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Commits
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e1ddd49e37 |
fix(client-core,ffvk): close the proof-lint hole in two of the three unguarded crates
`clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks` is what makes the SAFETY convention a rule rather than a habit,
and three crates had never adopted it — pf-client-core (91 unsafe items), pf-presenter (123) and
punktfunk-core (167) — while every other subsystem crate denied it. That gap is why the decoders'
`unsafe impl Send`s carried a one-line aside instead of an argument: nothing required one.
pf-client-core and pf-ffvk now deny it, with a proof written for all 58 + 3 sites they had.
⚠️ 44 of those 58 were WINDOWS-ONLY — `clipboard.rs` 24 and `video_d3d11.rs` 20 — and invisible to
the Linux measurement that sized this work at 14. Same trap as the E0133 sweep: a Linux-only survey
of a cross-platform crate undercounts by whatever the `cfg` hides, here by 3x. Landing the deny on
the strength of that number alone would have re-broken Windows CI, which is exactly the mistake this
session already made once with the `warn`-that-was-really-`deny`.
The proofs say what is actually load-bearing rather than restating the call. In `clipboard.rs` that
is the ownership split Win32 requires and nothing in the code stated: `GetClipboardData` returns a
handle BORROWED from the clipboard (never freed here), while `GlobalAlloc` + `SetClipboardData`
TRANSFERS ownership to it (which is why nothing frees that one either) — two opposite rules, three
lines apart. In `video_d3d11.rs` the recurring one is that libav's `get_format` list is
NUL-terminated by `AV_PIX_FMT_NONE`, which is what keeps the walk in bounds.
Remaining: punktfunk-core (~146, of which `abi.rs` is 141) and pf-presenter (~108). Both want the
"state the contract once" treatment — abi.rs's sites are a handful of repeating shapes (`opt_cstr`
on caller C strings, null-guarded out-param writes, forwarding calls), not 141 distinct arguments.
Note the vendored `fec-rs` (18 sites) is a separate path-dependency crate, so it is out of scope
rather than something to prove.
Verified: Linux .21 fmt + both CI clippy steps rc=0; Windows .47 `-p pf-client-core` clippy
`-D warnings` rc=0 (the only place the 44 are visible), plus the full Windows CI clippy set and
pf-capture's 18 tests.
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d2b6f5b65f |
docs(unsafe): audit all 49 unsafe impl — one proof was wrong, four were missing
windows / build (aarch64-pc-windows-msvc) (push) Canceled after 0s
windows / build (x86_64-pc-windows-msvc) (push) Canceled after 0s
windows-msix / package (arm64, C:\Users\Public\ffmpeg-arm64, --no-default-features, aarch64-pc-windows-msvc, C:\t-a64) (push) Canceled after 0s
windows-msix / package (x64, C:\Users\Public\ffmpeg, , x86_64-pc-windows-msvc, C:\t) (push) Canceled after 0s
windows-host / package (push) Canceled after 0s
windows-host / winget-source (push) Canceled after 0s
windows-drivers / probe-and-proto (push) Canceled after 0s
windows-drivers / driver-build (push) Canceled after 0s
rpm / build-publish (43, bazzite, punktfunk-fedora-rpm) (push) Canceled after 0s
rpm / build-publish (44, fedora-44, punktfunk-fedora44-rpm) (push) Canceled after 0s
flatpak / build-publish (push) Canceled after 0s
docker / build-push (--build-arg FEDORA_VERSION=44, ci, ci/fedora-rpm.Dockerfile, punktfunk-fedora44-rpm) (push) Canceled after 0s
docker / build-push (., web/Dockerfile, punktfunk-web) (push) Canceled after 0s
docker / build-push (ci, ci/fedora-rpm.Dockerfile, punktfunk-fedora-rpm) (push) Canceled after 0s
docker / build-push (ci, ci/rust-ci-noble.Dockerfile, punktfunk-rust-ci-noble) (push) Canceled after 0s
docker / build-push (ci, ci/rust-ci.Dockerfile, punktfunk-rust-ci) (push) Canceled after 0s
docker / build-push (docs-site, docs-site/Dockerfile, punktfunk-docs) (push) Canceled after 0s
docker / build-push-arm64cross (push) Canceled after 0s
docker / deploy-docs (push) Canceled after 0s
decky / build-publish (push) Canceled after 0s
deb / build-publish (push) Canceled after 0s
deb / build-publish-host (push) Canceled after 0s
deb / build-publish-client-arm64 (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / rust (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / rust-arm64 (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / web (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / docs-site (push) Canceled after 0s
ci / bench (push) Canceled after 0s
arch / build-publish (push) Canceled after 0s
apple / swift (push) Canceled after 0s
apple / screenshots (push) Canceled after 0s
android / android (push) Canceled after 0s
`unsafe impl Send`/`Sync` is the highest-risk unsafe category here and the one this program had never looked at: a wrong one is cross-thread UB that is invisible at every call site, with no `unsafe` block to catch a reviewer's eye. 49 of them (41 Send, 8 Sync). Two results. **`MappedView`'s `Sync` proof was factually wrong.** It read "only exposes accessors that are safe under concurrent use" — they are not. `read_u8`/`write_u8`/`read_u16` are plain unaligned accesses through `&self`, and `&MappedView` really is shared across threads: `ChannelState::data()` hands out `&'static MappedView`, and pf-xusb, pf-mouse and pf-gamepad all dispatch `WdfIoQueueDispatchParallel` with `NumberOfPresentedRequests = u32::MAX`. The struct's own doc had the right story — consistency is the channel protocol's job — but the `unsafe impl` stated a different, stronger claim, which is the one a reviewer checking that line would rely on. The impl is still sound, for a reason worth writing down: these bytes are mapped into ANOTHER PROCESS that writes them concurrently, so Rust-level exclusivity over them is unachievable no matter what this type does. Sync fields go through the atomic accessors; the plain ones cover only protocol-fenced bytes. The proof now says that, and states the rule it implies for accessors added later — plain path only for bytes the protocol already fences. **Four `Send` impls carried a one-line aside instead of a proof** — the pf-client-core decoders and `DrmFrameGuard`. All four are sound, and each now says why, including the two facts that make them work and were nowhere stated: libav permits a codec context to be used from a thread other than its creator provided use is serialised (`&mut self` is that serialisation), and D3D11's immediate context is thread-AGNOSTIC rather than thread-safe — it wants serialised use, not one fixed thread. Each also records that it is deliberately not `Sync`, which is the invariant a future `impl Sync` would silently break. Every one of the 49 now carries reasoning. Verified: Linux .21 fmt + both CI clippy steps rc=0; Windows .47 `-p pf-client-core` clippy `-D warnings` rc=0 (it compiles the `video_d3d11` proof the Linux run cannot see). The pf-umdf-util edit is comment-only — confirmed by diff, since that crate needs the WDK, which .47 does not have. |
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ee29b3c3a9 |
refactor(client-core): three decoder lift methods that took nothing to get wrong
`D3d11Decoder::lift`, `VaapiDecoder::map_dmabuf` and `VulkanDecoder::extract` each take `&mut self`
and NOTHING else. They dereference `self.frame`, the `*mut AVFrame` the decoder allocates in its own
constructor and owns until `Drop` — a pointer no caller supplies, can replace, or can invalidate.
None carried a `# Safety` section, and each body was already one `unsafe {}` with its proof, so the
marker was pure ceremony and its removal moves nothing.
All three live in files the workspace `deny` already covers (`video_vulkan.rs` since the fence came
off it), so they stay fully enforced.
Worth recording why this is where the marker sweep STOPS for these two crates: every remaining
candidate in pf-encode and pf-client-core sits inside a fenced file, and there removing a marker is
not free. The fence excuses `unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn`, which only applies to `unsafe fn` BODIES — a
safe fn always needs explicit blocks — so unmarking an ash-dense helper forces exactly the
whole-body `unsafe {}` this program rejected when it rejected `cargo fix`. The way to reach those is
to reclaim the file first, not to unmark inside it.
Verified on .21: fmt + `clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` + the feature-gated
`-p pf-encode` step, all rc=0.
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06a406adf2 |
refactor(client): the D3D11VA decoder owns its refs too, and the owner-only fields say so
Completes the decoder trio. `D3d11vaDecoder::new` had the same cascading unwind as the VAAPI and Vulkan constructors — four branches each unref'ing the hwdevice by hand — and `d3d11va_decode_supported` opened a frames context it released on one exit path while relying on the null check for the other. Both are `AvBuffer` now. The one surviving `av_buffer_unref` in the file is deliberate: it runs before ownership is taken, on the `av_hwdevice_ctx_init` failure ahead of `from_raw`. The Windows gate then caught something worth keeping: `field hw_device is never read`, in all three decoders. It was true and it was new — the hand-written `Drop` used to be the field's only reader, so moving the unref into the type left a field that is *purely* an owner. The compiler cannot express that, so each one now carries a doc comment saying what it is and an explicit `#[allow(dead_code)]`. Deleting the field would free the device early; renaming it `_hw_device` would silence the lint by hiding what it holds. Neither is what we mean. Verified on BOTH platforms this time. Windows runner .133 (the toolchain env from the runner notes, plus `PF_FFVK_VULKAN_INCLUDE` for pf-ffvk): `cargo check -p pf-client-core --all-targets` at EXITCODE=0, clean of the dead-code warnings. Linux .21: `cargo check --workspace --all-targets` exit 0 / zero errors, pf-client-core 34 passed / 0 failed, pf-encode 33 passed / 0 failed. |
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a42ab075a8 |
refactor(client): the hardware decoders own their hwdevice ref
`VaapiDecoder::new` and `VulkanDecoder::new` create a hwdevice and then do several more fallible things with it — resolve `vkWaitSemaphores`, find the decoder, alloc the context, open it — and every one of those branches unref'd the device by hand, with a `Drop` doing it once more. Six hand-written unrefs between them, each one a line somebody has to remember when adding a step. `video_libav::AvBuffer` owns it instead, so an early `bail!` releases it and the branches carry nothing. It is a deliberate second copy of `pf-encode`'s type: the crates do not depend on each other (host encode and client decode share no code path), and this one needs something the host's does not — see below — so hoisting it to a shared crate would mean giving that crate an ffmpeg dependency and both sets of semantics to save about twenty lines. That extra piece is `into_raw`. `pick_vulkan` hands its frames context to the codec (`(*ctx).hw_frames_ctx = fr` — the codec unrefs it when the context closes), so the wrapper must give up ownership rather than drop. Making the transfer explicit is the point: dropping an `AvBuffer` there too would be exactly the double-unref this type exists to prevent. Two `av_buffer_unref` calls survive in `video_vulkan.rs` on purpose. One runs before ownership is taken (the `av_hwdevice_ctx_init` failure, ahead of `from_raw`); the other releases the codec's OWN pre-existing frames ctx before we replace it, which was never ours to model. Field order preserved: `hw_device` stays declared after `ctx`, so it still releases after each `Drop` frees packet/frame/context — the order the hand-written unref had. Verified on .21 (CachyOS, FFmpeg 62): `cargo check --workspace --all-targets` clean at exit 0 with zero errors — the workspace-wide check owed since the AvBuffer commit — plus pf-client-core 34 passed / 0 failed and pf-encode 33 passed / 0 failed. The decoders themselves still need real VAAPI/Vulkan playback to exercise. |
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570ff504ad |
refactor(client-core/W8): split video.rs into flat decoder-backend siblings
Break the 1974-line pf-client-core/src/video.rs into flat sibling modules (matching the crate's video_d3d11.rs / video_pyrowave.rs convention), leaving video.rs as the contract + Decoder dispatch facade: - video_color.rs : ColorDesc + csc_rows (the Y'CbCr->RGB matrix) - video_software.rs : the libavcodec/swscale SoftwareDecoder - video_vaapi.rs : the Linux-only VAAPI/DRM-PRIME backend (mod is cfg(linux)) - video_vulkan.rs : the FFmpeg Vulkan Video backend Every crate::video::X / video::X path stays byte-stable (ColorDesc + csc_rows re-exported from video.rs; frame POD, VulkanDecodeDevice, QueueLock, Decoder, decodable_codecs*, ffmpeg_codec_id, fourcc/drm_fourcc_for all stay in video.rs). Code-driven placements: averr, AVERROR_EAGAIN, frame_is_keyframe stay in video.rs (shared by all three decoders); DrmFrameGuard's field + drm_fourcc_for + Software/Vaapi/VulkanDecoder ctors/decode became pub(crate) (sibling access); the test module split three ways (software tests need private decoder internals). Pure move; no behavior change. Verified on Linux (home-worker-5): cargo clippy -p pf-client-core (default [pyrowave] + --no-default-features, --all-targets -D warnings) + cargo test. Windows verify BLOCKED environmentally: pf-client-core -> sdl3 build-from-source -> CMake/CL.exe fails on winbox's non-ASCII home path (fails the baseline too, independent of this split); the split's Windows surface (facade cfg(windows) bits + video_d3d11) is verbatim-preserved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |