feat(host): Apollo-backlog hardening — cert gate, NVENC RFI, media QoS, async injector
A pass over the apollo-comparison backlog (re-verified against current code). Lands four items end-to-end plus a Windows-DualSense scoping doc. - #5/#92/#26 — GameStream paired-cert allow-list. tls.rs surfaces the verified peer cert to handlers (serve_https + PeerCertFingerprint, now shared with the mgmt API instead of duplicated); nvhttp gates /launch /resume /applist /cancel on AppState.paired and reports a real PairStatus; save_paired writes atomically (temp+rename). Closes the "mTLS accepts any client cert" hole. + regression test. - #6/#51/#19/#22 — NVENC caps query -> reference-frame invalidation. nvenc.rs query_caps probes nvEncGetEncodeCaps (max dims / 10-bit / custom-VBV / RFI), rejecting over-range modes and degrading 10-bit->8-bit instead of an opaque InvalidParam. New Encoder::invalidate_ref_frames (default false -> caller keyframes); the Windows NVENC path implements real RFI (multi-ref DPB + nvEncInvalidateRefFrames, dedup + IDR-on-overflow). control.rs decodes the 0x0301 lost-frame range (Apollo's IDX_INVALIDATE_REF_FRAMES) -> AppState.rfi_range -> encode loop, falling back to a keyframe. NOTE: the Windows NVENC impl is RTX-box/CI-pending (can't compile on Linux); adversarially reviewed vs the SDK. - #43/#72 — media socket QoS + buffer growth. New punktfunk_core::transport::qos: grow_socket_buffers (factored out the native plane's 32MB SO_SNDBUF growth so the GameStream sockets reuse it) + set_media_qos (opt-in PUNKTFUNK_DSCP=1: DSCP CS5 video / CS6 audio + Linux SO_PRIORITY, Apollo's scheme). Wired into UdpTransport and the GameStream video/audio sockets. Windows IP_TOS needs qWAVE (follow-up). - #8/#45 — GameStream input injection off the ENet service thread. on_receive no longer injects inline (a slow inject head-blocked ENet keepalive/retransmit); it forwards to a dedicated injector thread. The hardened InjectorService moved from punktfunk1 into crate::inject (shared by both planes) + a coalesce step that sums adjacent relative-mouse/scroll deltas while preserving button/key/abs ordering. Docs: re-verified apollo-comparison.md status (22 items already done/obsolete since the snapshot) + windows-dualsense-scoping.md (ViGEm can't emulate a DualSense; real DS5 on Windows needs a VHF virtual-HID driver — web-research pass pending). fmt + clippy -D warnings clean; full workspace test suite green; no C-ABI/OpenAPI drift. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::encode::Codec;
|
||||
use crate::gamestream::{
|
||||
tls::{serve_https, PeerCertFingerprint},
|
||||
AppState, APP_VERSION, AUDIO_PORT, CONTROL_PORT, GFE_VERSION, RTSP_PORT, VIDEO_PORT,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
|
||||
@@ -103,66 +104,6 @@ pub async fn run(
|
||||
serve_https(opts.bind, app, tls).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SHA-256 of the peer's client certificate (hex), injected per-connection into each request's
|
||||
/// extensions by [`serve_https`]; `None` when the peer presented no client cert. `require_auth`
|
||||
/// authorizes a request whose fingerprint is in the paired store.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone)]
|
||||
struct PeerCertFingerprint(Option<String>);
|
||||
|
||||
/// HTTPS server for the mgmt API. axum-server can't surface the client cert to a handler, so this
|
||||
/// runs the rustls handshake itself (via tokio-rustls), reads the verified peer certificate, and
|
||||
/// serves the axum `Router` over hyper with the peer's fingerprint attached to every request.
|
||||
async fn serve_https(bind: SocketAddr, app: Router, tls: Arc<rustls::ServerConfig>) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
use tower::ServiceExt;
|
||||
let acceptor = tokio_rustls::TlsAcceptor::from(tls);
|
||||
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(bind)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.with_context(|| format!("bind management API {bind}"))?;
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let (tcp, _peer) = match listener.accept().await {
|
||||
Ok(v) => v,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "management API accept failed");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
let acceptor = acceptor.clone();
|
||||
let app = app.clone();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let tls_stream = match acceptor.accept(tcp).await {
|
||||
Ok(s) => s,
|
||||
// A failed handshake is routine (port scan, a browser bailing on the self-signed
|
||||
// cert, a client cert we'd still accept but the peer hung up) — not fatal.
|
||||
Err(_) => return,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// The verified peer cert (the verifier accepts any well-formed one; we authorize by
|
||||
// fingerprint in the auth layer) → its SHA-256, matched against the paired store.
|
||||
let fp = tls_stream
|
||||
.get_ref()
|
||||
.1
|
||||
.peer_certificates()
|
||||
.and_then(|c| c.first())
|
||||
.map(|c| hex::encode(punktfunk_core::quic::endpoint::cert_fingerprint(c.as_ref())));
|
||||
let peer = PeerCertFingerprint(fp);
|
||||
let svc =
|
||||
hyper::service::service_fn(move |req: hyper::Request<hyper::body::Incoming>| {
|
||||
let app = app.clone();
|
||||
let peer = peer.clone();
|
||||
async move {
|
||||
let mut req = req.map(axum::body::Body::new);
|
||||
req.extensions_mut().insert(peer);
|
||||
app.oneshot(req).await // Router error is Infallible
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
let io = hyper_util::rt::TokioIo::new(tls_stream);
|
||||
let _ =
|
||||
hyper_util::server::conn::auto::Builder::new(hyper_util::rt::TokioExecutor::new())
|
||||
.serve_connection_with_upgrades(io, svc)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compose the full management router (also used directly by the handler tests).
|
||||
fn app(
|
||||
state: Arc<AppState>,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user