`punktfunk-sysext` checked the SHA256 of every image it downloaded, which sounds
like verification but isn't: SHA256SUMS lives on the same registry as the images
it describes, so anything able to replace an image could replace its checksum in
the same request. The checksum only ever proved the download wasn't corrupted.
Each feed now carries SHA256SUMS.asc, a detached OpenPGP signature over the
manifest, and the client verifies it before believing a line of it. The key is
packages@unom.io (AF245C506F4E4763) — the same one that already signs our RPMs,
so boxes have one key to trust and we have one key to rotate. Its public half is
baked into the script rather than fetched from the feed, because a key you fetch
from the thing you're authenticating authenticates nothing; gpg (present on
Bazzite) does the verifying against a throwaway keyring holding only that key, so
"good signature" and "signed by us" are the same statement.
Rollout: stable feeds only publish on a tag, so a `--seal` mode re-signs an
existing manifest without rebuilding an image, and every rpm.yml run seals the
OTHER channel of its Fedora major too. Canary pushes are frequent, so all live
feeds seal within a day of this landing and a key rotation propagates without
republishing anything. Until a feed is sealed the client refuses it and says so,
naming PUNKTFUNK_SYSEXT_ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1 as the informed way through.
Two things testing changed. The baked-key fingerprint check compared against an
empty string — the armor block is a single-quoted shell literal, so the extracted
range carried `FEED_KEY='` on its first line and gpg saw no armor at all; every
publish would have "mismatched" and, on a tag, failed the release. And `status`
captured fetch_manifest's stderr but only printed it on failure, swallowing the
ALLOW_UNSIGNED warning precisely when someone was running unverified.
Verified end to end on Bazzite 44 against a file:// feed with a throwaway key:
unsigned feed refused; ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1 proceeds and says so; wrong signer
rejected; tampered manifest rejected; good signature accepted; `update` exits 1
before touching anything on a bad feed. Publisher side: signs when the baked key
matches, refuses on mismatch, refuses with no key, and its signature round-trips
through the real client. shellcheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Six parallel audits swept the root docs, docs-site, every per-directory
README, and the packaging docs; every claim below was verified against
the source before editing.
- README: Layout gains the six missing crates (pf-client-core,
pf-presenter, pf-console-ui, pf-ffvk, pf-driver-proto, punktfunk-tray),
clients/session, api/ and ci/; Linux/Windows client rows reflect the
shell + Vulkan-session split and the Vulkan Video -> VAAPI/D3D11VA ->
software decode chains; the "every client over a C ABI" claim is
corrected (Rust clients link the core directly); tiered stats overlay
+ console shell noted; Apple row mentions AV1.
- CONTRIBUTING: drop the dead CLAUDE.md link (deliberately untracked);
point at the README's build/invariants sections. SECURITY: 0.9.0.
- host-cli/pairing: --allow-pairing/--require-pairing are no-op legacy
names — pairing is required by default, --allow-tofu is the real flag;
document --data-port and --idle-timeout-ms.
- configuration: document PUNKTFUNK_RECOVER_SESSION_CMD (session-crash
recovery hook), PUNKTFUNK_MDNS, PUNKTFUNK_DATA_PORT.
- virtual-displays/gnome: GNOME per-client scaling shipped (host-
persisted) — flip the ❌ to ✅ and describe how it works.
- stats: new "Detail levels" section (Off/Compact/Normal/Detailed +
per-platform cycle gestures); retire the GTK hand-off note.
- clients/install-client/status/roadmap: decode chains, Windows client
validation narrowed to HDR-only pending, adaptive bitrate, console
shell, Apple AV1, Windows host vendor list.
- Sub-READMEs: clients/linux rewritten for the re-architecture; session
Windows decode rung + d3d11va knob; Windows tiered overlay; Android
minSdk 28; decky file table; host zerocopy/ path; scripts port
47992 and steamos-host.md; pf-dualsense source path.
- packaging: canary version bases are tag-derived (<next-minor> via
pf-version.sh/.ps1), codecs-extra not ffmpeg-full, document the
pinned offline-Skia tarball + SKIA_BINARIES_URL and vulkan-headers.
- Convert 15 dangling design/*.md links to the punktfunk-planning
prose convention (those docs live in the private planning repo).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Firewall (the service.rs core landed in 796d381): scope the web-console rule
(TCP 47992) to Domain+Private by default with a `--allow-public-network` opt-in
that deletes-then-re-adds the rule, and add the installer "Allow connections on
Public networks" task (unchecked) forwarding the flag to `service install` and
`web setup`. Default is now trusted-networks-only; Public is explicit.
Vulnerability disclosure: SECURITY.md (report to security@punktfunk.com, scope,
SLAs, safe harbor), a Gitea issue-template contact link, a README security line,
and a Reporting section on the docs Security page.
Docs: the Security page now documents the Private/Domain firewall default (and
how to fix a misclassified-Public network / opt in); removed internal design-doc
and CLAUDE.md links from the user-facing docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
enricobuehlerandClaude Opus 5