Files
punktfunk/crates/punktfunk-core
enricobuehler 3bb87d260e fix(audio): detect jitter before it is audible, and stop re-probing a depth the link just refused
The 0.25.0 MacBook field report — audio jitter 'at certain points' — is the
jitter policy learning exclusively from audible failures, on both of its
sides. Growth needed THREE audible underruns before deepening the ring; the
A/V sync loop re-tested a shallower ring every five quiet seconds and paid an
audible starvation event every time it was wrong, forever; and a grown target
was never re-banked — growth raises a threshold, only a re-prime deepens the
ring — so a bunching link rode the knife edge, clicking once per bunching
period with the 'grown' target sitting inert. A ten-minute simulation of the
Wi-Fi power-save pattern (25 ms gaps / 300 ms, −50 ppm skew) measured ~2000
audible events under the shipped policy.

Three mechanisms, in JitterPolicy (Linux/Windows/Android) and mirrored in the
Swift AudioRing:

- NEAR-MISS: a read served with less than one protocol frame left over is the
  same evidence as an underrun, heard by no one. It grows the target one step
  per window, BEFORE the click — waiting for the third audible underrun means
  the user heard two.
- SHRINK PROBES: every shrink is armed for five seconds; answered by an
  underrun or near-miss it is undone on the spot, and a failed sync-driven
  shrink is not retried for a doubling backoff (60 s → 8 min). A probe that
  survives resets the backoff. Continuity outranks sync, now with a memory.
- HOLLOW RE-PRIME: an underrun while the depth AVERAGE runs more than a step
  below the target re-primes immediately, spending the click it already cost
  on the whole refill instead of limping. The average, not the instant, is
  what separates a hollow ring from one late packet, and it is seeded on
  prime so a fresh ring is never spuriously hollow.

Same simulation after: 9 audible events, tail clean but for the clock-skew
re-anchor (a genuinely slow host must re-bank every few minutes; only rate
adaptation would remove that, and no client has it). Neutralising the three
constants reproduces the ~2000 — the convergence tests fail against the old
behaviour.

Verified: 203 punktfunk-core tests, 254 Swift tests (5 skipped), clippy -D
warnings on punktfunk-core --all-features, cargo fmt --all --check.
2026-08-08 11:05:53 +02:00
..

punktfunk-core

The shared protocol core — the one place where punktfunk's transport, forward error correction, and crypto live. It's linked into the host and every native client, so there's exactly one implementation of the wire format everywhere.

Written in Rust with no async on the per-frame path (native threads only). It exposes both a normal Rust API and a stable, versioned C ABI, so the Swift and Kotlin clients — and any C embedder — link the same code as the Rust ones.

What's in here

  • Transport & session (session.rs, transport/, packet.rs) — the punktfunk/1 data plane over raw UDP: packetization, reassembly (with attacker-bounded limits), pacing, and socket tuning.
  • FEC (fec/) — the wall-breaker. Two codes:
    • GF(2⁸) classic ReedSolomon with the Cauchy generator matrix — byte-identical to the nanors library Moonlight uses, so our parity is decodable by a stock Moonlight client.
    • GF(2¹⁶) Leopard-RS (SIMD, O(n log n)) — up to 65535 shards/block, which removes the ~1 Gbps FEC ceiling. punktfunk/1 negotiates this one.
  • Crypto (crypto.rs) — AES-128-GCM session encryption with per-direction nonce salts and sequence-as-AAD; SPAKE2 PIN pairing lives behind the quic feature.
  • QUIC control plane (quic.rs, client.rs, feature quic) — the Hello/Welcome/Start handshake, cert pinning/TOFU, reverse audio, and the embeddable NativeClient connector. This is the only place tokio/quinn are allowed; the feature is off by default so the core stays runtime-free.
  • C ABI (abi.rs) — the versioned surface (punktfunk_abi_version(), PunktfunkConfig carrying its own struct_size) that generates include/punktfunk_core.h via cbindgen at build time.

Build outputs

The crate builds three ways at once (crate-type = ["lib", "cdylib", "staticlib"]):

Output Used by
lib (rlib) the host, probe, and tools link it as a normal Rust crate
cdylib (.so/.dylib) the Swift / Kotlin clients via the C ABI
staticlib (.a) the C test harness and static embedding

Test

cargo test -p punktfunk-core                 # unit + proptest + loopback
cargo run  -p loss-harness                   # FEC loss-resilience sweep (no network needed)
bash crates/punktfunk-core/tests/c/run.sh    # standalone C-ABI link + round-trip proof

Design invariants (do not regress)

  • One core, linked everywhere — protocol/FEC/crypto live only here, behind the stable C ABI.
  • No async on the hot path — the per-frame pipeline is native threads only; quic (tokio/quinn) is control-plane only, feature-gated, off by default.
  • Security hardening stays intact — the reassembler bounds attacker-controlled fields before allocating; AES-GCM keeps per-direction nonce salts + seq-as-AAD; the ABI checks struct_size. Regression tests exist — keep them green.
  • punktfunk-host — the streaming host built on this core
  • Clients — the apps that link this core over the C ABI (or directly, in Rust)
  • punktfunk-planning: implementation-plan.md (internal planning repo) — why GF(2¹⁶) FEC, the latency budget, and the architecture thesis