feat(web): harden login gate — throttle, scoped TLS, token-derived seal key
Remediates the two web-console residuals from the 2026-07-05 posture audit: - Brute-force throttle (loginThrottle.ts): per-IP exponential backoff after 5 free attempts, plus a global floor for spread-out floods, keyed on the socket peer IP (not spoofable X-Forwarded-For) with a size-capped map. The constant-time compare already stopped the timing leak; this bounds guess *volume* against a by-design LAN-exposed console. - Session seal key now derives from the high-entropy mgmt token instead of the low-entropy login password, so a captured cookie is no longer an offline password oracle. Falls back to the password only when no token is configured (dev/local). Rotating the token now invalidates sessions. - Replace the process-wide NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 with per-request Bun TLS scoped to the loopback proxy hop; a non-loopback mgmt URL now verifies normally. Dropped the env var from the systemd unit, Steam Deck installer, Windows run scripts, env examples, and web README. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ rem Fixed deployment wiring (the Windows analogue of scripts/punktfunk-web.servi
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set "PORT=47992"
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set "HOST=0.0.0.0"
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set "PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL=https://127.0.0.1:47990"
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set "NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0"
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rem No NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: the host's self-signed cert is accepted only for the loopback
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rem proxy hop, scoped inside the proxy code (Bun per-request TLS), not process-wide.
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rem Serve HTTPS (HTTP/1.1 over TLS) with the host's identity cert; mark the session cookie Secure.
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set "PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_CERT=%CERTFILE%"
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set "PUNKTFUNK_UI_TLS_KEY=%KEYFILE%"
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