4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5	d36bec6e9d	feat(core+host): negotiate ChaCha20-Poly1305 as the session cipher for soft-AES clients ... Lifts the ~100 Mbps decrypt ceiling on clients without hardware AES — the armv7 soft-AES targets (webOS TVs), where AES-128-GCM resolves to fixsliced software AES + software GHASH (~50-100 cpb) while ChaCha20-Poly1305's ARX construction runs ~10-17 cpb portable, a 4-7x lift that PyroWave-on-TV needs (design/chacha20-session-cipher.md). Phase 1 (core crypto, no wire change): SessionKey merges cipher choice and key material (invalid combinations unrepresentable, zeroize + redacted-Debug discipline kept); SessionCrypto dispatches both aead-0.5 ciphers per call — the salt||seq nonce scheme, per-direction salts, seq-as-AAD and replay window carry over verbatim (same 96-bit nonce / 16-byte tag, const-asserted). Config.key becomes SessionKey; validate's zero-key rejection follows the active variant. The C ABI keeps its fixed 16-byte key mapped to AES — no ABI_VERSION bump. Phase 2 (negotiation): VIDEO_CAP_CHACHA20 (0x40) — support-plus-request in one bit, the VIDEO_CAP_444 precedent. Welcome grows cipher@68 + key_chacha@69..101, emitted only when non-zero so an AES session's Welcome stays byte-identical to the pre-cipher form; decode is fail-closed (short key or unknown id -> Err, never a silent AES fallback). No WIRE_VERSION bump; downgrade resistance inherited from the pinned-TLS control channel. Phase 3 (host): grant only when the client advertised the bit and the PUNKTFUNK_CHACHA20 kill-switch (default on, documented) allows; fresh 32-byte per-session key from the same RNG discipline, legacy key field stays independently random; resolved cipher logged at session start. Verification: seal/open suites parameterized over both ciphers + a cross-cipher tamper case; Welcome roundtrip/truncation/fail-closed tests; ChaCha lossy-loopback soak (loss/replay is cipher-independent); bench gains _chacha20 series (AES ids unchanged for CI history) — host-side sealing line-rate-trivial on both x86 (~640 MiB/s) and Apple Silicon (~535 MiB/s). punktfunk-probe drives the interop matrix via PUNKTFUNK_CLIENT_CHACHA20=1 and logs the negotiated cipher. Phase 4 (pf-webos pin bump + unconditional cap bit) follows the next core release. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-21 22:50:00 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5	c7b8007ce7	fix(core): receive path — replay window covers the loss window, zero-alloc open ... Two receive-path findings from the networking audit: 1. The anti-replay window (4096 seqs) silently re-tightened the "late ≠ lost" fix: at 1 Gbps (~125k pkt/s) it spans only ~33 ms, so a Wi-Fi-retry-delayed shard the reassembler's 120 ms loss window would still use was dropped HERE first as "older than the window" — recreating the false-loss → recovery-IDR churn the time-based loss window was built to kill, exactly on the high-rate links punktfunk targets. Widened to 32768 (covers 120 ms up to ~270k pkt/s, ≈2 Gbps+); the bitmap costs 4 KiB per session and the replay-hiding bound stays finite. 2. Every received datagram still paid one Vec allocation in the AES-GCM open (and a to_vec on the plaintext probe path) — ~125k allocs/s of cross-thread allocator churn at line rate, the same class of overhead that was the documented single-core wall on the macOS receive path. New `SessionCrypto::open_in_place` (mirror of seal_in_place; GCM verifies the tag BEFORE decrypting, so a forged packet never yields plaintext) lets `poll_frame` decrypt inside the recv ring and hand the reassembler a slice. Byte-identical semantics, unit-tested against `open` incl. tamper/runt cases; criterion entry added next to seal_in_place. Tests: 94 core unit + loopback/c_abi suites green; clippy clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-10 14:55:06 +02:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	a3178d43ec	perf(core): in-place AES-GCM seal + reused wire-buffer pool (host send) ... The host sealed every packet with ~3 heap allocations: aes-gcm's convenience encrypt() allocates the ciphertext Vec, seal_for_wire allocates the seq||ct||tag wire Vec, and seal_frame allocated a fresh Vec<Vec<u8>> per frame. At line rate (~250k–500k pkt/s for 2.5–5 Gbps) that's the single-core allocator wall. - SessionCrypto::seal_in_place uses AeadInPlace::encrypt_in_place_detached to encrypt into the caller's buffer and write the detached tag at the end — byte-identical to seal's ciphertext||tag, no allocation (unit-tested for byte equality + decrypt). - Session keeps a wire_pool the caller returns via reclaim_wires; seal_frame seals each packet in place into the reused buffers (clear() keeps capacity), so after warmup there's no per-packet ciphertext/wire allocation. paced_submit and submit_frame reclaim the pool after sending. End-to-end encrypted/lossless multi-frame tests stay green (validates the pool reuse doesn't corrupt across frames). Next: write packetize directly into a contiguous send buffer (kills the remaining shard allocs + GSO's coalescing copy). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-12 23:47:38 +00:00
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 4.8	8cceb93541	rename: lumen → punktfunk, everywhere ... Full project rename, decided 2026-06-10: - Crates/binaries: punktfunk-core / punktfunk-host / punktfunk-client-rs. - C ABI: punktfunk_* symbols, Punktfunk* types, include/punktfunk_core.h, PUNKTFUNK_FEATURE_QUIC guard (header regenerated; cbindgen renames updated, incl. PUNKTFUNK_BTN_*/PUNKTFUNK_AXIS_* wire constants). - Protocol: punktfunk/1 — control-plane magic LMN1 → PKF1, nonce salt lmn1 → pkf1. WIRE BREAK: clients must be rebuilt from this revision. - Env knobs: PUNKTFUNK_VIDEO_SOURCE / PUNKTFUNK_COMPOSITOR / PUNKTFUNK_ZEROCOPY / …. - Host config dir: ~/.config/punktfunk (the box's dir was migrated in place — the persistent identity is unchanged, pinned fingerprints stay valid). - Swift package: PunktfunkKit + PunktfunkCore.xcframework + PunktfunkConnection (Sources/PunktfunkClient app + tests renamed with it); build-xcframework.sh updated. - scripts/: 60-punktfunk.rules, punktfunk-host.service; OpenAPI doc regenerated. Also: scripts/headless/run-headless-kde.sh — full headless Plasma bringup. Root cause of "desktop but no apps/settings" over the stream: plasmashell launched without XDG_MENU_PREFIX=plasma-, so the launcher resolved a nonexistent applications.menu and rendered an empty menu. The script sets the complete KDE session env (menu prefix, KDE_FULL_SESSION, session version) and rebuilds ksycoca before starting plasmashell. Gate: 97/97 tests, clippy -D warnings (both feature sets), fmt, C-ABI harness PASS, zero lumen references left outside .git. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-10 13:11:59 +00:00