feat(apple): adapt the macOS client to ABI v2 — client identity + SPAKE2 PIN pairing
ci / rust (push) Has been cancelled

The pairing/renegotiation batch bumped the punktfunk/1 ABI to v2 and the host now
hard-rejects v1 Hellos (m3.rs), so streaming from the Mac was dead until the bundled
PunktfunkCore.xcframework is rebuilt — it is gitignored, so that is a per-checkout step:
bash scripts/build-xcframework.sh. The Swift wrapper itself was already adapted upstream;
this lands the app on top of it.

- ClientIdentityStore: persistent client identity in the login Keychain, presented on
  every connect so paired hosts recognize this Mac. Keychain access failure throws
  instead of regenerating (a fresh identity would silently un-pair this Mac from every
  --require-pairing host); a lost first-run race resolves toward the stored identity;
  pairing uses the strict loadForPairing() so a memory-only identity can't strand a
  ceremony.
- PairSheet: the SPAKE2 PIN ceremony, reachable from a host card's context menu and from
  the trust prompt's "Pair with PIN instead…" (which drops the live session first — the
  host's accept loop is sequential). Success pins the verified fingerprint and connects;
  an in-flight ceremony self-discards when the sheet is dismissed, so a late success
  can't pin + auto-connect behind the user's back. Wrong PIN and Keychain failures get
  distinct, actionable error text.
- Tests: identity unit tests; the full pairing ceremony + --require-pairing gate on
  loopback (test-loopback.sh arms a second host, parses its PIN from the log, and gives
  both hosts throwaway config homes — no more writes to the real ~/.config/punktfunk);
  remote pairing + pinned stream over the LAN (PUNKTFUNK_REMOTE_PIN, _PORT).

Validated live against the box: SPAKE2 ceremony with the host's arming PIN → verified
fingerprint → pinned + identified 720p60 session (host persisted the client identity);
first light 60/60 AUs decoded to pixels; vkcube on glass through the app.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-10 21:49:36 +02:00
parent 49d31b9cad
commit 0494e0200a
11 changed files with 485 additions and 32 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
// This client's persistent punktfunk/1 identity: a self-signed certificate + key (PEM),
// generated once and stored in the login Keychain. The certificate's fingerprint is how
// hosts recognize this client after PIN pairing losing the key un-pairs this Mac from
// every host, so the pair is presented on every connect but never regenerated once
// stored. That invariant drives the error handling below: a Keychain that *refuses
// access* (locked, ACL denied) is an error, not a first run minting a replacement
// would silently shadow the durable identity and break every existing pairing.
import Foundation
import PunktfunkKit
import Security
final class ClientIdentityStore: @unchecked Sendable {
static let shared = ClientIdentityStore()
enum IdentityError: Error {
/// The Keychain refused access (locked, ACL denied, ) an identity may exist.
case keychain(OSStatus)
/// The identity lives only in memory (Keychain write failed); good enough to
/// present on a connect, not good enough to pair against.
case notPersisted
}
private let lock = NSLock()
private var cached: (identity: ClientIdentity, persisted: Bool)?
/// The identity to present when connecting, generating + persisting it on first run.
/// `persisted == false` means the Keychain write failed and it lives only in memory
/// fine for a session, see `loadForPairing()` for the strict variant. Blocking
/// (Keychain + key generation) call off the main actor.
func load() throws -> (identity: ClientIdentity, persisted: Bool) {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
if let cached { return cached }
switch copyStored() {
case .found(let identity):
let hit = (identity, true)
cached = hit
return hit
case .absent:
break // genuine first run mint below
case .corrupt:
// Our own item, undecodable: the pairings it backed are unusable either
// way, so deliberately self-heal by replacing it.
SecItemDelete(Self.query as CFDictionary)
case .denied(let status):
throw IdentityError.keychain(status)
}
let fresh = try generateIdentity()
let entry: (ClientIdentity, Bool)
switch add(fresh) {
case errSecSuccess:
entry = (fresh, true)
case errSecDuplicateItem:
// Lost a first-run race with another instance the stored identity is the
// durable one, never overwrite it.
if case .found(let identity) = copyStored() {
entry = (identity, true)
} else {
entry = (fresh, false)
}
default:
entry = (fresh, false)
}
cached = entry
return entry
}
/// Pairing variant: the host is about to durably trust this identity, so it must be
/// durable on our side too a memory-only identity would evaporate on relaunch and
/// strand the pairing.
func loadForPairing() throws -> ClientIdentity {
let (identity, persisted) = try load()
guard persisted else { throw IdentityError.notPersisted }
return identity
}
private struct Stored: Codable {
var certPEM: String
var keyPEM: String
}
private enum ReadResult {
case found(ClientIdentity)
case absent
case corrupt
case denied(OSStatus)
}
private static let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: "io.unom.punktfunk",
kSecAttrAccount as String: "client-identity",
]
private func copyStored() -> ReadResult {
var query = Self.query
query[kSecReturnData as String] = true
var out: CFTypeRef?
switch SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &out) {
case errSecSuccess:
guard let data = out as? Data,
let stored = try? JSONDecoder().decode(Stored.self, from: data)
else { return .corrupt }
return .found(ClientIdentity(certPEM: stored.certPEM, keyPEM: stored.keyPEM))
case errSecItemNotFound:
return .absent
case let status:
return .denied(status)
}
}
private func add(_ identity: ClientIdentity) -> OSStatus {
guard let data = try? JSONEncoder().encode(
Stored(certPEM: identity.certPEM, keyPEM: identity.keyPEM))
else { return errSecParam }
var add = Self.query
add[kSecValueData as String] = data
return SecItemAdd(add as CFDictionary, nil)
}
}