2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
enricobuehler	3c55ec37fa	fix(security): remaining audit findings — mgmt admin gate, RTSP DoS bounds, FEC drop, ALPN, ct-compare ... Addresses the lower-severity findings from docs/security-review.md (#4-#12). Each fix was adversarially re-reviewed (5-agent pass); two review catches folded in (the Apple client's GET /library cert path; an RTSP header-cap bypass + a spawn-panic counter leak). - #4 [low] mgmt mTLS-paired-cert no longer grants full admin. A paired STREAMING cert authorizes only a read-only allowlist (GET /host,/compositors,/status,/clients,/native/clients,/library); every state-changing route and every PIN-exposing route (/pair, /native/pair) requires the operator's bearer token. New cert_auth_is_a_read_only_allowlist test. (/library kept on the allowlist — the native clients browse it cert-only; its mutations stay token-only.) - #6 [low] RTSP pre-auth DoS bounds: a concurrent-connection cap (RAII slot guard), a per-read timeout (slow-loris), and Content-Length/header/message size caps — closing an unauthenticated slow-loris / memory-growth / thread-exhaustion vector on TCP 48010. - #11 [info] A FEC reconstruction failure is now a counted drop (discard the block, keep the session) instead of being stream-fatal — a lossy link can't be torn down by one bad block. - #10 [info] Fixed ALPN ("pkf1") on both native QUIC endpoints (defense-in-depth; a deliberate coordinated client+host upgrade — a new host rejects an ALPN-less old client). - #8 [info] Constant-time GameStream pairing phase-4 hash compare (crypto::ct_eq). - #7 [low] New VirtualDisplay::set_launch_command carries the launch command per-session on the GameStream path (no process-global env stomp under concurrent sessions); native path keeps the env under today's single-session model (documented; plumb per-session with concurrent sessions). - #5 [low] Legacy GameStream GCM nonce reuse: documented as inherent to Nvidia's old-style control encryption (Apollo/Moonlight identical; key is client-known) — unfixable on the legacy wire; the real fix is V2 control-encryption negotiation. Code comment at control.rs. - #9 [info] GameStream plain-HTTP pairing: documented (inherent to GFE compat; use punktfunk/1). - #12 [low] Web global NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: fix designed (undici dispatcher scoped to the loopback mgmt fetch) but DEFERRED — needs `bun add undici` in the web build env; reverted to keep the web working. Latent-only (the loopback mgmt fetch is the console's only outbound TLS). fmt + clippy -D warnings clean; 94 host + core tests green; no C-ABI/OpenAPI drift. (The HDR Steps 1-2 client work in the tree is the user's parallel WIP — deliberately NOT included here.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-21 09:50:24 +00:00
enricobuehler	3526517eb1	feat: HDR Step-0 colour-metadata transport + security-audit hardening ... Two strands, entangled in punktfunk1.rs, committed together (one builds-green tree). HDR pipeline Step 0 — glass-to-glass colour-metadata transport (docs/hdr-pipeline-plan.md): - Protocol/ABI: ColorInfo on the Welcome + a 0xCE HdrMeta datagram carry the source colour space + HDR10 static mastering metadata (quic.rs, abi.rs connect_ex5 fixing caps=0). - New platform-independent, unit-tested HDR static-metadata helpers (hdr.rs): chromaticities (1/50000), mastering luminance (0.0001 cd/m2), MaxCLL/MaxFALL in HDR10/ST.2086 units. - Capture/encode hooks (capture.rs, encode.rs set_hdr_meta) + Linux client / probe plumbing. Security-audit hardening — top 3 from docs/security-review.md, each adversarially verified: - #1 [HIGH] Secret file permissions. The host key.pem/cert.pem and both trust stores are now written owner-only: 0600 + dir 0700 on Unix (mirrors mgmt_token), best-effort SYSTEM/Administrators/OWNER-only icacls DACL on Windows (%ProgramData% is Users-readable). Closes a local key-disclosure -> host-impersonation gap. New gamestream::{create_private_dir, write_secret_file} + a 0600 regression test. - #2 [HIGH] Native SPAKE2 PIN is single-use. The PIN is consumed the moment the host sends its key-confirmation (which lets the client test its one guess), before reading the proof, so any completed attempt -- right OR wrong -- disarms the window. A wrong PIN isn't observable host-side (the client aborts before sending its proof), so consuming on first attempt is what delivers the documented "one online guess" instead of an unbounded brute-force of the static 4-digit PIN. Test verifies single-use. - #3 [MEDIUM] RTSP packetSize is bounded ([64,2048] in stream_config) and VideoPacketizer::new uses saturating .max(1), killing a PRE-AUTH div-by-zero/underflow panic of the video thread. Tests for {0,15,16,17} + out-of-range rejection. fmt + clippy -D warnings clean; full workspace test suite green (93 host tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-21 09:07:59 +00:00