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fix(web): four "fixes" from this branch that did not actually fix anything

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A verification pass re-read every finding from the original sweep against the
code on this branch rather than against the commit messages. It found that four
of them were still broken, two because the edit I made was inert. Commit
messages claim; code decides.

- **The Storybook typecheck was never on.** `tsconfig.json` listed `.storybook`
  as a bare directory name, and tsc silently skips dot-prefixed directories in
  that form — so the entry typechecked nothing at all. Proved it by planting
  `export const __probe: string = 1` in `.storybook/preview.tsx` and watching
  `bun run lint` pass. `.storybook/**/*` is what actually pulls it in; the same
  probe now fails as it should.

- **The Moonlight stale-PIN reset was a no-op.** `submit.reset()` sat at the top
  of `onSubmit`, immediately before `submit.mutate(...)` — which moves the status
  to pending in the same update, so it cleared a flag that was already changing.
  The green "PIN sent" note therefore still greeted the next pairing attempt over
  an empty PIN box. It now resets on the transition that actually matters:
  `pin_pending` going false → true.

- **The session⇄game controls had the enforcement flag inverted**, and I never
  touched it. `enforced.length === 0 || …` reads an EMPTY list as "this build
  enforces everything", when the contract says the opposite in as many words:
  "Empty on a platform with no launch path (macOS), so the console can say so
  instead of offering a switch that does nothing". On exactly the platform the
  flag exists for, every control stayed live and reported success for an axis the
  host would never act on. Absent still means "assume it acts" — that is the
  compatible reading for an older host, and a different case from present-empty.

- **Logout stopped revoking after a restart.** The epoch was a module-level
  counter starting at 1, so it revoked within one process run and then reset —
  and since the seal key derives from the stable mgmt token, a cookie captured
  before a restart unsealed fine and was accepted again for the rest of its
  7-day TTL. One service restart undid the whole fix. It persists next to the
  host's config now. Verified: log out, restart the console, the captured cookie
  still 401s, a fresh login still works.

Two more the pass rated as partial, both worth closing:

- The plugin-UI response filter was a denylist of four header names, so
  `Clear-Site-Data` sailed through — a plugin error page could wipe `pf_session`
  and sign the operator out of the console, on our own origin, because the iframe
  is same-origin by design. It is an allowlist now; a plugin-supplied CSP,
  `X-Frame-Options` or CORS header no longer speaks for us either.

- A half-configured TLS setup now refuses to start instead of logging a warning
  and serving anyway. Neither shape can work — one path missing puts the login
  password on the LAN in the clear, and PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE without TLS marks the
  cookie Secure so the browser drops it and login can never stick. Exiting with a
  reason beats a console that looks fine and is not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
enricobuehler
2026-08-01 00:20:10 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent dc57aa653c
commit f2e1b9872c
6 changed files with 142 additions and 55 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
web/server/routes/plugin-ui/[...].ts
+32 -13
View File
@@ -84,22 +84,41 @@ export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
const BODY_METHODS = new Set(["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]);
/**
* Fix up a plugin's response before it goes out on the console's origin.
* Rebuild a plugin's response before it goes out on the console's own origin.
*
* - `content-encoding` / `content-length` / `transfer-encoding`: `fetch` already decoded the body,
* but the plugin's original headers survive on the Response. Re-emitting `content-encoding: gzip`
* over plaintext makes the browser fail to decode the page, and a stale `content-length` truncates
* it. The framing belongs to OUR response, so drop the plugin's and let it be recomputed.
* - `set-cookie`: a plugin runs on the console's own origin, so any cookie it sets is scoped to the
* console — it could collide with (or shadow) `pf_session`. A plugin UI has no business setting
* cookies on this origin; it authenticates with the injected per-boot bearer.
* An ALLOWLIST, not a denylist. A plugin UI is proxied same-origin by design, so any header it
* returns is asserted for the console itself — and the first version of this dropped four names it
* had thought of. `Clear-Site-Data: "*"` from a plugin's error page was not one of them: the
* browser would honour it for this origin and wipe `pf_session`, signing the operator out of the
* console because a plugin 500'd. Same shape for a plugin-supplied `Content-Security-Policy`,
* `X-Frame-Options` or `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` — all of which would speak for us.
*
* So: name what a plugin page legitimately needs, and drop the rest. Framing headers
* (content-encoding/length, transfer-encoding) are deliberately absent — `fetch` already decoded
* the body, so re-emitting the plugin's originals made compressed pages fail to decode; ours are
* recomputed.
*/
const PLUGIN_HEADER_ALLOWLIST = new Set([
"content-type",
"cache-control",
"etag",
"last-modified",
"expires",
"vary",
"content-language",
"content-disposition",
"accept-ranges",
"content-range",
"location", // its own redirects, within its own prefix
"link", // preload hints for its own assets
"x-forwarded-prefix",
]);
function sanitize(resp: Response): Response {
const headers = new Headers(resp.headers);
headers.delete("content-encoding");
headers.delete("content-length");
headers.delete("transfer-encoding");
headers.delete("set-cookie");
const headers = new Headers();
for (const [k, v] of resp.headers) {
if (PLUGIN_HEADER_ALLOWLIST.has(k.toLowerCase())) headers.set(k, v);
}
// 204/304 must not carry a body — passing one through throws in the Response constructor.
const bodyless = resp.status === 204 || resp.status === 304;
return new Response(bodyless ? null : resp.body, {
web/server/util/auth.ts
+55 -24
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,55 @@
/**
* A revocation marker for issued sessions, PERSISTED across restarts.
*
* The session is stateless: everything lives inside the sealed cookie, so `session.clear()` only
* deletes the BROWSER's copy. A cookie captured beforehand stayed valid for its full 7-day TTL —
* "log out" did not log anything out.
*
* The counter has to survive a restart or it does not do its job: an in-memory `let epoch = 1`
* revokes within one process run, then resets to 1 the next time the service starts, and a cookie
* captured from that first run is accepted again for the rest of its TTL. (The seal key cannot save
* us — it is derived from the stable mgmt token, so pre-restart cookies still unseal fine.) So it
* lives in a file next to the host's own config.
*
* Best-effort by design: if the file cannot be read or written the console still works, it just
* falls back to in-memory revocation for this process. Refusing to log anyone out because a state
* file is unwritable would be the wrong trade for a LAN console.
*/
const EPOCH_FILE = (): string =>
process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_EPOCH_FILE ??
join(
process.env.PUNKTFUNK_CONFIG_DIR ?? join(homedir(), ".config", "punktfunk"),
"web-session-epoch",
);
let epochCache: number | null = null;
/** The epoch a new session is stamped with, and the one the gate requires. */
export function sessionEpoch(): number {
if (epochCache !== null) return epochCache;
try {
const raw = readFileSync(EPOCH_FILE(), "utf8").trim();
const n = Number.parseInt(raw, 10);
epochCache = Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : 1;
} catch {
epochCache = 1; // no file yet — first run
}
return epochCache;
}
/** Invalidate every session issued so far (what logging out does). */
export function revokeAllSessions(): void {
const next = sessionEpoch() + 1;
epochCache = next;
try {
mkdirSync(dirname(EPOCH_FILE()), { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(EPOCH_FILE(), String(next), { mode: 0o600 });
} catch {
// Unwritable state dir: the bump still holds for this process, which is the common case
// (log out, walk away). It is weaker than persisted, and better than refusing to log out.
}
}
// Shared auth helpers for the Nitro server (the deployed Bun server). Single-user,
// shared-password gate: the user logs in with PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD, which sets a SEALED
// (h3 useSession — AES-GCM) cookie; every request is gated by server/middleware/auth.ts.
@@ -8,6 +60,9 @@ import {
createHash,
timingSafeEqual as nodeTimingSafeEqual,
} from "node:crypto";
import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
import {
getRequestHeader,
getRequestIP,
@@ -201,27 +256,3 @@ export interface SessionData {
/** The epoch this session was sealed under — see `sessionEpoch`. */
epoch?: number;
}
/**
* A revocation counter for issued sessions.
*
* The session is stateless: everything lives inside the sealed cookie, so `session.clear()` only
* deletes the BROWSER's copy. A cookie captured beforehand (a shared machine, a shell history, a
* TLS-inspecting proxy) stayed valid for its full 7-day TTL with nothing the operator could do
* about it — "log out" did not log anything out.
*
* Bumping this invalidates every previously issued cookie, because the gate compares the stamped
* epoch against the current one. It lives in memory, so a host restart also revokes — acceptable
* for a single-user console, and the safe direction to fail.
*/
let epoch = 1;
/** The epoch a new session is stamped with, and the one the gate requires. */
export function sessionEpoch(): number {
return epoch;
}
/** Invalidate every session issued so far (the "sign out everywhere" lever). */
export function revokeAllSessions(): void {
epoch += 1;
}