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improve web ui

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This commit is contained in:
Enrico Bühler
2026-06-26 05:43:34 +00:00
parent 00cf51d610
commit 803573b4ec
73 changed files with 3373 additions and 2847 deletions
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web/server/util/auth.ts
+45 -39
View File
@@ -4,26 +4,29 @@
//
// The management token never reaches the browser: server/routes/api/[...].ts injects it
// server-side when proxying to the loopback management API.
import { createHash, timingSafeEqual as nodeTimingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto'
import type { SessionConfig } from 'h3'
import {
createHash,
timingSafeEqual as nodeTimingSafeEqual,
} from "node:crypto";
import type { SessionConfig } from "h3";
export const SESSION_NAME = 'pf_session'
export const SESSION_NAME = "pf_session";
/** The login password. Empty string ⇒ auth is MISCONFIGURED (the gate fails closed). */
export function uiPassword(): string {
return process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD ?? ''
return process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_PASSWORD ?? "";
}
/** The management API the proxy forwards to (loopback by default — never LAN-exposed). It serves
* HTTPS with the host's self-signed identity cert, so the deployment also sets
* NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 for the (loopback-only) proxy fetch — see .env.example. */
export function mgmtUrl(): string {
return process.env.PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL ?? 'https://127.0.0.1:47990'
return process.env.PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_URL ?? "https://127.0.0.1:47990";
}
/** Bearer token for the management API, injected server-side. */
export function mgmtToken(): string {
return process.env.PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN ?? ''
return process.env.PUNKTFUNK_MGMT_TOKEN ?? "";
}
/**
@@ -32,34 +35,37 @@ export function mgmtToken(): string {
* (changing the password then invalidates existing sessions, which is fine).
*/
export function sessionConfig(): SessionConfig {
const secret = process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECRET
const password = secret && secret.length >= 32
? secret
: createHash('sha256').update(`punktfunk-session-v1:${uiPassword()}`).digest('hex')
return {
name: SESSION_NAME,
password,
// Bounds a stolen/replayed cookie's lifetime (sets the cookie Max-Age AND the iron
// seal TTL). 7 days for a single-user console.
maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 7,
cookie: {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
path: '/',
// h3 defaults Secure to true, which browsers DROP over plain http:// (so login
// silently fails on a LAN HTTP server). Only mark Secure when actually behind TLS
// (set PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE=1 / =true then).
secure: /^(1|true)$/i.test(process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE ?? ''),
},
}
const secret = process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECRET;
const password =
secret && secret.length >= 32
? secret
: createHash("sha256")
.update(`punktfunk-session-v1:${uiPassword()}`)
.digest("hex");
return {
name: SESSION_NAME,
password,
// Bounds a stolen/replayed cookie's lifetime (sets the cookie Max-Age AND the iron
// seal TTL). 7 days for a single-user console.
maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 7,
cookie: {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: "lax",
path: "/",
// h3 defaults Secure to true, which browsers DROP over plain http:// (so login
// silently fails on a LAN HTTP server). Only mark Secure when actually behind TLS
// (set PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE=1 / =true then).
secure: /^(1|true)$/i.test(process.env.PUNKTFUNK_UI_SECURE ?? ""),
},
};
}
/** Constant-time string comparison (avoids leaking the password via timing). */
export function timingSafeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {
const ab = Buffer.from(a)
const bb = Buffer.from(b)
if (ab.length !== bb.length) return false
return nodeTimingSafeEqual(ab, bb)
const ab = Buffer.from(a);
const bb = Buffer.from(b);
if (ab.length !== bb.length) return false;
return nodeTimingSafeEqual(ab, bb);
}
/** Paths reachable WITHOUT a session: the login page, the auth endpoints, and the build's
@@ -70,21 +76,21 @@ export function timingSafeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {
* generic `*.json` allowlist would expose `/api/v1/openapi.json` (and any future
* `.json`/`.png` management route) through the proxy unauthenticated. */
export function isPublicPath(pathname: string): boolean {
if (pathname === '/api' || pathname.startsWith('/api/')) return false // always gated
if (pathname === '/login') return true
if (pathname.startsWith('/_auth/')) return true
if (pathname.startsWith('/assets/')) return true
if (pathname === '/favicon.ico' || pathname === '/robots.txt') return true
return false
if (pathname === "/api" || pathname.startsWith("/api/")) return false; // always gated
if (pathname === "/login") return true;
if (pathname.startsWith("/_auth/")) return true;
if (pathname.startsWith("/assets/")) return true;
if (pathname === "/favicon.ico" || pathname === "/robots.txt") return true;
return false;
}
/** Validate a post-login redirect target: a same-origin path only. Rejects protocol-
* relative (`//evil.com`) and absolute URLs to prevent an open redirect. */
export function safeNextPath(next: string | undefined): string {
if (!next || !next.startsWith('/') || next.startsWith('//')) return '/'
return next
if (!next || !next.startsWith("/") || next.startsWith("//")) return "/";
return next;
}
export interface SessionData {
authenticated?: boolean
authenticated?: boolean;
}