diff --git a/crates/punktfunk-host/src/inject/windows/gamepad_raii.rs b/crates/punktfunk-host/src/inject/windows/gamepad_raii.rs
index d41f76e1..ef6280e8 100644
--- a/crates/punktfunk-host/src/inject/windows/gamepad_raii.rs
+++ b/crates/punktfunk-host/src/inject/windows/gamepad_raii.rs
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ use windows::Win32::Devices::DeviceAndDriverInstallation::{
 };
 use windows::Win32::Devices::Enumeration::Pnp::{SwDeviceClose, HSWDEVICE};
 use windows::Win32::Foundation::{
-    DuplicateHandle, GetLastError, SetLastError, DUPLICATE_HANDLE_OPTIONS, ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS,
-    HANDLE, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, WIN32_ERROR,
+    DuplicateHandle, GetLastError, LocalFree, SetLastError, DUPLICATE_HANDLE_OPTIONS,
+    ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS, HANDLE, HLOCAL, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, WIN32_ERROR,
 };
 use windows::Win32::Security::Authorization::{
     ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW, SDDL_REVISION_1,
@@ -66,11 +66,37 @@ pub(super) struct Shm {
     view: MEMORY_MAPPED_VIEW_ADDRESS,
 }
 
-/// Build a `SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES` from an SDDL literal (`psd` is OS-allocated and leaked — acceptable
-/// for the handful of pad channels a host creates; it must outlive the returned `SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES`).
-fn sddl_sa(sddl: PCWSTR) -> Result<SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES> {
+/// Owns an SDDL-derived `SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES` **and** the OS-allocated security descriptor its
+/// `lpSecurityDescriptor` points at (`ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW`
+/// `LocalAlloc`s the descriptor). Drop `LocalFree`s it, so a `SecAttr` must outlive every
+/// `CreateFileMappingW` that borrows its `sa`: the section copies the security info at create time, so
+/// freeing after the create returns is safe — hence [`Shm::create_named`] builds one `SecAttr` before
+/// its squat-retry loop and reuses it across attempts instead of re-allocating (and re-leaking) per
+/// attempt.
+struct SecAttr {
+    sa: SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES,
+    psd: PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR,
+}
+
+impl Drop for SecAttr {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        // SAFETY: `psd` is the descriptor `ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW`
+        // allocated for us with `LocalAlloc`; release it with the matching `LocalFree`. Every
+        // `CreateFileMappingW` that borrowed `self.sa` has already returned (so has copied the
+        // security info into its section object), so no live `SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES` still points here.
+        unsafe {
+            let _ = LocalFree(Some(HLOCAL(self.psd.0)));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Build a [`SecAttr`] from an SDDL literal — a `SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES` plus the descriptor it borrows,
+/// freed together on drop. The returned owner must outlive every `CreateFileMappingW` that borrows
+/// its `sa` (see [`SecAttr`]).
+fn sddl_sa(sddl: PCWSTR) -> Result<SecAttr> {
     let mut psd = PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR::default();
-    // SAFETY: the SDDL literal is valid; `psd` receives an OS-allocated descriptor (leaked — see above).
+    // SAFETY: the SDDL literal is valid; `psd` receives a `LocalAlloc`'d descriptor that `SecAttr`'s
+    // `Drop` `LocalFree`s once the section create that borrows it has returned.
     unsafe {
         ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(
             sddl,
@@ -79,10 +105,13 @@ fn sddl_sa(sddl: PCWSTR) -> Result<SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES> {
             None,
         )?;
     }
-    Ok(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES {
-        nLength: core::mem::size_of::<SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES>() as u32,
-        lpSecurityDescriptor: psd.0,
-        bInheritHandle: false.into(),
+    Ok(SecAttr {
+        sa: SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES {
+            nLength: core::mem::size_of::<SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES>() as u32,
+            lpSecurityDescriptor: psd.0,
+            bInheritHandle: false.into(),
+        },
+        psd,
     })
 }
 
@@ -94,7 +123,9 @@ impl Shm {
     /// validated on-glass — `design/idd-push-security.md`).
     pub(super) fn create_unnamed(size: usize) -> Result<Shm> {
         let sa = sddl_sa(w!("D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)"))?;
-        Self::create_inner(&sa, PCWSTR::null(), size).context("create unnamed gamepad DATA section")
+        // `sa` owns the descriptor and lives to the end of this fn, so it outlives the create.
+        Self::create_inner(&sa.sa, PCWSTR::null(), size)
+            .context("create unnamed gamepad DATA section")
     }
 
     /// Create + zero a **named** `size`-byte section, mapped read/write — the bootstrap mailbox. SDDL
@@ -107,6 +138,8 @@ impl Shm {
     /// poll tick), then fail loudly rather than run the handshake through an attacker-owned (or
     /// another host instance's) mailbox.
     pub(super) fn create_named(name: &HSTRING, size: usize) -> Result<Shm> {
+        // Build the descriptor ONCE and reuse it across the squat-retry loop — it (and the OS
+        // allocation it owns) lives to the end of this fn, so it outlives every create below.
         let sa = sddl_sa(w!("D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;LS)"))?;
         for attempt in 0..5 {
             if attempt > 0 {
@@ -114,7 +147,7 @@ impl Shm {
             }
             // SAFETY: clearing the thread error slot so ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS below is unambiguous.
             unsafe { SetLastError(WIN32_ERROR(0)) };
-            let shm = Self::create_inner(&sa, PCWSTR(name.as_ptr()), size)
+            let shm = Self::create_inner(&sa.sa, PCWSTR(name.as_ptr()), size)
                 .with_context(|| format!("create gamepad bootstrap mailbox {name}"))?;
             // SAFETY: read immediately after the create; windows-rs only touches the error slot on
             // failure, so a success here preserves CreateFileMappingW's ALREADY_EXISTS signal.
@@ -132,7 +165,8 @@ impl Shm {
 
     fn create_inner(sa: &SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES, name: PCWSTR, size: usize) -> Result<Shm> {
         // SAFETY: an anonymous (pagefile-backed) section of `size` bytes with the caller's SDDL; the
-        // descriptor behind `sa` outlives this call (leaked by `sddl_sa`).
+        // descriptor behind `sa` outlives this call (owned by the caller's `SecAttr`, freed only once
+        // every create that borrows it has returned).
         let map = unsafe {
             CreateFileMappingW(
                 INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE,