Six crates were still unguarded, and all six are OURS — none vendored: pf-console-ui, pf-gpu,
punktfunk-tray, clients/windows, tools/display-disturb, wdk-probe. Two of them ship (the tray and
the Windows client), so "small" was about item count, not exposure.
Five are closed here. Only 17 of their 75 unsafe items actually lacked a proof — pf-gpu,
punktfunk-tray and display-disturb were already fully documented and needed nothing but the deny,
which is the good case: the convention was being followed, just not enforced.
The 17 that were missing are the usual Win32/COM shapes, and two were worth stating properly.
`clients/windows`'s `GetCurrentPackageFullName` is called with `len = 0` and no buffer — that is the
documented identity PROBE, which writes nothing, and reading it as a normal query would be a
mistake. `pf-console-ui`'s two `destroy_image_view` calls are the load-bearing ones: the comment
above one already argued that in-flight sampling of that slot ended two presents ago (the ring
alternates and the presenter waits its fence before each record), which is exactly the kind of
reasoning a `// SAFETY:` should carry and it was sitting there unlabelled.
Also fixes a real Windows-only clippy error this uncovered: `pf-gpu` had a
`#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]` fn AFTER its `mod tests`, tripping `items_after_test_module`. It
never fired on Linux (the item does not exist there) and no CI job clippies pf-gpu on Windows, so it
sat unseen. Moved above the test module.
Remaining: `wdk-probe` (26 items) alone, and only because it needs the WDK to build — .47 cannot,
so nothing here can verify a deny on it.
Verified: Linux .21 fmt + both CI clippy steps rc=0; Windows .47 the four Windows-relevant crates at
`-D warnings` rc=0.
`packaging/windows/drivers/*` has run `deny(unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn)` +
`deny(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)` for a while, with `forbid(unsafe_code)`
on the modules that need no unsafe at all. The main workspace had no lint config
whatsoever, so nothing stopped a clean crate from quietly growing an `unsafe`, and
nothing distinguished the handful of genuinely-unsafe lines inside a 600-line
`unsafe fn` from the safe ones surrounding them.
Three things, all mechanical:
* `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` on the eight crates that already contain zero unsafe
(`pf-driver-proto`, `pf-host-config`, `pf-paths`, the three clean clients, both
tools). These were clean by accident, not by contract; now they are clean by
contract.
* `unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "warn"` workspace-wide. `unsafe fn` states a contract
the CALLER must uphold — it was never meant to switch off checking for the whole
body. Measured fallout is 300 sites on Linux, and they are concentrated: six
files carry all of them, while `punktfunk-core`, `pf-frame`, `pf-clipboard` and
`pf-vdisplay` are already at zero. `warn` (not `deny`) so the build stays green
while those six are worked down; it flips to `deny` once they are. This is also
the Rust 2024 default, so it pays off the edition migration early.
* `proc::current_uid()` replaces eight `unsafe { libc::getuid() }` blocks. Each
site had copied out the same SAFETY note verbatim, which is the tell: `getuid()`
is parameterless, always succeeds and touches no memory, so there is no contract
for a caller to uphold and no reason for the unsafe to be visible eight times.
One `unsafe` behind a safe wrapper, none at the call sites.
Verified: `pf-vdisplay` builds clean on Linux (Nobara) at zero E0133; the
macOS-buildable crates build clean locally. No behaviour change.
Three upgrades from the on-glass rounds on .173/.221:
- `ddc-open` timing: the handle-ACQUISITION cost per monitor is reported even
when it yields no physical handles — the poller's first contact with a
virtual display, exactly what the DDC-fail-fast driver work changes; the
old code silently skipped handle-less monitors, which on a streaming host
in exclusive topology is every monitor there is.
- Monitors are labeled by GDI device name (\\.\DISPLAYn) so a virtual
display and a panel are tellable apart in the correlation log.
- `extend` mode: one SDC_TOPOLOGY_EXTEND poke — re-activates every
attachable display, i.e. the exact 'non-managed display re-activated'
event the exclusive watchdog evicts. One shot, not a loop: trigger a
reassert round, observe the recovery.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The stall-immunity bench needs both stall classes on demand, without a standby
TV or a monitor-tool storm: `ddc` replays the Twinkle-Tray/PowerDisplay-class
DDC/CI traffic (VCP reads, optional capabilities-string requests) through the
win32k I2C path; `modeset` re-commits the current mode with CDS_RESET — the
Level-Two modeset entry that idles the whole adapter with nothing Win32-visible
changing. Every op prints an epoch-stamped took_ms line so host.log stall
reports correlate line-for-line, and the op duration itself measures the
driver's service time per disturbance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
enricobuehler
