3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
enricobuehler	59bcfa1a12	fix(ci): rpm signing uses rpm's default signer; flatpak installs node before checkout ... Two CI fixes: - rpm signing (2nd bug): overriding %__gpg_sign_cmd via --define reached gpg with %{__plaintext_filename}/%{__signature_filename} UNEXPANDED ("No such file or directory"). Stop overriding it — use rpm's default signer (which expands those correctly) and just set _gpg_name; a passphrase-less key + loopback in gpg.conf makes gpg sign headless. (Requires a passphrase-less signing key, as the runbook's %no-protection key is.) - flatpak: the job runs in fedora:43 which has no node, so actions/checkout (a JS action) failed with "node: not found". Install nodejs in a plain `run:` step (shell, no node needed) before checkout. Also scope the heavy flatpak-builder run to client/core/manifest changes (+ tags) so it stops rebuilding on every unrelated docs/host push (tag pushes still build — paths filters only branch pushes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-15 13:54:43 +00:00
enricobuehler	0f17b6f864	fix(rpm): sign-rpms.sh — %{__gpg} is already the gpg binary, drop the literal gpg ... The first signed CI run failed at the Sign step: `%{__gpg} gpg ...` expands to `<gpgpath> gpg ...`, so gpg got a spurious `gpg` filename arg ("no command supplied", options "not considered"). Dropped the literal `gpg` → `%{__gpg} --batch ...`. Validated locally: the corrected invocation parses as a sign command (fails only with "No secret key", which is present in CI). The checksig gate did its job — nothing published, installs stayed safe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-15 13:39:00 +00:00
enricobuehler	1fd4c97139	feat(rpm): wire per-package GPG signing (dormant until a key secret is set) ... The audit's signing recommendation, scoped to RPM (apt's signed Release metadata already covers .debs; bootc cosign deferred). packaging/rpm/sign-rpms.sh GPG-signs dist/*.rpm and self-verifies (rpmkeys --checksig), run from rpm.yml between build + publish. Safe to ship: the step is a NO-OP (exit 0, unsigned as today) until RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY is set as a CI secret — so it can't break current CI, and when enabled a bad macro fails loudly via the in-step checksig rather than shipping bad signatures. rpm/README gains the one-time enablement runbook (generate a dedicated passphrase-less key, add the secret, publish the public key, flip gpgcheck=1 only after a signed build lands) and notes step-ca is for TLS, not OpenPGP (it can't sign RPMs). Also fixes the rpm/README version staleness the doc review caught: rolling is 0.2.0-0.ciN (outranks the stray 0.1.1, no pin needed), host releases use host-v* not the client's v*. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-15 10:46:27 +00:00