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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 enricobuehler
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8103958169 |
fix(security): the plugin lane stops being a way in
Acts on the 2026-08-05 host security review. 36 of its 38 findings; the two exceptions are recorded below and in the review doc. The review's headline is that `plugin_may_access` was the one authorization gate in the system that was allow-by-default — a hand-maintained denylist of route prefixes, where every sibling gate is deny-by-default. Its own doc comment names the two capabilities it exists to withhold, and both were reachable one route over, because ~1450 commits of new routes were added and the list was never one of the things anyone remembered to update. So the gate is now an allowlist, and a test walks the live route table and fails the build for any route that has not been deliberately classified for both non-admin lanes. That test is the actual fix: it is what stops the next route from arriving pre-authorized. Route reachability and field authority turned out to be different questions. A provider plugin has to be able to reconcile its own library entries — that is what a scanner plugin IS — but `prep` and a `command` launch inside that payload are handed to `/bin/sh -c` as the host user, and every execution site documents them as operator-typed. Requests now carry the lane that authorized them, and those two fields are refused to everyone but the operator's own token. The art proxy read any absolute path off disk in the host process, which on Windows is LocalSystem, from a path the plugin lane could write and then read back — so it yielded `mgmt-token`, which is full admin. It now serves only real images (extension AND magic bytes, so a renamed secret fails), only from inside an allowed root, only after canonicalization, and never over UNC; and a path it would refuse to serve can no longer be persisted in the first place. On Windows, the config-dir hardening was skipped exactly when it was needed — it ran only in the branch that CREATES host.env, so the case it was written for (a local user pre-created the directory and planted one) was the one case it never ran in. It is now unconditional and first, an existing host.env is re-owned, and the inheritable OWNER RIGHTS ACE that kept an attacker's files theirs after the directory was re-owned is gone. The identity and token readers were hardening the directory only on the path that GENERATED a new secret, so a planted cert/key or token was adopted verbatim and permanently; they harden before the first read now. `ensure_admin_only_source` is implemented. The 2026-07-05 audit recorded it as FIXED and it was in no commit in this repository's history — the local EoP it described was live, and it is the payload half of the config-dir chain above. Also: the three input planes are bounded and lossy like the mic plane on the same loop already was; Android's library client no longer accepts any publicly-trusted certificate for the pinned host; the usbip vhci nodes get their own group instead of riding on `input`, which every packaging scriptlet tells users to join; a registry URL can no longer inject a TOML table into bunfig.toml; the pairing cooldown is charged before the arming state is read, so armed/disarmed is no longer a free oracle; and the whole Low tier, of which the two worth naming are a clipboard MIME NUL that panicked the host on one control message, and an unauthenticated global logout that let any LAN peer sign the operator out on a loop. NOT fixed, deliberately: H-3 (plugin UIs framed allow-same-origin). Dropping allow-same-origin does not work: the document's origin goes opaque, its subresource requests are then cross-site, the SameSite=Lax session cookie is not sent, and every plugin asset 302s to /login. The "open in new tab" link is the same escalation with no iframe at all, so the sandbox attribute is not where this gets fixed either. It needs a second listener — a distinct origin that is still the same site — which changes the console's deploy model and wants on-glass validation. The mechanism and the dead end are written down at the iframe. H-6 registry authentication, whose other half lives in unom/infra. The in-repo halves are done: workflow_dispatch inputs no longer interpolate into run: blocks (one of them in the step holding UPDATE_MANIFEST_KEY), and the syft installer is pinned to its tag instead of main. Digest pinning is left until the registry is authenticated, because a tag — content-keyed or not — can simply be overwritten while anonymous pushes are accepted. M-5 is half done: the oracle is closed, but binding the arming window needs the console to learn the fingerprint first, which is a knock-then-bind flow rather than an edit. Verified: cargo fmt --all --check clean; cargo check --all-targets green on Linux and on Windows (confirmed non-vacuous — a planted type error in windows/install.rs fails the build); scripts/xcheck.sh windows check green; cargo test -p punktfunk-host --bins 416 passed, the single failure being gamestream::stream::tests::sender_delivers_batches, the known qemu-environmental UDP-loopback flake that fails identically on clean main in the same container; cargo test -p pf-clipboard 13 passed; web console typechecks. |
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 enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 5
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4a5d4b0a71 |
feat(web): the console follows the host's events instead of asking ten times a minute
The host has published every lifecycle transition on GET /api/v1/events since the API existed — client connect/disconnect, session and stream start/end, pairing decisions, display create/release, library, store and plugin changes — and nothing consumed a byte of it. The console instead polled ten endpoints on 1-5 s timers, so a change was up to 5 s stale and two pages could disagree while you looked at them. The Library page polled not at all: install a game in Steam and it never appeared until a full reload. The console now subscribes once and invalidates exactly the queries an event affects. Events never carry data into the cache — they only say "this is stale" — so an unknown future kind costs nothing and a missed event degrades to the polling that is still there underneath, now at a slow safety-net interval. The fast ticks that remain are the ones events cannot express: the live stream numbers while streaming, and a lingering display's teardown countdown. Four things had to be true for this to work, and none of them were. Each was found by measuring, not by reading: - Nitro's `localFetch` accumulates the response and only builds it when the handler returns, so nothing streams through the deployed Bun server. Three frames sent a second apart arrived together, three seconds late, when the upstream closed — and an SSE stream never closes, so nothing would ever have arrived. /api/v1/events gets its own route that hands back a web Response wrapping the upstream stream, which passes straight through. - Hydration mounts the app shell and discards it ~15 ms later. A subscription owned by that effect opened, closed, and never came back. It is a refcounted module singleton now, with a grace period so a remount re-attaches instead of reconnecting. - `getRouter()` runs more than once in the browser, and each call built its own QueryClient. The subscription held the first, the live pages read the second, and every invalidation went to a cache nobody was reading. One client per browser session; the server still gets a fresh one per request, which it must. - `invalidateQueries` only refetches queries that currently have an observer. An event means the HOST changed, so every cached copy is wrong whether or not something is watching it. Two features fall out of the same work: - **Automation** — a page for GET/PUT /api/v1/hooks. The host has run these hooks all along and the console never showed them, so the only way to see what your machine does when a stream starts was to open the config file. Writing one means writing a shell command the host will execute, so saving re-asks for the console password, like an update or an unreviewed install. - The Host page warns when another Moonlight-compatible server (Sunshine, Apollo) is running on the same machine. The host has detected this at startup for ages and reported it in /local/summary; nothing surfaced it. It is the most common reason a host looks installed and working but no client can reach it. Verified in a real browser against a mock host: three events drive three refetches of a query with no polling timer, the conflicts card names the intruder, the hook list and its dialog render, and the console reports no errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 5
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4575134c21 |
fix(web): one bad password from anywhere stops locking out the whole console
The console's login throttle was documented as per-IP and was not. Nitro's `localFetch` hands the app a synthetic request whose socket has no `remoteAddress`, so `getRequestIP()` returned undefined for every request and every attempt was charged to one shared "unknown" bucket. Five wrong guesses from any LAN peer locked out everyone — including the operator, and including the update-apply route, which shares that budget. The Bun entry is the only place the real peer is knowable, so it now stamps it into a header (deleting any client-supplied copy first) and `peerAddress()` reads it back. Verified on a real build bound to 0.0.0.0: seven wrong logins from 127.0.0.1 lock 127.0.0.1 out, a different peer still logs in on the first try, and a request forging the header is charged to its real address. Also on the way through: - Installing an unreviewed package and adding a catalog source now re-ask for the console password, like applying an update already did. A 7-day session cookie should not be able to run new code on the host, and `store/install` with `accept_unverified` did exactly that through the generic passthrough. The gate sits at the trust boundary — adding a source, or a raw spec — not on every install from a source the operator already chose to trust. - The ui-credential denylist is matched against the normalised path too, so `/api//v1/...` and friends can no longer walk around it. - The console serves nosniff, a no-referrer policy, and a CSP that pins frame-ancestors, object-src and base-uri. - A plugin UI's response no longer re-emits the content-encoding that `fetch` already decoded (which made compressed plugin pages fail to load), no longer sets cookies on the console's origin, and OPTIONS reaches the plugin instead of being refused 405 by us. - An unreachable host reads as 502 on these routes, matching the passthrough, instead of a bare 500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5
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bb1f93d90e |
feat(web,docs): the Update-now flow — password re-entry at the BFF, restart-tolerant progress, same-origin hardening
apply.post.ts intercepts the one proxied route that restarts the host: the console password is re-verified per apply (login throttle shared, stripped before forwarding) so a 7-day cookie alone can't do it. New Sec-Fetch-Site same-origin check on every mutating request (login CSRF included). The card's apply flow: confirm dialog → live-session force escalation → download/verify/restart progress rendered from the last snapshot while polls fail (the host and, on Windows, this very server restart mid-flow) → durable success/failure from last_result. Docs: the one-click section + kill switch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |