3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
enricobuehler	91bb955d0c	style(host): rustfmt the security-fix wrapping (cargo fmt --all --check) ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-29 05:19:22 +00:00
enricobuehler	6f903f79bc	fix(host/security): Windows DACL hardening — close audit #2, #3, #8, #11 ... Windows local-privilege findings from design/security-review-2026-06-28.md. These are #[cfg(windows)] paths (verify in CI / on the box; this Linux dev VM can't compile MSVC). They follow the existing write_secret_file/icacls patterns; the cross-platform parts are cargo check/clippy/test green. - #2 [HIGH]: route the mgmt bearer token write through the shared write_secret_file so it gets the SAME Windows DACL (SYSTEM/Administrators) as the host key — it was cfg(unix)-only and left Users-readable, leaking full mgmt admin authority to any local user. - #3 [HIGH]: create_private_dir now applies a restrictive DACL to the %ProgramData%\punktfunk config directory (re-owns to Administrators to defeat a pre-creation, strips inheritance, SYSTEM/Admins/OWNER full + Users read-only) so a local user can't plant host.env/apps.json that the SYSTEM service trusts (env/arg-injection LPE). host.env is now written DACL-locked via write_secret_file; the config + logs dirs go through create_private_dir. - #8 [LOW]: write the web-console password file empty, icacls-lock it, THEN write the secret — closes the brief write-then-icacls TOCTOU window. - #11 [LOW]: the SYSTEM logs dir is DACL-locked (Users read-only, no create), so a local user can't pre-plant host.log as a reparse/hardlink to redirect SYSTEM's writes (subsumed by the #3 dir lockdown). Deferred: #5 (host<->UMDF gamepad/IDD shared-section Everyone:GENERIC_ALL). The section SDDL is intentionally permissive because the UMDF driver opens it under a restricted token of unknown SID/integrity; scoping it blind would likely break the live-validated gamepad/IDD pipeline, so it needs on-box validation first. Tracked in the report. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-28 22:14:19 +00:00
enricobuehler	b2e5878711	feat(host/mgmt): HTTPS + token auth by default (no loopback no-auth fallback) ... The mgmt API already always serves HTTPS (the host identity cert), but on a loopback bind with no token it ran unauthenticated — any local process could drive it. Make auth required ALWAYS: - new mgmt_token::load_or_generate(): token precedence is --mgmt-token > env PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN > persisted ~/.config/punktfunk/mgmt-token > freshly generated 32-byte hex, persisted 0600 in KEY=VALUE form (so the bundled web console can source it directly as a systemd EnvironmentFile — one source of truth). config_dir() made pub(crate). - parse_serve() resolves the token via load_or_generate() when unset, so a bare `serve` Just Works with auth on and no operator step. - mgmt::run() drops the loopback no-token exemption and requires a token; require_auth()'s unauthenticated fallback now returns 401. The paired-cert (mTLS) branch is unchanged — Apple client + library auth unaffected. - web /api proxy: 503 (legible) instead of forwarding an empty bearer. - tests: test_app/test_app_native default a token, send() auto-attaches the bearer; blank-token test asserts the new "no token" refusal. 80 pass. - docs: mgmt module doc + host.env.example reflect always-on auth + auto-gen. Compiles, clippy/fmt clean, openapi no drift. Part B (bundle the web console into apt, auto-wired to this token) follows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-15 08:42:28 +00:00