK_BTN_*/PUNKTFUNK_AXIS_* wire constants). - Protocol: punktfunk/1 — control-plane magic LMN1 → PKF1, nonce salt lmn1 → pkf1. WIRE BREAK: clients must be rebuilt from this revision. - Env knobs: PUNKTFUNK_VIDEO_SOURCE / PUNKTFUNK_COMPOSITOR / PUNKTFUNK_ZEROCOPY / …. - Host config dir: ~/.config/punktfunk (the box's dir was migrated in place — the persistent identity is unchanged, pinned fingerprints stay valid). - Swift package: PunktfunkKit + PunktfunkCore.xcframework + PunktfunkConnection (Sources/PunktfunkClient app + tests renamed with it); build-xcframework.sh updated. - scripts/: 60-punktfunk.rules, punktfunk-host.service; OpenAPI doc regenerated. Also: scripts/headless/run-headless-kde.sh — full headless Plasma bringup. Root cause of "desktop but no apps/settings" over the stream: plasmashell launched without XDG_MENU_PREFIX=plasma-, so the launcher resolved a nonexistent applications.menu and rendered an empty menu. The script sets the complete KDE session env (menu prefix, KDE_FULL_SESSION, session version) and rebuilds ksycoca before starting plasmashell. Gate: 97/97 tests, clippy -D warnings (both feature sets), fmt, C-ABI harness PASS, zero lumen references left outside .git. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |