feat(rpm): wire per-package GPG signing (dormant until a key secret is set)
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The audit's signing recommendation, scoped to RPM (apt's signed Release metadata already
covers .debs; bootc cosign deferred). packaging/rpm/sign-rpms.sh GPG-signs dist/*.rpm and
self-verifies (rpmkeys --checksig), run from rpm.yml between build + publish.

Safe to ship: the step is a NO-OP (exit 0, unsigned as today) until RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY is
set as a CI secret — so it can't break current CI, and when enabled a bad macro fails loudly
via the in-step checksig rather than shipping bad signatures. rpm/README gains the one-time
enablement runbook (generate a dedicated passphrase-less key, add the secret, publish the
public key, flip gpgcheck=1 only after a signed build lands) and notes step-ca is for TLS,
not OpenPGP (it can't sign RPMs).

Also fixes the rpm/README version staleness the doc review caught: rolling is 0.2.0-0.ciN
(outranks the stray 0.1.1, no pin needed), host releases use host-v* not the client's v*.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-15 10:46:27 +00:00
parent 9e015304ee
commit 1fd4c97139
3 changed files with 90 additions and 3 deletions
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@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
`punktfunk-host` is published as an RPM to **Gitea's RPM package registry** in the public `unom`
org (group `bazzite`), so Bazzite / Fedora Atomic hosts layer and update it with `rpm-ostree`.
CI (`.gitea/workflows/rpm.yml`) builds and publishes on every push to `main` (a rolling
`0.0.1-0.ciN.<sha>` build) and on `v*` tags (a clean `X.Y.Z-1`). The RPM is built in the
`0.2.0-0.ciN.<sha>` build, which outranks the stray `0.1.1` so `rpm-ostree upgrade` always gets the
latest — no version pin needed) and on **host-scoped** `host-v*` tags (a clean `X.Y.Z-1`; the Apple
client's `v*` tags deliberately do **not** publish a host RPM). The RPM is built in the
Fedora 43 image (`ci/fedora-rpm.Dockerfile`) so its auto-generated library Requires
(`libavcodec.so.NN`, …) match Bazzite's sonames; the NVIDIA driver lib (`libcuda.so.1`) is
excluded — NVENC/EGL come from whatever NVIDIA stack the host runs (a weak Recommends).
@@ -37,8 +39,42 @@ systemctl reboot
```
> If `rpm-ostree` can't complete the metadata GPG check non-interactively, set `repo_gpgcheck=0`
> (TLS-only trust to the self-hosted registry). Proper per-package signing (`gpgcheck=1`) would
> need a CI signing key + `rpm --addsign` — future hardening, not wired up.
> (TLS-only trust to the self-hosted registry).
## Enabling per-package signing (`gpgcheck=1`)
CI is wired to GPG-sign each RPM (`packaging/rpm/sign-rpms.sh`, run from `rpm.yml`), but it's
**dormant** until you provide a signing key — until then packages publish unsigned and the repo
above uses `gpgcheck=0`. This is a self-hosted registry served over HTTPS with GPG-signed metadata
(`repo_gpgcheck=1`), so per-package signing is hardening, not a correctness fix. (Note: this is a
GPG/OpenPGP key — a `step-ca`/X.509 cert can't sign RPMs; step-ca is for the registry/console TLS.)
One-time setup:
```sh
# 1. Generate a DEDICATED, passphrase-less signing key (separate from the Gitea registry key).
gpg --batch --gen-key <<EOF
%no-protection
Key-Type: eddsa
Key-Curve: ed25519
Name-Real: punktfunk packages
Name-Email: packages@unom.io
Expire-Date: 0
%commit
EOF
gpg --armor --export-secret-keys packages@unom.io # -> paste into the CI secret below
gpg --armor --export packages@unom.io > RPM-GPG-KEY-punktfunk # the PUBLIC key
# 2. In the repo's Gitea Actions secrets, add RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY = the armored PRIVATE key
# (and RPM_GPG_PASSPHRASE only if the key has one). The next CI run signs + self-verifies.
# 3. Publish RPM-GPG-KEY-punktfunk where clients can fetch it, then on each host import it and
# flip the repo to gpgcheck=1:
sudo rpm --import https://git.unom.io/.../RPM-GPG-KEY-punktfunk
sudo sed -i 's/^gpgcheck=0/gpgcheck=1/' /etc/yum.repos.d/punktfunk.repo
```
Do **not** flip `gpgcheck=1` before a signed build has published, or installs will fail.
After reboot, as the desktop user:
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Detached-GPG-sign the built dist/*.rpm so the Gitea RPM registry can be served with gpgcheck=1.
#
# DORMANT by default: if RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY is unset this exits 0 and leaves the RPMs unsigned —
# exactly today's behaviour — so it is SAFE to ship before a key exists. The signing only activates
# once you add the key as a CI secret (see packaging/rpm/README.md "Enabling per-package signing").
#
# Recommended: a DEDICATED, PASSPHRASE-LESS signing key (simplest in CI), distinct from the Gitea
# instance's repo-metadata key. If your key has a passphrase, set RPM_GPG_PASSPHRASE too.
#
# Usage (in rpm.yml, after build-rpm.sh): RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY=... [RPM_GPG_PASSPHRASE=...] bash packaging/rpm/sign-rpms.sh
set -euo pipefail
if [ -z "${RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY:-}" ]; then
echo "RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY unset — leaving dist/*.rpm UNSIGNED (registry stays gpgcheck=0)."
exit 0
fi
command -v rpmsign >/dev/null 2>&1 || dnf -y install rpm-sign >/dev/null
GNUPGHOME="$(mktemp -d)"; export GNUPGHOME; chmod 700 "$GNUPGHOME"
trap 'rm -rf "$GNUPGHOME"' EXIT
echo "allow-loopback-pinentry" > "$GNUPGHOME/gpg-agent.conf"
printf '%s' "$RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY" | gpg --batch --import
KEYID="$(gpg --list-secret-keys --with-colons | awk -F: '/^sec:/{print $5; exit}')"
[ -n "$KEYID" ] || { echo "no secret key imported from RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY" >&2; exit 1; }
# rpm v4 detached-signing macro. Force loopback pinentry (no TTY in CI); feed the passphrase, if
# any, on stdin via --passphrase-fd 0.
SIGN_CMD="%{__gpg} gpg --batch --no-verbose --no-armor --pinentry-mode loopback"
[ -n "${RPM_GPG_PASSPHRASE:-}" ] && SIGN_CMD="$SIGN_CMD --passphrase-fd 0"
SIGN_CMD="$SIGN_CMD -u %{_gpg_name} --digest-algo sha256 -sbo %{__signature_filename} %{__plaintext_filename}"
for rpm in dist/*.rpm; do
printf '%s' "${RPM_GPG_PASSPHRASE:-}" | rpmsign \
--define "_gpg_name $KEYID" \
--define "__gpg_sign_cmd $SIGN_CMD" \
--addsign "$rpm"
done
# Verify locally so a bad signature fails the build before publishing.
rpm --import <(gpg --export --armor "$KEYID")
rpmkeys --checksig dist/*.rpm
echo "signed + verified $(find dist -name '*.rpm' | wc -l) RPM(s) with key $KEYID"