Files
enricobuehler 5219107177 chore(unsafe): the workspace adopts the drivers' unsafe discipline
`packaging/windows/drivers/*` has run `deny(unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn)` +
`deny(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)` for a while, with `forbid(unsafe_code)`
on the modules that need no unsafe at all. The main workspace had no lint config
whatsoever, so nothing stopped a clean crate from quietly growing an `unsafe`, and
nothing distinguished the handful of genuinely-unsafe lines inside a 600-line
`unsafe fn` from the safe ones surrounding them.

Three things, all mechanical:

* `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` on the eight crates that already contain zero unsafe
  (`pf-driver-proto`, `pf-host-config`, `pf-paths`, the three clean clients, both
  tools). These were clean by accident, not by contract; now they are clean by
  contract.

* `unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "warn"` workspace-wide. `unsafe fn` states a contract
  the CALLER must uphold — it was never meant to switch off checking for the whole
  body. Measured fallout is 300 sites on Linux, and they are concentrated: six
  files carry all of them, while `punktfunk-core`, `pf-frame`, `pf-clipboard` and
  `pf-vdisplay` are already at zero. `warn` (not `deny`) so the build stays green
  while those six are worked down; it flips to `deny` once they are. This is also
  the Rust 2024 default, so it pays off the edition migration early.

* `proc::current_uid()` replaces eight `unsafe { libc::getuid() }` blocks. Each
  site had copied out the same SAFETY note verbatim, which is the tell: `getuid()`
  is parameterless, always succeeds and touches no memory, so there is no contract
  for a caller to uphold and no reason for the unsafe to be visible eight times.
  One `unsafe` behind a safe wrapper, none at the call sites.

Verified: `pf-vdisplay` builds clean on Linux (Nobara) at zero E0133; the
macOS-buildable crates build clean locally. No behaviour change.
2026-07-28 21:31:41 +02:00
..

loss-harness

A FEC loss-resilience sweep for punktfunk-core. It drives access units through the in-process loopback at increasing packet-loss rates — for both FEC schemes (GF(2⁸) and GF(2¹⁶)) — and reports how many frames survive.

It's a pure-software stand-in for tc netem: no network, no root, runs anywhere punktfunk-core builds. Use it to sanity-check the FEC before reaching for the real punktfunk/1 harness (which adds tc netem jitter/reorder on the UDP path).

cargo run -p loss-harness        # from the repo root

Part of the measurement tooling (punktfunk-planning: implementation-plan.md §10), alongside latency-probe.