3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
enricobuehler	8103958169	fix(security): the plugin lane stops being a way in ... Acts on the 2026-08-05 host security review. 36 of its 38 findings; the two exceptions are recorded below and in the review doc. The review's headline is that `plugin_may_access` was the one authorization gate in the system that was allow-by-default — a hand-maintained denylist of route prefixes, where every sibling gate is deny-by-default. Its own doc comment names the two capabilities it exists to withhold, and both were reachable one route over, because ~1450 commits of new routes were added and the list was never one of the things anyone remembered to update. So the gate is now an allowlist, and a test walks the live route table and fails the build for any route that has not been deliberately classified for both non-admin lanes. That test is the actual fix: it is what stops the next route from arriving pre-authorized. Route reachability and field authority turned out to be different questions. A provider plugin has to be able to reconcile its own library entries — that is what a scanner plugin IS — but `prep` and a `command` launch inside that payload are handed to `/bin/sh -c` as the host user, and every execution site documents them as operator-typed. Requests now carry the lane that authorized them, and those two fields are refused to everyone but the operator's own token. The art proxy read any absolute path off disk in the host process, which on Windows is LocalSystem, from a path the plugin lane could write and then read back — so it yielded `mgmt-token`, which is full admin. It now serves only real images (extension AND magic bytes, so a renamed secret fails), only from inside an allowed root, only after canonicalization, and never over UNC; and a path it would refuse to serve can no longer be persisted in the first place. On Windows, the config-dir hardening was skipped exactly when it was needed — it ran only in the branch that CREATES host.env, so the case it was written for (a local user pre-created the directory and planted one) was the one case it never ran in. It is now unconditional and first, an existing host.env is re-owned, and the inheritable OWNER RIGHTS ACE that kept an attacker's files theirs after the directory was re-owned is gone. The identity and token readers were hardening the directory only on the path that GENERATED a new secret, so a planted cert/key or token was adopted verbatim and permanently; they harden before the first read now. `ensure_admin_only_source` is implemented. The 2026-07-05 audit recorded it as FIXED and it was in no commit in this repository's history — the local EoP it described was live, and it is the payload half of the config-dir chain above. Also: the three input planes are bounded and lossy like the mic plane on the same loop already was; Android's library client no longer accepts any publicly-trusted certificate for the pinned host; the usbip vhci nodes get their own group instead of riding on `input`, which every packaging scriptlet tells users to join; a registry URL can no longer inject a TOML table into bunfig.toml; the pairing cooldown is charged before the arming state is read, so armed/disarmed is no longer a free oracle; and the whole Low tier, of which the two worth naming are a clipboard MIME NUL that panicked the host on one control message, and an unauthenticated global logout that let any LAN peer sign the operator out on a loop. NOT fixed, deliberately: H-3 (plugin UIs framed allow-same-origin). Dropping allow-same-origin does not work: the document's origin goes opaque, its subresource requests are then cross-site, the SameSite=Lax session cookie is not sent, and every plugin asset 302s to /login. The "open in new tab" link is the same escalation with no iframe at all, so the sandbox attribute is not where this gets fixed either. It needs a second listener — a distinct origin that is still the same site — which changes the console's deploy model and wants on-glass validation. The mechanism and the dead end are written down at the iframe. H-6 registry authentication, whose other half lives in unom/infra. The in-repo halves are done: workflow_dispatch inputs no longer interpolate into run: blocks (one of them in the step holding UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY), and the syft installer is pinned to its tag instead of main. Digest pinning is left until the registry is authenticated, because a tag — content-keyed or not — can simply be overwritten while anonymous pushes are accepted. M-5 is half done: the oracle is closed, but binding the arming window needs the console to learn the fingerprint first, which is a knock-then-bind flow rather than an edit. Verified: cargo fmt --all --check clean; cargo check --all-targets green on Linux and on Windows (confirmed non-vacuous — a planted type error in windows/install.rs fails the build); scripts/xcheck.sh windows check green; cargo test -p punktfunk-host --bins 416 passed, the single failure being gamestream::stream::tests::sender_delivers_batches, the known qemu-environmental UDP-loopback flake that fails identically on clean main in the same container; cargo test -p pf-clipboard 13 passed; web console typechecks.	2026-08-05 17:12:12 +02:00
enricobuehler	f3615f83a5	fix(gamescope): the takeover no longer kills the host it is running in ... Field report, Nobara + 0.20.0: switching into Game Mode mid-stream disconnects the client and the box never lights up again. His journal has the whole mechanism, ten seconds apart: 12:34:18.9 freed Steam: stopped the display manager for this stream 12:34:29.0 systemd[1685]: Stopping punktfunk-host.service Stopping the display manager ends the user's last login session. The packaged host is a `systemd --user` unit, so logind then stops user@1000.service once UserStopDelaySec elapses — 10s by default on Nobara — and takes the host with it. The stream dies, the scheduled restore never runs, and the display manager stays down with nothing left to restart it: a black box that needs a VT to recover. Exactly the two symptoms reported, and the intermittency is just whether an active Gaming Mode session was there to trigger the takeover at all. It never showed on the repro VM because lingering was enabled there for the earlier sessionless tests (`Linger=yes` — confirmed on the VM today), which is precisely the thing that breaks the dependency: logind keeps the user manager alive with no session. Our KDE/GNOME/Arch setup guides already ask for it; his box, following the KDE route, did not have it. So the takeover now ensures lingering BEFORE it touches the display manager: `loginctl enable-linger` directly (allow_active in logind's own policy — verified working unprivileged on Nobara), else the packaged helper gains a `linger` verb that enables it for PKEXEC_UID alone, never a caller-named user. If neither works the takeover is refused with an actionable error and managed degrades to attach — mirroring the box's own session is strictly better than a screen that needs a VT. Hosts that cannot be reached this way (root, a system unit) skip the check: the cgroup test is a pure `cgroup_under_user_manager` with a unit test, matched against the real shapes on a Nobara box (`user@1000.service/app.slice/...` vs a `session-N.scope`). Also documents the requirement in the gamescope guide's Nobara section. Checked on Linux: clippy -D warnings, 78 tests, rustfmt; helper verified with `sh -n`, and the linger enable/disable round-trip run live on the Nobara VM.	2026-07-27 19:04:20 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5	8d5a9f66c9	fix(gamescope): ship a packaged privilege path for the DM-stop takeover ... Field report (Nobara, 0.19.2): entering Game Mode mid-stream left the monitor on and the stream mirroring at the desktop's resolution. Root cause: the DM-flavor takeover needs privilege to stop plasmalogin, the polkit rule is a docs-only manual step nobody installs, so every managed entry silently degraded to ATTACH — and with a physical display connected the attach path mirrors the box's own session at its own mode. Ship the privilege with the packages instead: a root helper (libexec/punktfunk/pf-dm-helper, verbs stop|restore) behind its own polkit action (io.unom.punktfunk.dm-helper, allow_any — the same mechanism Nobara's os-session-select uses, and the helper derives the DM unit from the display-manager.service symlink itself so callers never name a unit across the privilege boundary). The host tries the plain system-bus verbs first (root / operator rule still take precedence), then pkexec's the helper; the restore paths (idle restore + in-stream desktop-switch honor) use the same ladder so a takeover that needed the helper can always be undone by it. Packaged in rpm/deb/arch (Arch under /usr/lib/punktfunk with the policy's exec.path annotation rewritten; the host probes both layouts). Nix is left out deliberately: store paths can't match the probe, NixOS keeps the manual rule. Docs updated — the rule snippet stays as the scoped alternative. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-24 23:41:29 +02:00