Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
enricobuehler 5219107177 chore(unsafe): the workspace adopts the drivers' unsafe discipline
`packaging/windows/drivers/*` has run `deny(unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn)` +
`deny(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)` for a while, with `forbid(unsafe_code)`
on the modules that need no unsafe at all. The main workspace had no lint config
whatsoever, so nothing stopped a clean crate from quietly growing an `unsafe`, and
nothing distinguished the handful of genuinely-unsafe lines inside a 600-line
`unsafe fn` from the safe ones surrounding them.

Three things, all mechanical:

* `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` on the eight crates that already contain zero unsafe
  (`pf-driver-proto`, `pf-host-config`, `pf-paths`, the three clean clients, both
  tools). These were clean by accident, not by contract; now they are clean by
  contract.

* `unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "warn"` workspace-wide. `unsafe fn` states a contract
  the CALLER must uphold — it was never meant to switch off checking for the whole
  body. Measured fallout is 300 sites on Linux, and they are concentrated: six
  files carry all of them, while `punktfunk-core`, `pf-frame`, `pf-clipboard` and
  `pf-vdisplay` are already at zero. `warn` (not `deny`) so the build stays green
  while those six are worked down; it flips to `deny` once they are. This is also
  the Rust 2024 default, so it pays off the edition migration early.

* `proc::current_uid()` replaces eight `unsafe { libc::getuid() }` blocks. Each
  site had copied out the same SAFETY note verbatim, which is the tell: `getuid()`
  is parameterless, always succeeds and touches no memory, so there is no contract
  for a caller to uphold and no reason for the unsafe to be visible eight times.
  One `unsafe` behind a safe wrapper, none at the call sites.

Verified: `pf-vdisplay` builds clean on Linux (Nobara) at zero E0133; the
macOS-buildable crates build clean locally. No behaviour change.
2026-07-28 21:31:41 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8 2f2147b093 refactor: drop milestone names + consolidate clients; loss-recovery & rumble fixes
Two bodies of work in one commit (the rename moved files the fixes also touched).

Naming/structure cleanup (pre-launch):
- Host modules m3.rs->punktfunk1.rs, m0.rs->spike.rs; CLI m3-host->punktfunk1-host,
  m0->spike; bare `punktfunk-host` now prints help. Types M3Options/M3Source->
  Punktfunk1Options/Punktfunk1Source.
- Clients consolidated out of crates/ into clients/: punktfunk-client-rs->
  clients/probe (crate punktfunk-probe), client-linux->clients/linux,
  client-windows->clients/windows, punktfunk-android->clients/android/native
  (crate punktfunk-client-android; kept [lib] name=punktfunk_android so the JNI
  contract is unchanged). crates/ now holds only core + host.
- Milestone codes M0-M4 purged from code/CLI/CLAUDE.md/README/docs/docs-site,
  kept only in docs/implementation-plan.md. docs/m2-plan.md->
  docs/gamestream-host-plan.md. CI/gradle/flatpak paths updated.

Client loss-recovery (video froze and never recovered after a brief drop):
- Export punktfunk_connection_frames_dropped through the C ABI (the core already
  tracked it for the client keyframe-recovery loop; it was never reachable from
  the ABI clients). Regenerated punktfunk_core.h.
- Apple (StreamPump + Stage2Pipeline) and Android (decode.rs) now poll
  frames_dropped and request a keyframe when it climbs -- the same loss-driven
  recovery Linux/Windows already had. Under infinite GOP the decoder silently
  conceals reference-missing frames, so the decode-error trigger rarely fires.

Apple rumble robustness (worked then went spotty -- DualSense + Xbox):
- Add CHHapticEngine stopped/reset handlers (rebuild on app background / audio
  interruption / server reset) and drop the permanent `broken` latch on a
  transient drive failure; latch only when the controller truly has no haptics.
- Surface swallowed SDL set_rumble errors on Linux/Windows + diagnostic logging.

Verified: cargo build/clippy/fmt --workspace, C-ABI harness, header drift.
Not runnable on this box (verify in CI): Gitea workflows, gradle/Android,
flatpak, Swift/decky.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 21:05:58 +00:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8 a988909196 feat: M1 lumen-core (FEC/crypto/packet/session + C ABI) and workspace scaffold
Ground-up low-latency streaming stack per docs/implementation-plan.md. M1 is
complete and tested; Linux host backends are cfg-gated stubs to be filled in on
real hardware (M0/M2).

lumen-core (built + tested on macOS/aarch64 — 21 tests):
- fec: ErasureCoder over GF(2^8) (reed-solomon-erasure, Moonlight-compatible)
  and GF(2^16) Leopard-RS (reed-solomon-simd, the >1 Gbps wall-breaker); proptested
- packet: zero-copy #[repr(C)] framing, multi-block, FEC-aware reassembly
- crypto: AES-128-GCM with per-direction nonce salts + sequence-as-AAD
- session: host submit / client poll hot paths + input; loopback & UDP transports
- abi: opaque handles, versioned LumenConfig, panic guards; cbindgen-generated header
- acceptance: Rust loopback+proptest and a C harness that links the staticlib

Scaffold (compiles green on all platforms): lumen-host (vdisplay/capture/encode/
inject/web/pipeline seams under cfg(linux)), lumen-client-rs, tools/{loss-harness,
latency-probe}, Apple/Android client stubs, Gitea CI, docs.

Hardened against a multi-agent adversarial review (13 verified findings fixed,
regression-tested): reassembler memory-DoS bounds + block-consistency validation,
GCM nonce-reuse direction separation, ABI struct_size guard + range checks, FEC
shard-length guards, shard_payload datagram bound, key zeroization + Debug redaction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 00:02:52 +02:00