The host has published every lifecycle transition on GET /api/v1/events since the
API existed — client connect/disconnect, session and stream start/end, pairing
decisions, display create/release, library, store and plugin changes — and
nothing consumed a byte of it. The console instead polled ten endpoints on 1-5 s
timers, so a change was up to 5 s stale and two pages could disagree while you
looked at them. The Library page polled not at all: install a game in Steam and
it never appeared until a full reload.
The console now subscribes once and invalidates exactly the queries an event
affects. Events never carry data into the cache — they only say "this is stale" —
so an unknown future kind costs nothing and a missed event degrades to the
polling that is still there underneath, now at a slow safety-net interval. The
fast ticks that remain are the ones events cannot express: the live stream
numbers while streaming, and a lingering display's teardown countdown.
Four things had to be true for this to work, and none of them were. Each was
found by measuring, not by reading:
- Nitro's `localFetch` accumulates the response and only builds it when the
handler returns, so nothing streams through the deployed Bun server. Three
frames sent a second apart arrived together, three seconds late, when the
upstream closed — and an SSE stream never closes, so nothing would ever have
arrived. /api/v1/events gets its own route that hands back a web Response
wrapping the upstream stream, which passes straight through.
- Hydration mounts the app shell and discards it ~15 ms later. A subscription
owned by that effect opened, closed, and never came back. It is a refcounted
module singleton now, with a grace period so a remount re-attaches instead of
reconnecting.
- `getRouter()` runs more than once in the browser, and each call built its own
QueryClient. The subscription held the first, the live pages read the second,
and every invalidation went to a cache nobody was reading. One client per
browser session; the server still gets a fresh one per request, which it must.
- `invalidateQueries` only refetches queries that currently have an observer.
An event means the HOST changed, so every cached copy is wrong whether or not
something is watching it.
Two features fall out of the same work:
- **Automation** — a page for GET/PUT /api/v1/hooks. The host has run these
hooks all along and the console never showed them, so the only way to see what
your machine does when a stream starts was to open the config file. Writing one
means writing a shell command the host will execute, so saving re-asks for the
console password, like an update or an unreviewed install.
- The Host page warns when another Moonlight-compatible server (Sunshine,
Apollo) is running on the same machine. The host has detected this at startup
for ages and reported it in /local/summary; nothing surfaced it. It is the most
common reason a host looks installed and working but no client can reach it.
Verified in a real browser against a mock host: three events drive three
refetches of a query with no polling timer, the conflicts card names the
intruder, the hook list and its dialog render, and the console reports no errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The console's login throttle was documented as per-IP and was not. Nitro's
`localFetch` hands the app a synthetic request whose socket has no
`remoteAddress`, so `getRequestIP()` returned undefined for every request and
every attempt was charged to one shared "unknown" bucket. Five wrong guesses
from any LAN peer locked out everyone — including the operator, and including
the update-apply route, which shares that budget. The Bun entry is the only
place the real peer is knowable, so it now stamps it into a header (deleting
any client-supplied copy first) and `peerAddress()` reads it back.
Verified on a real build bound to 0.0.0.0: seven wrong logins from 127.0.0.1
lock 127.0.0.1 out, a different peer still logs in on the first try, and a
request forging the header is charged to its real address.
Also on the way through:
- Installing an unreviewed package and adding a catalog source now re-ask for
the console password, like applying an update already did. A 7-day session
cookie should not be able to run new code on the host, and `store/install`
with `accept_unverified` did exactly that through the generic passthrough.
The gate sits at the trust boundary — adding a source, or a raw spec — not
on every install from a source the operator already chose to trust.
- The ui-credential denylist is matched against the normalised path too, so
`/api//v1/...` and friends can no longer walk around it.
- The console serves nosniff, a no-referrer policy, and a CSP that pins
frame-ancestors, object-src and base-uri.
- A plugin UI's response no longer re-emits the content-encoding that `fetch`
already decoded (which made compressed plugin pages fail to load), no longer
sets cookies on the console's origin, and OPTIONS reaches the plugin instead
of being refused 405 by us.
- An unreachable host reads as 502 on these routes, matching the passthrough,
instead of a bare 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
apply.post.ts intercepts the one proxied route that restarts the host: the console
password is re-verified per apply (login throttle shared, stripped before forwarding) so
a 7-day cookie alone can't do it. New Sec-Fetch-Site same-origin check on every mutating
request (login CSRF included). The card's apply flow: confirm dialog → live-session
force escalation → download/verify/restart progress rendered from the last snapshot
while polls fail (the host and, on Windows, this very server restart mid-flow) →
durable success/failure from last_result. Docs: the one-click section + kill switch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pairing:
- Refresh the paired-devices list after a native PIN pairing (the happy path never
invalidated it, so a newly paired device stayed hidden until remount).
- Moonlight PIN: a 204 means "PIN delivered to the waiting handshake", NOT paired, so
it now reads "PIN sent" instead of a false "Paired successfully".
- Hide the Moonlight pairing card on native-only hosts (HostInfo.gamestream) — it could
never receive a PIN there.
- Per-row pending on unpair/approve/deny; PIN input maxLength 16 (was 8).
Displays / Library:
- "Arrange displays" save refreshes the settings card (it rewrites the policy), without
clobbering unsaved Custom edits (re-seed only when the draft still matches the server).
- Live-display list wrapped in QueryState so errors don't read as "no displays".
- "Forever" keep-alive option in the custom editor; edit-game form round-trips the logo
artwork (was dropped on save); per-card delete pending.
Stats:
- Distinct colour for the native "queue" latency stage (it collided with "capture").
- "Not measured on this path" note on the GameStream health chart; configured-bitrate
target line on throughput; host-authoritative elapsed timer; LiveCard surfaces
non-404 errors.
Shell / auth / i18n:
- SSR-stable locale: first client render matches the base-locale SSR (no hydration
mismatch), then adopts the persisted/browser locale post-hydration.
- BFF proxy maps an upstream (mgmt-token) 401 to 502 so a logged-in user isn't bounced
into a post-login redirect loop.
- Logout checks the POST result before navigating; logs dedup by seq (StrictMode);
login "next" keeps query/hash; Dashboard shows the active-session count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address findings from a repo security review:
- core: add a sliding-window anti-replay filter over the AEAD-authenticated
sequence in Session (poll_input/poll_frame), closing the input-replay gap the
data plane previously left to the LAN/VPN trust assumption. 4096-deep window,
unit-tested; the encrypted loopback suite confirms no false drops.
- clients: write the mTLS client private key 0600 and lock the config dir 0700
on Unix (it was world-readable at the umask default), re-locking existing
stores on load. pf-client-core::trust plus the probe's own identity writer.
Windows keeps the %APPDATA% ACL; Android/Apple already wrap the key.
- web: fix a post-login open redirect — resolve `next` via URL and require it to
stay same-origin, rejecting `/\evil.com` and tab/encoding variants the old
`!startsWith("//")` guard missed. Also fixes the dead safeNextPath helper.
- ci: SHA-256-pin the BtbN FFmpeg DLLs bundled into the signed Windows installer
(were fetched from the rolling `latest` tag unverified); fails closed on a
re-roll, matching the VB-CABLE gate.
- ci: fail-open fork-guard on the Windows/Apple host-mode PR build jobs that
share runner labels with the signing jobs. Definitive fix stays server-side
(Gitea outside-collaborator approval / isolated PR runners) — see the notes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remediates the two web-console residuals from the 2026-07-05 posture audit:
- Brute-force throttle (loginThrottle.ts): per-IP exponential backoff
after 5 free attempts, plus a global floor for spread-out floods, keyed
on the socket peer IP (not spoofable X-Forwarded-For) with a size-capped
map. The constant-time compare already stopped the timing leak; this
bounds guess *volume* against a by-design LAN-exposed console.
- Session seal key now derives from the high-entropy mgmt token instead of
the low-entropy login password, so a captured cookie is no longer an
offline password oracle. Falls back to the password only when no token
is configured (dev/local). Rotating the token now invalidates sessions.
- Replace the process-wide NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 with per-request
Bun TLS scoped to the loopback proxy hop; a non-loopback mgmt URL now
verifies normally. Dropped the env var from the systemd unit, Steam Deck
installer, Windows run scripts, env examples, and web README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Web console
- Pairing/Library/Stats refactored into self-contained subsections that each own
their own queries + mutations; a shared slot-based layout (view.tsx) is filled by
the live page (containers) and Storybook (pure cards + fixtures) so the layout can't
drift.
- All paired devices in one list on Pairing with a protocol column (punktfunk/1 +
Moonlight), routing each unpair to the right endpoint; the redundant Clients page is
removed.
- Library: overview grid split from the add/edit form into separate files.
- Login screen links out to the docs.
Docs
- "Console login password" section on every host page (apt/RPM/Bazzite/SteamOS/Windows)
plus a new "Forgot your Password?" troubleshooting page, linked from the login screen.
- Console served as HTTP/1.1 over TLS (drop the unusable HTTP/3 advertising) across the
Bun entry, launchers, systemd units, and packaging.
Tooling
- Biome now respects .gitignore (stops linting generated code), config migrated to
2.5.1; all lint issues fixed cleanly.
Also includes this branch's in-progress host, Apple client, packaging, and CI changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mgmt API already always serves HTTPS (the host identity cert), but on a
loopback bind with no token it ran unauthenticated — any local process could
drive it. Make auth required ALWAYS:
- new mgmt_token::load_or_generate(): token precedence is --mgmt-token > env
PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN > persisted ~/.config/punktfunk/mgmt-token > freshly
generated 32-byte hex, persisted 0600 in KEY=VALUE form (so the bundled web
console can source it directly as a systemd EnvironmentFile — one source of
truth). config_dir() made pub(crate).
- parse_serve() resolves the token via load_or_generate() when unset, so a bare
`serve` Just Works with auth on and no operator step.
- mgmt::run() drops the loopback no-token exemption and requires a token;
require_auth()'s unauthenticated fallback now returns 401. The paired-cert
(mTLS) branch is unchanged — Apple client + library auth unaffected.
- web /api proxy: 503 (legible) instead of forwarding an empty bearer.
- tests: test_app/test_app_native default a token, send() auto-attaches the
bearer; blank-token test asserts the new "no token" refusal. 80 pass.
- docs: mgmt module doc + host.env.example reflect always-on auth + auto-gen.
Compiles, clippy/fmt clean, openapi no drift. Part B (bundle the web console into
apt, auto-wired to this token) follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mgmt API serves HTTPS with the host's self-signed identity cert and requires
mTLS-or-bearer auth (the mTLS work), but the web console's proxy still defaulted to
`http://127.0.0.1:47990` — so a deployment copying .env.example got a plain-HTTP
request to an HTTPS port (→ 502 Bad Gateway, observed live on the Bazzite box).
- .env.example + server/util/auth.ts + vite.config.ts: default PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL to
https://127.0.0.1:47990.
- vite dev proxy: `secure: false` (the host cert is self-signed).
- Document that the deployment needs PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN (matching the host's) and
NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 — the web server's only outbound TLS is the loopback
hop to the host's own self-signed cert, so disabling verify there is scoped + safe.
The running Bazzite box is already fixed live (web.env → https + token + cert-skip,
verified: login 200, /api/v1/status 200). This makes fresh deployments correct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Multi-agent security review of d356d15 (4 dimensions, 2-skeptic verification):
- CRITICAL functional+security: the session cookie inherited h3's Secure=true default;
browsers DROP Secure cookies over plain http://, so login silently failed on a LAN HTTP
client (worked only on localhost, a secure context — which is why the live test passed).
Now set the cookie attributes explicitly: HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax + Path=/, and Secure
only when PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE=1 (behind TLS). Verified: Set-Cookie no longer has Secure.
- Gate bypass: isPublicPath allowlisted any path ending in .json/.css/.png/etc., so
/api/v1/openapi.json (served unauthenticated on the mgmt side too) leaked the whole API
schema through the token-injecting proxy. Now /api is ALWAYS gated and the generic
extension allowlist is gone (client assets are all under /assets/, still allowlisted).
Verified: /api/v1/openapi.json and /api/v1/status.json → 401.
- Session lifetime: added maxAge (7d) — bounds a stolen cookie (cookie Max-Age + iron seal
TTL); previously never expired.
- Open redirect: the post-login `next` accepted protocol-relative `//evil.com`. Hardened
client + added safeNextPath() (same-origin path only).
Re-validated end to end: login assets public (200), /api/openapi.json gated (401), authed
/api/v1/status (200), unauth /→302. tsc + build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single-user, LAN-reachable-but-gated. The web server is a backend-for-frontend:
- Login: POST /_auth/login {password} checks PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD (constant-time) and
sets a SEALED session cookie (h3 useSession / AES-GCM). server/middleware/auth.ts gates
every request — pages 302 → /login, /api → 401 — and FAILS CLOSED (503) when
PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD is unset, so a misconfigured LAN-exposed server admits no one.
- The management API stays loopback-only + token (never LAN-exposed). The proxy
(server/routes/api/[...].ts) injects PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN server-side and drops the
browser's cookie before forwarding — the token never reaches the browser, which only
holds the session cookie.
Nitro doesn't auto-scan a server/ dir, so the Nitro plugin gets an explicit scanDirs to
pick up middleware + routes. Client: removed the localStorage token (server injects it);
the fetcher bounces to /login on 401; new /login page (bare, no shell); Settings drops the
token field and gains a Sign-out button; en/de strings.
Validated live end to end: unauth /→302, /api→401; wrong pw→401; right pw→200+cookie;
authed /api/v1/status→200 (proxied, mgmt token injected — the host required it); logout→
session cleared→401. tsc + build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 5