4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
enricobuehler	8103958169	fix(security): the plugin lane stops being a way in ... Acts on the 2026-08-05 host security review. 36 of its 38 findings; the two exceptions are recorded below and in the review doc. The review's headline is that `plugin_may_access` was the one authorization gate in the system that was allow-by-default — a hand-maintained denylist of route prefixes, where every sibling gate is deny-by-default. Its own doc comment names the two capabilities it exists to withhold, and both were reachable one route over, because ~1450 commits of new routes were added and the list was never one of the things anyone remembered to update. So the gate is now an allowlist, and a test walks the live route table and fails the build for any route that has not been deliberately classified for both non-admin lanes. That test is the actual fix: it is what stops the next route from arriving pre-authorized. Route reachability and field authority turned out to be different questions. A provider plugin has to be able to reconcile its own library entries — that is what a scanner plugin IS — but `prep` and a `command` launch inside that payload are handed to `/bin/sh -c` as the host user, and every execution site documents them as operator-typed. Requests now carry the lane that authorized them, and those two fields are refused to everyone but the operator's own token. The art proxy read any absolute path off disk in the host process, which on Windows is LocalSystem, from a path the plugin lane could write and then read back — so it yielded `mgmt-token`, which is full admin. It now serves only real images (extension AND magic bytes, so a renamed secret fails), only from inside an allowed root, only after canonicalization, and never over UNC; and a path it would refuse to serve can no longer be persisted in the first place. On Windows, the config-dir hardening was skipped exactly when it was needed — it ran only in the branch that CREATES host.env, so the case it was written for (a local user pre-created the directory and planted one) was the one case it never ran in. It is now unconditional and first, an existing host.env is re-owned, and the inheritable OWNER RIGHTS ACE that kept an attacker's files theirs after the directory was re-owned is gone. The identity and token readers were hardening the directory only on the path that GENERATED a new secret, so a planted cert/key or token was adopted verbatim and permanently; they harden before the first read now. `ensure_admin_only_source` is implemented. The 2026-07-05 audit recorded it as FIXED and it was in no commit in this repository's history — the local EoP it described was live, and it is the payload half of the config-dir chain above. Also: the three input planes are bounded and lossy like the mic plane on the same loop already was; Android's library client no longer accepts any publicly-trusted certificate for the pinned host; the usbip vhci nodes get their own group instead of riding on `input`, which every packaging scriptlet tells users to join; a registry URL can no longer inject a TOML table into bunfig.toml; the pairing cooldown is charged before the arming state is read, so armed/disarmed is no longer a free oracle; and the whole Low tier, of which the two worth naming are a clipboard MIME NUL that panicked the host on one control message, and an unauthenticated global logout that let any LAN peer sign the operator out on a loop. NOT fixed, deliberately: H-3 (plugin UIs framed allow-same-origin). Dropping allow-same-origin does not work: the document's origin goes opaque, its subresource requests are then cross-site, the SameSite=Lax session cookie is not sent, and every plugin asset 302s to /login. The "open in new tab" link is the same escalation with no iframe at all, so the sandbox attribute is not where this gets fixed either. It needs a second listener — a distinct origin that is still the same site — which changes the console's deploy model and wants on-glass validation. The mechanism and the dead end are written down at the iframe. H-6 registry authentication, whose other half lives in unom/infra. The in-repo halves are done: workflow_dispatch inputs no longer interpolate into run: blocks (one of them in the step holding UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY), and the syft installer is pinned to its tag instead of main. Digest pinning is left until the registry is authenticated, because a tag — content-keyed or not — can simply be overwritten while anonymous pushes are accepted. M-5 is half done: the oracle is closed, but binding the arming window needs the console to learn the fingerprint first, which is a knock-then-bind flow rather than an edit. Verified: cargo fmt --all --check clean; cargo check --all-targets green on Linux and on Windows (confirmed non-vacuous — a planted type error in windows/install.rs fails the build); scripts/xcheck.sh windows check green; cargo test -p punktfunk-host --bins 416 passed, the single failure being gamestream::stream::tests::sender_delivers_batches, the known qemu-environmental UDP-loopback flake that fails identically on clean main in the same container; cargo test -p pf-clipboard 13 passed; web console typechecks.	2026-08-05 17:12:12 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	63bc2bb10f	docs(web-console): fix stale http:// URLs — the console serves HTTPS on :47992 ... The punktfunk-web unit serves HTTP/1.1 over TLS with the host's own self-signed identity cert, but several guides still told users to open http://<host>:47992, which fails. Correct the scheme everywhere and note the one-time browser cert warning in the canonical + SteamOS docs. The RPM %post web hint was doubly wrong (http://<host-ip>:3000): wrong scheme and wrong port — the service listens on :47992, not the :3000 dev default. Also fixes scripts/web-init.sh, so the URL the SteamOS/Linux installer prints at the end of setup is correct too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-12 12:14:52 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5	af74c9ca67	feat(web,host/windows): move the web console off :3000 to :47992 ... Port 3000 collides with half the dev-server ecosystem; 47992 sits next to the mgmt API (47990) in the punktfunk port family. Updates the run scripts, systemd/scheduled-task units, Dockerfile, Windows firewall rule + installer, packaging, and every doc that referenced :3000. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-02 18:17:42 +00:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	4a7cf9af7b	feat(packaging/web): bundle the web console into the apt install (punktfunk-web) ... Every user needs the console for pairing, so ship it via apt, auto-wired to the host — no manual bun/env setup. New punktfunk-web .deb (Architecture: all, Depends: nodejs >= 20 — runs the node-server build under apt-native node, no bundled bun): - packaging/debian/build-web-deb.sh: stages web/.output (server + public) + a /usr/bin/punktfunk-web-server wrapper (node) + the systemd --user units + the web.env template + docs. Refuses a bun bundle (Bun.serve) as a wrong-preset guard. - scripts/punktfunk-web.service: --user unit on :3000, EnvironmentFile sources the host's ~/.config/punktfunk/mgmt-token (the shared bearer) + the generated web-password; sets PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL=https://127.0.0.1:47990 + NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 (loopback self-signed cert). Restart=on-failure rides out the host-writes-token-first ordering. - scripts/punktfunk-web-init.service + web-init.sh: --user one-shot that generates the login password (a .deb postinst runs as root → wrong $HOME) and surfaces it to the journal. - build-deb.sh: punktfunk-host now Recommends punktfunk-web (apt pulls it by default; headless boxes opt out with --no-install-recommends). - deb.yml: build the web console + smoke-boot it under node (gate the .deb on a real /login 200) + build-web-deb.sh; the publish loop globs it automatically. - web/{.env.example,web.env.example}: document the auto-wiring vs a manual deploy. End state: `apt install punktfunk-host` pulls punktfunk-web; enable both --user services; the console logs in (password from the journal) and proxies the host's HTTPS mgmt API with the shared token — zero hand-edited env. Local .deb build + node smoke-boot verified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-15 08:50:40 +00:00