Files
enricobuehlerandClaude Fable 5 efb37d1826 feat: signed plugin index with validation and publish pipeline
The catalog the Punktfunk plugin store fetches. Served straight out of this
repository over Gitea's anonymous raw endpoint:

  https://git.unom.io/unom/punktfunk-plugin-index/raw/branch/main/v1/index.json
  https://git.unom.io/unom/punktfunk-plugin-index/raw/branch/main/v1/index.json.sig

Hosts verify the ed25519 signature against a compiled-in public key and only
then parse. Verified that the raw endpoint serves blobs byte-for-byte, which
the signature depends on; .gitattributes pins LF so a Windows checkout cannot
break it from the other direction.

Entries pin one exact version plus that version's registry tarball integrity
hash -- no ranges, no "latest". A plugin author publishing a new version
changes nothing for users; the new version becomes installable only when a
reviewer works the checklist and lands a new pinned entry here. That data
shape is what makes "verified on every release" enforceable rather than a
promise.

Seeded with the two first-party plugins, both integrity hashes confirmed
against the live registry:
  - @punktfunk/plugin-rom-manager 0.3.1 (linux, windows)
  - @punktfunk/plugin-playnite    0.1.1 (windows)

Tooling (bun + TypeScript, node builtins only):
  - validate: every field rule the host enforces, plus a live registry
    cross-check that the pinned version exists and its dist.integrity matches
    the pin. Strict on unknown keys, since the host silently drops entries
    that fail validation -- a `min_host` typo would otherwise ship as a
    missing version floor with no error anywhere.
  - sign / verify / keygen: ed25519 over the exact bytes of index.json.
    keygen never prints the private key; verify defaults to the host-pinned
    public key so an index can be audited with no arguments.

CI splits by trust: pull requests run validate only and hold no secrets, so a
fork PR can never reach the signing key or a token that can write to main.
Publishing from main validates, signs, self-verifies, then commits the
signature back. The loop guard is a paths-ignore filter on v1/index.json.sig,
with a [skip ci] marker as a second line of defence; ed25519 determinism means
an unchanged index re-signs to identical bytes and commits nothing at all.

CI signs after the merge, so there is a brief window where index.json is newer
than its signature. It fails closed -- hosts reject the document and keep
their last good cached catalog -- and is documented as such in the README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 20:25:16 +02:00

71 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript

#!/usr/bin/env bun
/**
* Generate an ed25519 signing keypair for the index.
*
* Prints the PUBLIC key in the exact form the host pins (`ed25519:<base64>` of
* the raw 32 bytes) and writes the PRIVATE key as a PKCS#8 PEM.
*
* The private key is NEVER printed to stdout -- it only ever reaches a file
* with 0600 permissions, so it cannot leak into a terminal scrollback, a CI
* log, or a shell history via a pipe.
*
* Usage:
* bun tools/keygen.ts [--out path/to/key.pem] [--force]
*
* Then: store the PEM contents in the INDEX_SIGNING_KEY CI secret, add the
* public key to a host key slot, and destroy every other copy of the PEM.
*/
import { generateKeyPairSync } from "node:crypto";
import { existsSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { resolve } from "node:path";
import { encodePublicKey } from "./keys.ts";
function die(message: string): never {
console.error(`error: ${message}`);
process.exit(1);
}
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
let out = "index-signing-key.pem";
let force = false;
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
const arg = args[i]!;
if (arg === "--out") {
const next = args[++i];
if (!next) die("--out needs a path");
out = next;
} else if (arg.startsWith("--out=")) {
out = arg.slice("--out=".length);
} else if (arg === "--force") {
force = true;
} else {
die(`unknown argument ${arg}`);
}
}
const outPath = resolve(out);
if (existsSync(outPath) && !force) {
die(
`${outPath} already exists. Refusing to overwrite a private key -- ` +
"move it aside first, or pass --force if you are certain it is disposable.",
);
}
const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
const pem = privateKey.export({ type: "pkcs8", format: "pem" }) as string;
// mode 0600 on create; also set explicitly in case of a pre-existing file.
writeFileSync(outPath, pem, { mode: 0o600 });
console.log(`private key -> ${outPath} (mode 0600, NOT printed, do not commit)`);
console.log("");
console.log("public key (pin this in the host):");
console.log("");
console.log(` ${encodePublicKey(publicKey)}`);
console.log("");
console.log("Next steps:");
console.log(" 1. Put the PEM contents in the INDEX_SIGNING_KEY repository secret.");
console.log(" 2. Add the public key above to a host key slot (the host pins two,");
console.log(" so you can roll to a new key before retiring the old one).");
console.log(" 3. Destroy every copy of the PEM outside the secret store.");