fix(core/net): bind the data plane to the authenticated peer + stop adaptive FEC wedging large frames

Four defects from the punktfunk-core quality sweep, all in the data plane.

transport/udp: the hole-punch adopted the source address of ANY datagram whose
first 8 bytes matched PUNCH_MAGIC — a fixed public constant with no key, nonce
or session id — and the authenticated QUIC peer was passed only as the
no-punch fallback, so it was never used to validate. Hole-punch is the default
bring-up path (it is skipped only for a fixed --data-port), and the data socket
is an OS ephemeral, so spraying the ephemeral range during the 2500 ms punch
wait let anyone steal the video plane: the legitimate client is then filtered
out by the connect() and gets nothing, while QUIC stays healthy so no reconnect
fires. With a spoofed source the same 8 bytes aim a full-rate stream at a third
party. Take the authenticated peer IP and require the punch to match it — only
the PORT is in question (that is what a NAT remaps and what the punch exists to
discover); the client dials the same host IP as its QUIC connection, so a NAT
presents one source IP for both planes. Also budget each read from the REMAINING
window, so off-peer datagrams cannot stretch the wait past punch_timeout.

transport/udp: the punch keepalive treated every send error as fatal and broke
out of its loop permanently and silently. It holds a clone of the connected,
non-blocking data socket — exactly the socket whose transient conditions this
module defines and documents in is_transient_io. One ENOBUFS from a full wlan tx
queue or an ENETUNREACH during an AP roam killed the only thing holding the NAT
mapping open; the path recovers, video keeps flowing, and the stream dies later
when the idle timer expires the mapping during a static scene. Route it through
is_transient_io like every other send site in the file.

packet: adaptive FEC moved fec_percent live (host bands it 1..=50 while Welcome
advertises 10) but the receiver's per-block acceptance ceiling was computed once
from the negotiated percentage and never re-derived. Once FEC ramped, every
packet of a maximal block failed `total > max_total_shards`, the block never
accumulated a shard, the frame aged out, and the resulting loss drove FEC higher
still — large frames wedged at 100% loss exactly when FEC was meant to rescue
the link. Fixed on both sides, because hosts and clients update independently:
the sender clamps per-block parity to the ceiling the peer negotiated, and the
receiver sizes that ceiling from the whole clamp range rather than a stale
snapshot of it.

No wire bytes and no C ABI signature change; WIRE_VERSION and ABI_VERSION are
unchanged. Regression tests cover all three (the punch tests were confirmed to
fail without the fix).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

crates/punktfunk-core/src/packet/reassemble.rs

@@ -106,8 +106,19 @@ pub struct ReassemblerLimits {
 impl ReassemblerLimits {
     pub fn from_config(c: &Config) -> Self {
         let max_data = c.fec.max_data_per_block as usize;
+        // Size the ceiling from the whole range adaptive FEC may reach, NOT from the percentage
+        // negotiated at session start: the sender moves `fec_percent` live (`Packetizer::
+        // set_fec_percent`, clamped to ≤ 90) and the wire is self-describing, so it never
+        // renegotiates. Deriving this from the start value made every packet of a large block
+        // fail the `total > max_total_shards` check once FEC ramped up — the block never
+        // accumulated a shard, the frame aged out, and the resulting loss drove FEC *higher*,
+        // wedging large frames at 100% loss exactly when FEC was meant to rescue the link. A
+        // current sender also clamps its side (`Packetizer::recovery_for`); this keeps an
+        // already-deployed sender that doesn't from wedging a current receiver. Still a hard
+        // pre-allocation bound against hostile headers — just the sender's clamp, not a stale
+        // snapshot of it.
         let max_total =
-            (max_data + c.fec.recovery_for(max_data)).min(c.fec.scheme.max_total_shards());
+            (max_data + (max_data * 90).div_ceil(100)).min(c.fec.scheme.max_total_shards());
         let total_data = c.max_frame_bytes.div_ceil(c.shard_payload.max(1)).max(1);
         ReassemblerLimits {
             shard_bytes: c.shard_payload,