72777119fd39a38eafd0d0fff4df3785404bd552
6
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 enricobuehler
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8103958169 |
fix(security): the plugin lane stops being a way in
Acts on the 2026-08-05 host security review. 36 of its 38 findings; the two exceptions are recorded below and in the review doc. The review's headline is that `plugin_may_access` was the one authorization gate in the system that was allow-by-default — a hand-maintained denylist of route prefixes, where every sibling gate is deny-by-default. Its own doc comment names the two capabilities it exists to withhold, and both were reachable one route over, because ~1450 commits of new routes were added and the list was never one of the things anyone remembered to update. So the gate is now an allowlist, and a test walks the live route table and fails the build for any route that has not been deliberately classified for both non-admin lanes. That test is the actual fix: it is what stops the next route from arriving pre-authorized. Route reachability and field authority turned out to be different questions. A provider plugin has to be able to reconcile its own library entries — that is what a scanner plugin IS — but `prep` and a `command` launch inside that payload are handed to `/bin/sh -c` as the host user, and every execution site documents them as operator-typed. Requests now carry the lane that authorized them, and those two fields are refused to everyone but the operator's own token. The art proxy read any absolute path off disk in the host process, which on Windows is LocalSystem, from a path the plugin lane could write and then read back — so it yielded `mgmt-token`, which is full admin. It now serves only real images (extension AND magic bytes, so a renamed secret fails), only from inside an allowed root, only after canonicalization, and never over UNC; and a path it would refuse to serve can no longer be persisted in the first place. On Windows, the config-dir hardening was skipped exactly when it was needed — it ran only in the branch that CREATES host.env, so the case it was written for (a local user pre-created the directory and planted one) was the one case it never ran in. It is now unconditional and first, an existing host.env is re-owned, and the inheritable OWNER RIGHTS ACE that kept an attacker's files theirs after the directory was re-owned is gone. The identity and token readers were hardening the directory only on the path that GENERATED a new secret, so a planted cert/key or token was adopted verbatim and permanently; they harden before the first read now. `ensure_admin_only_source` is implemented. The 2026-07-05 audit recorded it as FIXED and it was in no commit in this repository's history — the local EoP it described was live, and it is the payload half of the config-dir chain above. Also: the three input planes are bounded and lossy like the mic plane on the same loop already was; Android's library client no longer accepts any publicly-trusted certificate for the pinned host; the usbip vhci nodes get their own group instead of riding on `input`, which every packaging scriptlet tells users to join; a registry URL can no longer inject a TOML table into bunfig.toml; the pairing cooldown is charged before the arming state is read, so armed/disarmed is no longer a free oracle; and the whole Low tier, of which the two worth naming are a clipboard MIME NUL that panicked the host on one control message, and an unauthenticated global logout that let any LAN peer sign the operator out on a loop. NOT fixed, deliberately: H-3 (plugin UIs framed allow-same-origin). Dropping allow-same-origin does not work: the document's origin goes opaque, its subresource requests are then cross-site, the SameSite=Lax session cookie is not sent, and every plugin asset 302s to /login. The "open in new tab" link is the same escalation with no iframe at all, so the sandbox attribute is not where this gets fixed either. It needs a second listener — a distinct origin that is still the same site — which changes the console's deploy model and wants on-glass validation. The mechanism and the dead end are written down at the iframe. H-6 registry authentication, whose other half lives in unom/infra. The in-repo halves are done: workflow_dispatch inputs no longer interpolate into run: blocks (one of them in the step holding UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY), and the syft installer is pinned to its tag instead of main. Digest pinning is left until the registry is authenticated, because a tag — content-keyed or not — can simply be overwritten while anonymous pushes are accepted. M-5 is half done: the oracle is closed, but binding the arming window needs the console to learn the fingerprint first, which is a knock-then-bind flow rather than an edit. Verified: cargo fmt --all --check clean; cargo check --all-targets green on Linux and on Windows (confirmed non-vacuous — a planted type error in windows/install.rs fails the build); scripts/xcheck.sh windows check green; cargo test -p punktfunk-host --bins 416 passed, the single failure being gamestream::stream::tests::sender_delivers_batches, the known qemu-environmental UDP-loopback flake that fails identically on clean main in the same container; cargo test -p pf-clipboard 13 passed; web console typechecks. |
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 enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5
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06a249e49f |
feat(host/linux): opt-in one-click updates — the pf-update root helper, group-scoped polkit grant, per-PM legs
The U2 leg of planning:host-update-from-web-console.md. A new dep-free root helper (crates/pf-update) runs the distro package manager against the INSTALLED punktfunk packages — apt (index refresh scoped to our list when present), dnf, rpm-ostree (single-transaction re-resolve, reported staged), sysext (the proven signed-feed updater), pacman only behind the explicit PACMAN_FULL_SYSUPGRADE opt-in — then the run-the-binary gate, then a root-written result record. Zero attacker-influenceable parameters end to end: fixed ExecStart oneshot (punktfunk-update.service), polkit rule scoped to that one unit's start verb for the shipped-EMPTY punktfunk-update group (joining it is the auditable opt-in; every postinst creates it, none populate it). The host starts the unit, interprets the record (staged / nothing-newer-yet / changed), and crosses its own restart on the same intent/reconcile machinery as the Windows leg. Status now reports staged results and the opt-in hint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5
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11045a0f70 |
chore: consolidate parallel-session WIP (HOLD — do not push)
Local snapshot of intermingled in-flight work, committed to unblock the encode
refactor (a clean ffmpeg_win.rs for the vbv-dedup follow-on). These hunks span
the same files and can't be cleanly split here; the commit bundles three
distinct workstreams that each belong in their own PR:
- logging rework (~43 files: level re-tiering, structured fields, `?e`,
hot-path flood latches)
- conflicting-host detection (detect.rs + detect/{linux,windows}.rs + wiring
in main.rs/mgmt.rs/Cargo.toml/docs/packaging)
- standby-sink DWM-stall attribution (windows/display_events.rs + capture/
vdisplay wiring)
NOT verified as a combination. NOT to be pushed until the refactor is done and
these are re-verified and reorganized into their proper per-workstream PRs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8
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cef2f6780c |
fix(packaging): correct CachyOS firewall to ufw + ship ufw openers + web-console opener
CachyOS ships ufw enabled by default (firewalld is not installed) — verified live on the .21 box — but the docs and shipped firewall openers claimed "CachyOS enables firewalld by default". Correct that everywhere and ship a ufw application profile (the one-liner analogue of the firewalld service files): - packaging/linux/punktfunk.ufw (new): [punktfunk-native], [punktfunk-gamestream], [punktfunk-web] profiles, installed to /etc/ufw/applications.d/punktfunk by the Arch (CachyOS) and .deb host packages. `sudo ufw allow punktfunk-native`. - packaging/linux/punktfunk-web.xml (new): firewalld service for the optional web console (TCP 47992), installed by the host package on arch/deb/rpm. Neither the native nor gamestream opener covered 47992, so a firewalld/ufw host that enabled punktfunk-web could not reach the console over the LAN. - Fix the "CachyOS enables firewalld" claim in arch.md, arch/README.md, debian/README.md, both firewalld service .xml comments, and the pacman scriptlet; firewalld now attributed to the spins that use it (EndeavourOS, Fedora/RHEL). - Docs present both one-liners (ufw + firewalld) whichever firewall you run, plus a console-opener step; postinst/scriptlet hints detect ufw as well as firewalld. The native data plane stays hole-punched (ephemeral UDP, no fixed port) — its openers correctly open only 9777/udp + mDNS; the stale "open a UDP range" note is replaced with the accurate outbound-UDP explanation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8
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8a06c7545b |
docs(arch): fish-safe repo setup, firewalld services, fix client label
The pacman-repo setup step used a bash heredoc (`<<'EOF'`), which fish — the
default shell on CachyOS — cannot parse ("expected a string, but found a
redirection"). Replace it with a cross-shell `printf | sudo tee -a` form in both
the Arch guide and packaging/arch/README.md; `$repo`/`$arch` stay literal for
pacman and the output is byte-identical to the old heredoc.
Firewall: stock Arch ships none (ports already open), but CachyOS enables
firewalld by default and an Arch package must never touch the running firewall.
Ship firewalld service definitions the host package installs to
/usr/lib/firewalld/services/ (punktfunk-gamestream, punktfunk-native), not
auto-enabled; the install scriptlet prints the enable command only when
firewall-cmd is present. Document it in the Arch guide (new section) and README.
The mgmt API (loopback) and web console ports are deliberately not opened.
Also fix the "GTK4 couch/Deck client" mislabel — it's the native
GTK4/libadwaita Linux client (desktop/laptop/Deck are targets; the
controller-optimized launcher is one view, not its identity) — across the Arch
PKGBUILD/README, Arch guide, and the Debian README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8
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8a134b6157 |
feat(packaging/arch): Arch + SteamOS install target (PKGBUILD + sysext)
Add packaging/arch: a PKGBUILD mirroring the rpm/deb artifact set (binary, udev rule, 32MB sysctl, systemd USER units with ExecStart rewritten, headless helpers, env templates, openapi), a pacman .install scriptlet, a systemd-sysext builder for immutable SteamOS, and a README. Builds the working tree via PF_SRCDIR (CI/dev) or a git tag (AUR). Arch's stock ffmpeg already ships NVENC, so deps collapse to ~10 packages with nvidia-utils/compositors as optdepends (never hard-depend on the driver, same invariant as rpm/deb). SteamOS delivery is a **systemd-sysext** (overlays /usr read-only from writable /var/lib/extensions/, survives A/B OS updates, no steamos-readonly disable) — pacman/distrobox/flatpak are all unsuitable for a host that needs uinput/uhid, the host PipeWire socket, the GPU node, and to spawn a compositor. KNOWN GAP, documented prominently: encode is NVENC-only (src/encode/linux.rs has no VAAPI backend), so this works on Arch+NVIDIA (and bazzite-deck-nvidia) but an AMD Steam Deck installs yet cannot encode until a hevc_vaapi backend is written — a code change, not packaging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |