fix(security): land the 2026-07 audit fixes — SSRF guards, roster lane, SYSTEM path hygiene

The low/medium findings from the July host+Windows security review, as
implemented in the audit session's working tree:

- Webhooks and library-art fetches refuse loopback/link-local/metadata
  targets and no longer follow redirects (SSRF pivots from the privileged
  host process).
- The paired-client rosters (/clients, /native/clients) move off the
  streaming-client auth lane — one paired device could enumerate every other
  device's name + fingerprint; only the bearer/loopback console keeps them.
- Device-name sanitizing extends to bidi/format control characters
  (spoofable rendering) via the shared native_pairing::is_spoofy_char;
  stream-marker quoting uses the same set.
- The SYSTEM service resolves powershell by its full System32 path —
  CreateProcess checks the launching EXE's own directory first, so a planted
  powershell.exe beside the host binary would have run as SYSTEM.
- The pf-vdisplay driver's opt-in file log moves from world-writable
  C:\Users\Public to WUDFHost's own temp dir.
- GameStream pairing sessions are single-use (removed whatever the outcome).
- Uninstall also removes the pf_mouse driver-store entry (rider from the
  virtual-HID-mouse work).
- openapi.json regenerated (hardened-config-dir doc wording).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

api/openapi.json

@@ -2744,7 +2744,7 @@
       },
       "CustomEntry": {
         "type": "object",
-        "description": "A user-added title, persisted in `~/.config/punktfunk/library.json`. Same shape the API\nreturns and the web console edits.",
+        "description": "A user-added title, persisted in the hardened host config dir's `library.json` (see\n[`custom_path`]). Same shape the API returns and the web console edits.",
         "required": [
           "id",
           "title"

crates/punktfunk-host/src/gamestream/nvhttp.rs

@@ -59,6 +59,33 @@ fn peer_is_paired(peer: &Option<Extension<PeerCertFingerprint>>, st: &AppState)
         .any(|der| hex::encode(punktfunk_core::quic::endpoint::cert_fingerprint(der)) == *fp)
 }
 
+/// The peer's client-cert fingerprint as raw bytes — the form [`LaunchSession::owner_fp`] stores.
+/// `None` when no (or a blank/short) cert was presented.
+fn peer_fp(peer: &Option<Extension<PeerCertFingerprint>>) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+    match peer {
+        Some(Extension(PeerCertFingerprint(Some(fp)))) => hex::decode(fp)
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|v| <[u8; 32]>::try_from(v).ok()),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether the caller may control (resume/cancel) the current launch session. `true` when there is
+/// no session (nothing to protect — keeps cancel idempotent), or the session's owner fingerprint
+/// matches the caller's. Only a paired-but-DIFFERENT client with a known, mismatching fingerprint is
+/// rejected — so a same-client control action always succeeds, but one paired client can no longer
+/// resume or cancel *another* paired client's session (security-review 2026-07-17).
+fn peer_may_control_session(peer: &Option<Extension<PeerCertFingerprint>>, st: &AppState) -> bool {
+    match st.launch.lock().unwrap().as_ref() {
+        None => true,
+        Some(session) => match (session.owner_fp, peer_fp(peer)) {
+            (Some(owner), Some(caller)) => owner == caller,
+            // Owner or caller fingerprint unknown → the `peer_is_paired` gate already applied stands.
+            _ => true,
+        },
+    }
+}
+
 fn router(state: Arc<AppState>, https: bool) -> Router {
     Router::new()
         .route("/serverinfo", get(h_serverinfo))
@@ -131,12 +158,7 @@ async fn h_launch(
         tracing::warn!("launch rejected — client is not paired");
         return xml(error_xml()).into_response();
     }
-    let req_fp: Option<[u8; 32]> = match &peer {
+    let req_fp: Option<[u8; 32]> = peer_fp(&peer);
-        Some(Extension(PeerCertFingerprint(Some(fp)))) => hex::decode(fp)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|v| <[u8; 32]>::try_from(v).ok()),
-        _ => None,
-    };
 
     // Mode-conflict ADMISSION (Stage 4) — GameStream is single-session (`st.launch`), so a DIFFERENT
     // paired client launching while a session is live is governed by `mode_conflict` (see
@@ -205,6 +227,10 @@ async fn h_resume(
         tracing::warn!("resume rejected — client is not paired");
         return xml(error_xml());
     }
+    if !peer_may_control_session(&peer, &st) {
+        tracing::warn!("resume rejected — caller does not own the session");
+        return xml(error_xml());
+    }
     if st.launch.lock().unwrap().is_some() {
         xml(session_url_xml(&st, "resume"))
     } else {
@@ -220,6 +246,10 @@ async fn h_cancel(
         tracing::warn!("cancel rejected — client is not paired");
         return xml(error_xml());
     }
+    if !peer_may_control_session(&peer, &st) {
+        tracing::warn!("cancel rejected — caller does not own the session");
+        return xml(error_xml());
+    }
     *st.launch.lock().unwrap() = None;
     // Quit semantics: stop the running media threads (they observe these flags) so the session
     // actually ends — the virtual output/gamescope teardown follows via the capturer's RAII.

crates/punktfunk-host/src/gamestream/pairing.rs

@@ -259,11 +259,22 @@ impl Pairing {
         // Constant-time compare so a timing side-channel can't probe the expected hash.
         let hash_ok = crypto::ct_eq(&expected, &s.client_hash);
         let sig_ok = verify256(&s.client_pubkey, client_secret, client_sig).is_ok();
+        // Clone what the success branch needs so the `&mut map` borrow (`s`) is released before we
+        // mutate the map below.
+        let client_cert_der = s.client_cert_der.clone();
+        // The pairing session is single-use: remove it now, WHATEVER the outcome. Phase 4 runs over
+        // plain HTTP, so a passive observer captures the request; without this, a replay re-passes the
+        // hash/sig check and re-pins the (same) cert over and over — unbounded `paired`/paired.json
+        // growth + PairingCompleted event spam until restart (security-review 2026-07-17).
+        map.remove(uniqueid);
         if hash_ok && sig_ok {
             {
                 let mut store = paired_store.lock().unwrap();
-                store.push(s.client_cert_der.clone());
+                // De-dup: re-pairing an already-trusted cert must not append a duplicate DER.
-                super::save_paired(&store);
+                if !store.iter().any(|der| der == &client_cert_der) {
+                    store.push(client_cert_der.clone());
+                    super::save_paired(&store);
+                }
             }
             tracing::info!(uniqueid, "pairing phase 4 complete — client cert pinned");
             // Lifecycle event, plane parity with `NativePairing::add` (RFC §4). GameStream
@@ -271,7 +282,7 @@ impl Pairing {
             crate::events::emit(crate::events::EventKind::PairingCompleted {
                 device: crate::events::DeviceRef {
                     name: uniqueid.to_string(),
-                    fingerprint: hex::encode(crypto::sha256(&[s.client_cert_der.as_slice()])),
+                    fingerprint: hex::encode(crypto::sha256(&[client_cert_der.as_slice()])),
                     plane: crate::events::Plane::Gamestream,
                 },
             });
@@ -283,7 +294,6 @@ impl Pairing {
                 sig_ok,
                 "pairing phase 4 rejected — PIN or cert mismatch"
             );
-            map.remove(uniqueid);
             Ok(paired_xml("", false))
         }
     }

crates/punktfunk-host/src/gamestream/rtsp.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 use super::audio;
 use super::stream::{self, StreamConfig};
-use super::{AppState, AUDIO_PORT, CONTROL_PORT, RTSP_PORT, VIDEO_PORT};
+use super::{AppState, LaunchSession, AUDIO_PORT, CONTROL_PORT, RTSP_PORT, VIDEO_PORT};
 use crate::encode::Codec;
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -172,6 +172,24 @@ fn parse_request(head: &str, body: String) -> Request {
     }
 }
 
+/// Authorize a state-changing RTSP verb against the pairing-gated `/launch` session. The RTSP/UDP
+/// media plane is UNAUTHENTICATED, so `ANNOUNCE`/`PLAY`/`TEARDOWN` are honored only for the paired
+/// client that completed `/launch` (which set `state.launch`), and — when the launching IP is known
+/// — only from that same source IP. An unpaired RTSP peer can therefore neither start a stream,
+/// overwrite a paired client's negotiated config, nor tear its active stream down
+/// (security-review 2026-06-28 #4; extended from `PLAY`-only to `ANNOUNCE`/`TEARDOWN` 2026-07-17).
+/// `nvhttp` gates `/launch` on a pinned client cert. Returns the launch session on success — `PLAY`
+/// needs its keys/appid; the other verbs use it as a bool gate.
+fn authorized_launch(state: &AppState, peer: Option<SocketAddr>) -> Option<LaunchSession> {
+    let ls = (*state.launch.lock().unwrap())?;
+    match (ls.peer_ip, peer.map(|p| p.ip())) {
+        // Launching IP known on both sides but mismatched → not the owner.
+        (Some(want), Some(got)) if want != got => None,
+        // Owner IP matches, or the address couldn't be captured on one side → launch-present only.
+        _ => Some(ls),
+    }
+}
+
 fn handle_request(req: &Request, state: &AppState, peer: Option<SocketAddr>) -> String {
     match req.method.as_str() {
         "OPTIONS" => response(
@@ -203,6 +221,16 @@ fn handle_request(req: &Request, state: &AppState, peer: Option<SocketAddr>) ->
             )
         }
         "ANNOUNCE" => {
+            // ANNOUNCE overwrites the session's negotiated stream/audio config. Gate it to the
+            // launch owner so an unpaired RTSP peer can't scribble a paired client's config (or
+            // race one in ahead of the owner's own ANNOUNCE).
+            if authorized_launch(state, peer).is_none() {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    ?peer,
+                    "RTSP ANNOUNCE — refused: not the paired `/launch` owner"
+                );
+                return response_status("401 Unauthorized", &req.cseq, &[], None);
+            }
             let map = parse_announce(&req.body);
             match stream_config(&map) {
                 Some(cfg) => {
@@ -217,25 +245,14 @@ fn handle_request(req: &Request, state: &AppState, peer: Option<SocketAddr>) ->
             response(&req.cseq, &[], None)
         }
         "PLAY" => {
-            // The RTSP/UDP media plane is UNAUTHENTICATED. A stream may start only for the paired
+            // A stream may start only for the paired client that owns the current `/launch`
-            // client that completed the pairing-gated `/launch` (which set `state.launch`), and —
+            // (`authorized_launch` enforces launch-present + matching source IP). `nvhttp` gates
-            // when the launching IP is known — only from that same source IP. So an unpaired RTSP
+            // `/launch` on a pinned cert, so an unpaired RTSP peer can neither start a stream on an
-            // peer can neither start a stream on an idle host nor ride a paired client's active
+            // idle host nor ride a paired client's active launch.
-            // launch (security-review 2026-06-28 #4). `nvhttp` gates `/launch` on a pinned cert.
+            let Some(ls) = authorized_launch(state, peer) else {
-            let launch = *state.launch.lock().unwrap();
+                tracing::warn!(?peer, "RTSP PLAY — refused: not the paired `/launch` owner");
-            let Some(ls) = launch else {
-                tracing::warn!(?peer, "RTSP PLAY — refused: no paired `/launch` session");
                 return response_status("401 Unauthorized", &req.cseq, &[], None);
             };
-            if let (Some(want), Some(got)) = (ls.peer_ip, peer.map(|p| p.ip())) {
-                if want != got {
-                    tracing::warn!(
-                        %want, %got,
-                        "RTSP PLAY — refused: peer IP does not match the launching client"
-                    );
-                    return response_status("401 Unauthorized", &req.cseq, &[], None);
-                }
-            }
             let cfg = *state.stream.lock().unwrap();
             match cfg {
                 Some(cfg) if !state.streaming.swap(true, Ordering::SeqCst) => {
@@ -271,6 +288,15 @@ fn handle_request(req: &Request, state: &AppState, peer: Option<SocketAddr>) ->
             response(&req.cseq, &[("Session", "DEADBEEFCAFE;timeout = 90")], None)
         }
         "TEARDOWN" => {
+            // Gate to the launch owner so an unpaired RTSP peer can't stop a paired client's media
+            // threads (a trivial, repeatable stream DoS).
+            if authorized_launch(state, peer).is_none() {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    ?peer,
+                    "RTSP TEARDOWN — refused: not the paired `/launch` owner"
+                );
+                return response_status("401 Unauthorized", &req.cseq, &[], None);
+            }
             // Signal both stream threads to stop.
             state.streaming.store(false, Ordering::SeqCst);
             state.audio_streaming.store(false, Ordering::SeqCst);

crates/punktfunk-host/src/hooks.rs

@@ -150,6 +150,19 @@ impl HooksConfig {
                 if !url.starts_with("https://") && !url.starts_with("http://") {
                     return Err(at("`webhook` must be an http(s):// URL"));
                 }
+                if webhook_host_is_internal(url) {
+                    return Err(at(
+                        "`webhook` must not target a loopback/link-local/metadata host",
+                    ));
+                }
+                // A signed webhook over plaintext http:// sends the HMAC'd event body in the clear.
+                // Warn rather than reject (an internal-only `http://` receiver may be intentional).
+                if h.hmac_secret_file.is_some() && url.starts_with("http://") {
+                    tracing::warn!(
+                        %url,
+                        "webhook has an hmac_secret_file but is http:// — the signed body is sent in cleartext; prefer https://"
+                    );
+                }
             }
             if h.timeout_s == 0 || h.timeout_s > MAX_TIMEOUT_S {
                 return Err(at(&format!("`timeout_s` must be 1–{MAX_TIMEOUT_S}")));
@@ -586,6 +599,45 @@ fn fire_webhook(
     });
 }
 
+/// True if `url`'s host is a clearly-illegitimate webhook target — loopback, link-local (which
+/// includes the `169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata endpoint), the unspecified address, or `localhost`
+/// — so a tampered/misguided hooks.json can't make the privileged host POST event data to its own
+/// services or a metadata endpoint (direct-SSRF guard; security-review 2026-07-17). Deliberately does
+/// NOT block RFC-1918 / ULA / `.local` — a webhook to another box on the operator's own LAN is a
+/// legitimate self-hosting config. A best-effort textual + IP-literal check (no DNS resolution, so
+/// not a full anti-rebinding defense; the operator-gated config already limits the threat).
+fn webhook_host_is_internal(url: &str) -> bool {
+    // scheme://[userinfo@]host[:port]/... → the bare host.
+    let after_scheme = url.split_once("://").map(|(_, r)| r).unwrap_or(url);
+    let authority = after_scheme.split(['/', '?', '#']).next().unwrap_or("");
+    let hostport = authority
+        .rsplit_once('@')
+        .map(|(_, h)| h)
+        .unwrap_or(authority);
+    let host = if let Some(rest) = hostport.strip_prefix('[') {
+        rest.split(']').next().unwrap_or("") // [::1]:443 → ::1
+    } else {
+        hostport
+            .rsplit_once(':')
+            .map(|(h, _)| h)
+            .unwrap_or(hostport)
+    };
+    let host = host.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
+    if host.is_empty() || host == "localhost" || host.ends_with(".localhost") {
+        return true;
+    }
+    match host.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
+        Ok(std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4)) => {
+            v4.is_loopback() || v4.is_link_local() || v4.is_unspecified()
+        }
+        Ok(std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6)) => {
+            // Loopback (::1), unspecified (::), or link-local fe80::/10.
+            v6.is_loopback() || v6.is_unspecified() || (v6.segments()[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80
+        }
+        Err(_) => false, // a resolvable hostname — not statically classifiable here
+    }
+}
+
 fn post_webhook(url: &str, json: &str, secret_file: Option<&std::path::Path>) {
     // TLS is verified (ureq's default rustls roots); redirects are never followed, so a
     // compromised receiver can't bounce the POST cross-origin (RFC §9.5).

crates/punktfunk-host/src/library/art.rs

@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ fn warm_art_once() {
 fn fetch_json(url: &str) -> Option<serde_json::Value> {
     let agent = ureq::AgentBuilder::new()
         .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+        // Don't follow redirects — a redirect target (`3xx` → `http://169.254.169.254/…` or an
+        // internal host) would be an SSRF pivot from the privileged host. Matches the webhook path
+        // (security-review 2026-07-17). A rare legitimately-redirecting CDN just yields no art.
+        .redirects(0)
         .build();
     let body = agent.get(url).call().ok()?.into_string().ok()?;
     serde_json::from_str(&body).ok()
@@ -123,6 +127,10 @@ pub(crate) fn fetch_image(url: &str) -> Option<(Vec<u8>, String)> {
     }
     let agent = ureq::AgentBuilder::new()
         .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+        // Don't follow redirects (SSRF pivot): this is called on launcher-cache- and custom-entry-
+        // supplied URLs, so a `3xx` to an internal/metadata endpoint must not be chased by the
+        // privileged host. Matches the webhook path (security-review 2026-07-17).
+        .redirects(0)
         .build();
     let resp = agent.get(url).call().ok()?;
     let ctype = resp

crates/punktfunk-host/src/library/custom.rs

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 
 use super::*;
 
-/// A user-added title, persisted in `~/.config/punktfunk/library.json`. Same shape the API
+/// A user-added title, persisted in the hardened host config dir's `library.json` (see
-/// returns and the web console edits.
+/// [`custom_path`]). Same shape the API returns and the web console edits.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
 pub struct CustomEntry {
     /// Host-assigned, stable for the life of the entry (the `{id}` in the CRUD path).
@@ -72,16 +72,13 @@ impl From<CustomEntry> for GameEntry {
     }
 }
 
-fn config_dir() -> PathBuf {
-    std::env::var_os("XDG_CONFIG_HOME")
-        .map(PathBuf::from)
-        .or_else(|| std::env::var_os("HOME").map(|h| PathBuf::from(h).join(".config")))
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."))
-        .join("punktfunk")
-}
-
 fn custom_path() -> PathBuf {
-    config_dir().join("library.json")
+    // The shared, hardened host config dir (`%ProgramData%\punktfunk` / `~/.config/punktfunk`, with
+    // the `PUNKTFUNK_CONFIG_DIR` override) — NOT a bespoke XDG/HOME resolver with a CWD-relative
+    // fallback. This file drives operator `prep`/`launch` command execution, so it must live where the
+    // rest of the privileged host config does and be DACL/0600-locked against a non-privileged local
+    // user planting one (security-review 2026-07-17). Matches hooks.json / the mgmt token.
+    pf_paths::config_dir().join("library.json")
 }
 
 /// Load the custom entries (empty + non-fatal if the file is absent or malformed).
@@ -96,12 +93,18 @@ pub fn load_custom() -> Vec<CustomEntry> {
 }
 
 fn save_custom(entries: &[CustomEntry]) -> Result<()> {
-    let dir = config_dir();
+    let dir = pf_paths::config_dir();
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).with_context(|| format!("create {}", dir.display()))?;
+    // Owner-private dir (0700 / SYSTEM+Admins DACL) so a non-privileged local user can't plant a
+    // library.json whose `prep`/`launch` commands the host would later execute — the same trust
+    // boundary hooks.json and the mgmt token already use.
+    pf_paths::create_private_dir(&dir).with_context(|| format!("create {}", dir.display()))?;
     let json = serde_json::to_string_pretty(entries)?;
-    // Write-then-rename so a crash mid-write never truncates the catalog.
+    // Write-then-rename so a crash mid-write never truncates the catalog; `write_secret_file` gives
+    // the temp file its restrictive perms (0600 / SYSTEM+Admins DACL) before the rename carries them
+    // to the final path.
     let tmp = custom_path().with_extension("json.tmp");
-    std::fs::write(&tmp, json).with_context(|| format!("write {}", tmp.display()))?;
+    pf_paths::write_secret_file(&tmp, json.as_bytes())
+        .with_context(|| format!("write {}", tmp.display()))?;
     std::fs::rename(&tmp, custom_path()).context("rename library.json")?;
     Ok(())
 }

crates/punktfunk-host/src/library/gog.rs

@@ -67,8 +67,29 @@ fn gog_games() -> Vec<GameEntry> {
     out
 }
 
+/// Join a manifest-supplied relative path onto `install`, rejecting anything that could escape (or
+/// replace) it: a drive prefix (`C:`), a root (`\`), or a `..` component — any of which `Path::join`
+/// lets REPLACE or climb out of `install` on Windows. Keeps a crafted `goggame-*.info` from pointing
+/// the play task's exe or working dir at an arbitrary program (security-review 2026-07-17). `None`
+/// ⇒ the path is out of bounds and the caller refuses it.
+#[cfg(windows)]
+fn confined_join(install: &str, rel: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    use std::path::Component;
+    let rp = Path::new(rel);
+    if rp.components().any(|c| {
+        matches!(
+            c,
+            Component::Prefix(_) | Component::RootDir | Component::ParentDir
+        )
+    }) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(Path::new(install).join(rp))
+}
+
 /// The primary play task from `<install>\goggame-<id>.info`: `(absolute exe, args, working dir)`.
-/// Prefers `isPrimary` + `FileTask`, else the first `FileTask`. Paths are resolved against `install`.
+/// Prefers `isPrimary` + `FileTask`, else the first `FileTask`. Paths are resolved against `install`
+/// and confined to it ([`confined_join`]).
 #[cfg(windows)]
 fn gog_play_task(install: &str, id: &str) -> Option<(String, String, String)> {
     let text =
@@ -87,7 +108,8 @@ fn gog_play_task(install: &str, id: &str) -> Option<(String, String, String)> {
         })
         .or_else(|| tasks.iter().find(|t| is_file(t)))?;
     let rel = pick.get("path").and_then(|s| s.as_str())?;
-    let exe = Path::new(install).join(rel);
+    // Refuse the launch outright if the manifest's exe path escapes the install dir.
+    let exe = confined_join(install, rel)?;
     let args = pick
         .get("arguments")
         .and_then(|s| s.as_str())
@@ -96,7 +118,8 @@ fn gog_play_task(install: &str, id: &str) -> Option<(String, String, String)> {
     let workdir = pick
         .get("workingDir")
         .and_then(|s| s.as_str())
-        .map(|w| Path::new(install).join(w))
+        // A working dir that escapes falls back to the install root (safe) rather than failing.
+        .and_then(|w| confined_join(install, w))
         .unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new(install).to_path_buf());
     Some((
         exe.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),

crates/punktfunk-host/src/library/lutris.rs

@@ -102,6 +102,19 @@ fn lutris_art(slug: &str) -> Artwork {
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
 fn lutris_image(kind: &str, slug: &str) -> Option<String> {
     use base64::Engine as _;
+    // `slug` comes verbatim from Lutris's `pga.db` (untrusted at this layer). Reject any path
+    // separator, parent ref, or NUL so a crafted slug can't escape the art roots and read an
+    // arbitrary `<slug>.jpg` off disk — the bytes are base64-inlined into the `/api/v1/library`
+    // JSON a paired client can GET, so an escape is an arbitrary-file-read exfil primitive
+    // (security-review 2026-07-17). Real Lutris slugs are `[a-z0-9-]`.
+    if slug.is_empty()
+        || slug.contains('/')
+        || slug.contains('\\')
+        || slug.contains("..")
+        || slug.contains('\0')
+    {
+        return None;
+    }
     let home = std::env::var_os("HOME").map(PathBuf::from)?;
     let roots = [
         home.join(".local/share/lutris"),

crates/punktfunk-host/src/library/xbox.rs

@@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ fn xbox_games() -> Vec<GameEntry> {
             if !cfg.is_file() {
                 continue;
             }
+            // Cap the read like the other untrusted on-disk manifests (Epic `read_capped`, Lutris
+            // art) — a planted multi-GB MicrosoftGame.config under `<drive>:\XboxGames\…\Content\`
+            // must not OOM the privileged host during enumeration (security-review 2026-07-17). A
+            // real GDK manifest is a few KB.
+            match cfg.metadata() {
+                Ok(m) if m.len() <= 1024 * 1024 => {}
+                _ => continue,
+            }
             let Ok(text) = std::fs::read_to_string(&cfg) else {
                 continue;
             };

crates/punktfunk-host/src/mgmt/auth.rs

@@ -105,8 +105,11 @@ pub(crate) fn cert_may_access(method: &Method, path: &str) -> bool {
             "/api/v1/host"
                 | "/api/v1/compositors"
                 | "/api/v1/status"
-                | "/api/v1/clients"
+                // The paired-client ROSTERS (`/clients`, `/native/clients`) are deliberately NOT on
-                | "/api/v1/native/clients"
+                // this lane — they expose every OTHER paired device's name + fingerprint, which one
+                // paired streaming client must not be able to enumerate. Only the bearer/loopback
+                // console needs them, and no first-party client calls them (security-review 2026-07-17).
+                //
                 // The native clients browse the game library with their cert (no bearer token); the
                 // library MUTATIONS (POST/PUT/DELETE /library/custom) stay token-only via the exact
                 // GET-path match above.

crates/punktfunk-host/src/mgmt/clients.rs

@@ -47,7 +47,12 @@ pub(crate) struct SubmitPin {
 pub(crate) async fn list_paired_clients(
     State(st): State<Arc<MgmtState>>,
 ) -> Json<Vec<PairedClient>> {
-    let ders = st.app.paired.lock().unwrap().clone();
+    let ders = st
+        .app
+        .paired
+        .lock()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
+        .clone();
     Json(ders.iter().map(|der| client_info(der)).collect())
 }
 
@@ -101,7 +106,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn unpair_client(
             "fingerprint must be the 64-char hex SHA-256 of the client certificate DER",
         );
     }
-    let mut paired = st.app.paired.lock().unwrap();
+    let mut paired = st.app.paired.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
     let before = paired.len();
     paired.retain(|der| !hex::encode(Sha256::digest(der)).eq_ignore_ascii_case(&fingerprint));
     if paired.len() < before {

crates/punktfunk-host/src/mgmt/host.rs

@@ -306,8 +306,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn list_compositors() -> Json<Vec<AvailableCompositor>> {
 )]
 pub(crate) async fn get_status(State(st): State<Arc<MgmtState>>) -> Json<RuntimeStatus> {
     // GameStream plane (set by RTSP/nvhttp on the compat path).
-    let gs_launch = *st.app.launch.lock().unwrap();
+    let gs_launch = *st.app.launch.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
-    let gs_stream = *st.app.stream.lock().unwrap();
+    let gs_stream = *st.app.stream.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
     let gs_video = st.app.streaming.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
     let gs_audio = st.app.audio_streaming.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
     // Native punktfunk/1 plane (published by the native video loop; the default plane). See
@@ -362,7 +362,12 @@ pub(crate) async fn get_status(State(st): State<Arc<MgmtState>>) -> Json<Runtime
         video_streaming: gs_video || !native.is_empty(),
         audio_streaming: gs_audio || !native.is_empty(),
         pin_pending: st.app.pairing.pin.awaiting_pin(),
-        paired_clients: st.app.paired.lock().unwrap().len() as u32,
+        paired_clients: st
+            .app
+            .paired
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
+            .len() as u32,
         active_sessions: native.len() as u32 + u32::from(gs_video),
         session,
         stream,
@@ -417,7 +422,12 @@ pub(crate) async fn get_local_summary(State(st): State<Arc<MgmtState>>) -> Json<
         video_streaming: st.app.streaming.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
         audio_streaming: st.app.audio_streaming.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
         session,
-        paired_clients: st.app.paired.lock().unwrap().len() as u32,
+        paired_clients: st
+            .app
+            .paired
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
+            .len() as u32,
         native_paired_clients,
         pin_pending: st.app.pairing.pin.awaiting_pin(),
         pending_approvals,

crates/punktfunk-host/src/mgmt/session.rs

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
 pub(crate) async fn stop_session(State(st): State<Arc<MgmtState>>) -> StatusCode {
     let was_streaming = st.app.streaming.swap(false, Ordering::SeqCst);
     st.app.audio_streaming.store(false, Ordering::SeqCst);
-    *st.app.launch.lock().unwrap() = None;
+    *st.app.launch.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) = None;
-    *st.app.stream.lock().unwrap() = None;
+    *st.app.stream.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) = None;
     // Native plane: the GameStream flags above don't reach it (it runs its own loops off the shared
     // session registry), so signal every live native session to tear down too.
     let native = crate::session_status::count();

crates/punktfunk-host/src/mgmt/tests.rs

@@ -121,8 +121,6 @@ async fn cert_auth_is_a_read_only_allowlist() {
         "/api/v1/host",
         "/api/v1/status",
         "/api/v1/compositors",
-        "/api/v1/clients",
-        "/api/v1/native/clients",
         "/api/v1/library",
     ] {
         assert_ne!(
@@ -131,6 +129,15 @@ async fn cert_auth_is_a_read_only_allowlist() {
             "a paired streaming cert should authorize GET {p}"
         );
     }
+    // The paired-client ROSTERS are token-only: one paired cert must NOT be able to enumerate every
+    // other paired device's name + fingerprint (security-review 2026-07-17).
+    for p in ["/api/v1/clients", "/api/v1/native/clients"] {
+        assert_eq!(
+            send_cert(&app, get_req(p), fp).await,
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            "the client roster {p} must require the bearer token, not just a paired cert"
+        );
+    }
     // PIN-exposing GET + state-changing routes → token-only (cert rejected without a bearer).
     assert_eq!(
         send_cert(&app, get_req("/api/v1/native/pair"), fp).await,

crates/punktfunk-host/src/native_pairing.rs

@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ pub use approval::{PairingDecision, PendingRequest};
 pub use arming::PinAttempt;
 pub use store::PairedClient;
 
+/// Re-exported for the stream marker's quoting (its `imp` is `cfg(unix)` — gate alike, or the
+/// Windows build trips `-D unused-imports`).
+#[cfg(unix)]
+pub(crate) use sanitize::is_spoofy_char;
 /// The untrusted-device-name sanitizer lives in its own module (plan §W5); re-exported so
 /// `crate::native_pairing::sanitize_device_name` stays stable (the `native` accept loop
 /// reaches it there).

crates/punktfunk-host/src/native_pairing/sanitize.rs

@@ -13,16 +13,7 @@ pub(crate) fn sanitize_device_name(name: &str, fp_hex: &str) -> String {
     let cleaned: String = name
         .chars()
         .map(|c| if c == '\t' || c == '\n' { ' ' } else { c })
-        .filter(|&c| {
+        .filter(|&c| !c.is_control() && !is_spoofy_char(c))
-            !c.is_control()
-                // Bidi/format controls that could spoof or reorder the displayed name.
-                && !('\u{202A}'..='\u{202E}').contains(&c) // LRE..RLO/PDF
-                && !('\u{2066}'..='\u{2069}').contains(&c) // LRI..PDI
-                && c != '\u{200E}' // LRM
-                && c != '\u{200F}' // RLM
-                && c != '\u{061C}' // ALM
-                && c != '\u{FEFF}' // BOM / zero-width no-break space
-        })
         .collect();
     // Collapse internal whitespace runs, trim, cap at the wire limit.
     let collapsed = cleaned.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>().join(" ");
@@ -42,6 +33,19 @@ pub(crate) fn sanitize_device_name(name: &str, fp_hex: &str) -> String {
     }
 }
 
+/// A Unicode bidi/format control that could spoof or reorder a displayed name (an `RLO` making a
+/// hostile device read like a trusted one). The canonical set — shared by every place that scrubs an
+/// untrusted client name before display/storage (device names here, the stream marker) so the set
+/// can't drift. Does NOT include C0/C1 controls; callers combine this with `char::is_control`.
+pub(crate) fn is_spoofy_char(c: char) -> bool {
+    ('\u{202A}'..='\u{202E}').contains(&c) // LRE..RLO/PDF
+        || ('\u{2066}'..='\u{2069}').contains(&c) // LRI..PDI
+        || c == '\u{200E}' // LRM
+        || c == '\u{200F}' // RLM
+        || c == '\u{061C}' // ALM
+        || c == '\u{FEFF}' // BOM / zero-width no-break space
+}
+
 /// Max stored device-name length (matches the `Hello` wire cap, `quic::HELLO_NAME_MAX`).
 const NAME_MAX: usize = 64;
 

crates/punktfunk-host/src/stream_marker.rs

@@ -157,11 +157,12 @@ mod imp {
     }
 
     /// Make a client name safe to place inside single quotes in a sourceable file: drop the single
-    /// quote itself and any control characters (newlines especially), and cap the length so a hostile
+    /// quote itself, any control characters (newlines especially), and any bidi/format control that
-    /// or absurd name can't bloat the file. Empty stays empty.
+    /// could spoof the displayed name (the shared [`crate::native_pairing::is_spoofy_char`] set), and
+    /// cap the length so a hostile or absurd name can't bloat the file. Empty stays empty.
     fn sanitize(name: &str) -> String {
         name.chars()
-            .filter(|c| *c != '\'' && !c.is_control())
+            .filter(|c| *c != '\'' && !c.is_control() && !crate::native_pairing::is_spoofy_char(*c))
             .take(96)
             .collect()
     }

crates/punktfunk-host/src/windows/install.rs

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ fn uninstall_gamepad() -> Result<()> {
     // Devnodes first (incl. phantoms — the same ghost-device complaint the vdisplay uninstall
     // fixed), then the store packages.
     remove_pad_devnodes();
-    delete_store_drivers(&["pf_dualsense", "pf_dualshock4", "pf_xusb"]);
+    delete_store_drivers(&["pf_dualsense", "pf_dualshock4", "pf_xusb", "pf_mouse"]);
     Ok(())
 }
 

crates/punktfunk-host/src/windows/service.rs

@@ -979,7 +979,14 @@ fn set_fw_public_marker(allow_public: bool) {
 /// `Get-NetConnectionProfile` (per-interface category: Public / Private / DomainAuthenticated).
 /// `None` when it can't be determined — the caller then skips the warning.
 fn active_network_is_public() -> Option<bool> {
-    let out = std::process::Command::new("powershell")
+    // Resolve powershell by full System32 path — this runs in the SYSTEM service, which must not trust
+    // PATH / the CreateProcess search (it checks the launching EXE's OWN directory first, so a planted
+    // `powershell.exe` next to the host binary would run as SYSTEM). Matches the pf_vdisplay resolver
+    // and the "a privileged service must not trust PATH" rule (security-review 2026-07-17).
+    let ps = std::env::var("SystemRoot")
+        .map(|r| format!(r"{r}\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "powershell.exe".to_string());
+    let out = std::process::Command::new(&ps)
         .args([
             "-NoProfile",
             "-NonInteractive",

packaging/windows/drivers/pf-vdisplay/src/log.rs

@@ -29,10 +29,13 @@ fn file_appender() -> Option<&'static std::sync::Mutex<std::fs::File>> {
             if !file_log_enabled() {
                 return None;
             }
+            // WUDFHost's own (LocalService) temp dir — NOT world-writable/readable `C:\Users\Public`,
+            // where a non-admin could pre-create/hold the file or read the diagnostics
+            // (security-review 2026-07-17). Opt-in/debug only.
             std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
                 .create(true)
                 .append(true)
-                .open("C:\\Users\\Public\\pfvd-driver.log")
+                .open(std::env::temp_dir().join("pfvd-driver.log"))
                 .ok()
                 .map(std::sync::Mutex::new)
         })