7 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
enricobuehler	defdfbdb58	fix(security): plugin UIs get their own origin ... Closes H-3 of the 2026-08-05 review, the last of its six highs. A plugin's interface was reverse-proxied onto the console's own origin and framed with `allow-same-origin`, so plugin JS ran as first-party code on that origin: one `fetch('/api/**', {credentials:'same-origin'})` and the BFF attached the operator's ADMIN bearer. That reached everything `plugin_may_access` withholds — arm pairing, read the host PIN, approve a device, read `/hooks`. The "open in new tab" link was the same escalation with no iframe involved at all. The fix is not a sandbox attribute, and it is worth writing down why, because the obvious change is the one that does not work. Dropping `allow-same-origin` gives the frame an OPAQUE origin; its subresource requests are then cross-site; the `SameSite=Lax` session cookie stops being sent; every plugin asset 302s to /login and the frame is blank. Nothing about the new-tab link is helped either. So the origin moves instead. A second listener on its own port (default PORT + 1) serves plugin UIs and nothing else: different ORIGIN — scheme+host+PORT — so the same-origin policy separates the plugin from the console: it cannot read the console's DOM, its cross-origin fetch of /api/** is unreadable (no CORS) and cannot mutate (Sec-Fetch-Site sees same-site). same SITE — cookie scope ignores the port and SameSite is computed on the site, so the session cookie still reaches the plugin listener and plugin pages keep working. Enforcement is two refusals and both are load-bearing: the console origin refuses /plugin-ui/**, and the plugin origin refuses everything ELSE — above all /api/**, which would otherwise hand the admin bearer right back to plugin JS that is now same-origin with that listener. Both are unconditional: if the plugin port cannot be bound, plugin UIs are DISABLED and the console says so, rather than falling back to the arrangement this exists to remove. Two consequences that would otherwise bite in the field: The port has to be open. Done for the Windows netsh rule, the firewalld service and the ufw profile. A browser stores a self-signed-certificate exception per ORIGIN, including the port — and a certificate interstitial can never be shown inside an iframe, so the frame would just sit blank with nothing on screen explaining why. A `no-cors` probe distinguishes it (a TLS failure rejects; any HTTP answer, even 401, resolves) and the console renders a card linking the operator to open the port once in a real tab. Also here: the health probe moved server-side to the console origin (it used to rely on being same-origin with the plugin), the postMessage listener now verifies `event.origin` — a real check rather than a tautology — and plugin-kit's `postMessage(..., "*")` is documented as load-bearing, since narrowing it to `location.origin` would now target the plugin's own origin and silently drop every message. Verified against a running console with a fake mgmt API and a fake plugin: console /plugin-ui/** → 404; plugin-origin /api/v1/hooks, /, /login, /_auth/logout → 404; plugin page loads 200 through its own origin; unauthenticated plugin origin → 401 (not a redirect to a /login it does not serve); a forged x-pf-listener header changes nothing on either listener; the plugin's own Clear-Site-Data / Access-Control-Allow-Origin / Set-Cookie are dropped by the proxy allowlist; the plugin origin's CSP names the console as its only frame-ancestors source; and with the port squatted, ui-config reports `unavailable`, the console still refuses /plugin-ui/**, and the console itself keeps working. Still wants on-glass confirmation in a real browser — the cookie and framing behaviour is reasoned from spec, not observed. cargo fmt --all --check clean; cargo check -p punktfunk-host --all-targets green on Windows; web console builds and typechecks.	2026-08-05 17:50:04 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	f87a43f42d	feat(web): harden login gate — throttle, scoped TLS, token-derived seal key ... Remediates the two web-console residuals from the 2026-07-05 posture audit: - Brute-force throttle (loginThrottle.ts): per-IP exponential backoff after 5 free attempts, plus a global floor for spread-out floods, keyed on the socket peer IP (not spoofable X-Forwarded-For) with a size-capped map. The constant-time compare already stopped the timing leak; this bounds guess *volume* against a by-design LAN-exposed console. - Session seal key now derives from the high-entropy mgmt token instead of the low-entropy login password, so a captured cookie is no longer an offline password oracle. Falls back to the password only when no token is configured (dev/local). Rotating the token now invalidates sessions. - Replace the process-wide NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 with per-request Bun TLS scoped to the loopback proxy hop; a non-loopback mgmt URL now verifies normally. Dropped the env var from the systemd unit, Steam Deck installer, Windows run scripts, env examples, and web README. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-06 07:28:39 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5	af74c9ca67	feat(web,host/windows): move the web console off :3000 to :47992 ... Port 3000 collides with half the dev-server ecosystem; 47992 sits next to the mgmt API (47990) in the punktfunk port family. Updates the run scripts, systemd/scheduled-task units, Dockerfile, Windows firewall rule + installer, packaging, and every doc that referenced :3000. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-02 18:17:42 +00:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	ae51276a03	feat(web): consolidate paired devices, self-contained sections, docs + lint ... Web console - Pairing/Library/Stats refactored into self-contained subsections that each own their own queries + mutations; a shared slot-based layout (view.tsx) is filled by the live page (containers) and Storybook (pure cards + fixtures) so the layout can't drift. - All paired devices in one list on Pairing with a protocol column (punktfunk/1 + Moonlight), routing each unpair to the right endpoint; the redundant Clients page is removed. - Library: overview grid split from the add/edit form into separate files. - Login screen links out to the docs. Docs - "Console login password" section on every host page (apt/RPM/Bazzite/SteamOS/Windows) plus a new "Forgot your Password?" troubleshooting page, linked from the login screen. - Console served as HTTP/1.1 over TLS (drop the unusable HTTP/3 advertising) across the Bun entry, launchers, systemd units, and packaging. Tooling - Biome now respects .gitignore (stops linting generated code), config migrated to 2.5.1; all lint issues fixed cleanly. Also includes this branch's in-progress host, Apple client, packaging, and CI changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-30 19:05:22 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	4a7cf9af7b	feat(packaging/web): bundle the web console into the apt install (punktfunk-web) ... Every user needs the console for pairing, so ship it via apt, auto-wired to the host — no manual bun/env setup. New punktfunk-web .deb (Architecture: all, Depends: nodejs >= 20 — runs the node-server build under apt-native node, no bundled bun): - packaging/debian/build-web-deb.sh: stages web/.output (server + public) + a /usr/bin/punktfunk-web-server wrapper (node) + the systemd --user units + the web.env template + docs. Refuses a bun bundle (Bun.serve) as a wrong-preset guard. - scripts/punktfunk-web.service: --user unit on :3000, EnvironmentFile sources the host's ~/.config/punktfunk/mgmt-token (the shared bearer) + the generated web-password; sets PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL=https://127.0.0.1:47990 + NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 (loopback self-signed cert). Restart=on-failure rides out the host-writes-token-first ordering. - scripts/punktfunk-web-init.service + web-init.sh: --user one-shot that generates the login password (a .deb postinst runs as root → wrong $HOME) and surfaces it to the journal. - build-deb.sh: punktfunk-host now Recommends punktfunk-web (apt pulls it by default; headless boxes opt out with --no-install-recommends). - deb.yml: build the web console + smoke-boot it under node (gate the .deb on a real /login 200) + build-web-deb.sh; the publish loop globs it automatically. - web/{.env.example,web.env.example}: document the auto-wiring vs a manual deploy. End state: `apt install punktfunk-host` pulls punktfunk-web; enable both --user services; the console logs in (password from the journal) and proxies the host's HTTPS mgmt API with the shared token — zero hand-edited env. Local .deb build + node smoke-boot verified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-15 08:50:40 +00:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	f4e37ac3b3	fix(web): default mgmt proxy to the HTTPS self-signed mgmt API ... The mgmt API serves HTTPS with the host's self-signed identity cert and requires mTLS-or-bearer auth (the mTLS work), but the web console's proxy still defaulted to `http://127.0.0.1:47990` — so a deployment copying .env.example got a plain-HTTP request to an HTTPS port (→ 502 Bad Gateway, observed live on the Bazzite box). - .env.example + server/util/auth.ts + vite.config.ts: default PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL to https://127.0.0.1:47990. - vite dev proxy: `secure: false` (the host cert is self-signed). - Document that the deployment needs PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN (matching the host's) and NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 — the web server's only outbound TLS is the loopback hop to the host's own self-signed cert, so disabling verify there is scoped + safe. The running Bazzite box is already fixed live (web.env → https + token + cert-skip, verified: login 200, /api/v1/status 200). This makes fresh deployments correct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-15 07:50:41 +00:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	d356d1534f	feat(web): login-gated BFF auth — sealed session cookie + server-side token injection ... Single-user, LAN-reachable-but-gated. The web server is a backend-for-frontend: - Login: POST /_auth/login {password} checks PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD (constant-time) and sets a SEALED session cookie (h3 useSession / AES-GCM). server/middleware/auth.ts gates every request — pages 302 → /login, /api → 401 — and FAILS CLOSED (503) when PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD is unset, so a misconfigured LAN-exposed server admits no one. - The management API stays loopback-only + token (never LAN-exposed). The proxy (server/routes/api/[...].ts) injects PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN server-side and drops the browser's cookie before forwarding — the token never reaches the browser, which only holds the session cookie. Nitro doesn't auto-scan a server/ dir, so the Nitro plugin gets an explicit scanDirs to pick up middleware + routes. Client: removed the localStorage token (server injects it); the fetcher bounces to /login on 401; new /login page (bare, no shell); Settings drops the token field and gains a Sign-out button; en/de strings. Validated live end to end: unauth /→302, /api→401; wrong pw→401; right pw→200+cookie; authed /api/v1/status→200 (proxied, mgmt token injected — the host required it); logout→ session cleared→401. tsc + build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-10 18:43:14 +00:00